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Current House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Archer, 
R-Tex., while a minority member of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, sponsored income tax cuts for capital gains in 1978 
and 1989. These tax cuts would have been brought about by index-
ing the basis of capital assets for inflation, either in conjunction 
with, or in lieu of, an exclusion of part of the gain realized upon a 
sale or exchange. Both proposals were passed by the then Demo-
cratic-controlled House, but were not passed by the Senate, and 
the proposals died in Conference. 1 Recent Senate Finance Commit-
tee Chair Bob Packwood, R-Ore., when Chair in 1986, ended the 
60% exclusion for long-term capital gains to partially pay for 
bringing the top permanent individual tax rate down from 50% to 
28%. A 28% rate was also adopted as the top individual rate for 
capital gains. 2 
The Republican administration under President Bush attempted 
unsuccessfully from 1989 through 1992 to cut the individual capital 
gains rate3 without raising the individual rate on ordinary income. 
Congress held hearings on and debated capital gains in 1989 and 
1990. Congress, with President George Bush's acquiescence, raised 
the top individual permanent rate on ordinary income to 31% in 
1990, while maintaining the 28% ceiling on capital gains! This had 
the effect of restoring a capital gains preference at that rate, but 
limited only to individuals. In 1993, Congress, at the behest of 
' See infra notes 7 and 8. 
• Kenneth J. Kies, The Current Political, Budgetary, and Tax Policy Environment Sug-
gests the Possibility of Major Federal Tax Legislation in the 100th Congress, 35 Tax Notes 
179, 184 (Apr. 13, 1987); S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 169-70 (1986), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4092 (hereinafter 1986 Legislative History). 
• Jane Gravelle, Capital Gains Tax Issues and Proposals: An Overview, 95 Tax Notes 
Today 61-26 (Mar. 29, 1995). President George Bush proposed: a top individual capital 
gains rate of 15% on selected capital assets in 1989; in 1990, a 30% exclusion on all capital 
assets, except collectibles, resulting in a top rate of 19.6%; a 30% exclusion in 1991, on 
which no action was taken; and a 45% exclusion in 1992. 
• Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11101, 104 Stat. 1388-403, 403-405 (1990). 
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Democratic President Bill Clinton, in effect added additional indi-
vidual ordinary income rates of 36% and 39.6%.C5 This substan-
tially increased the capital gains preference for individuals at the 
rates above the 28% capital gains rate, which again was not 
disturbed. 
In 1994, Republican candidates in the House campaigned on the 
platform of a "Contract with America," which called for cutting 
capital gains taxes in half.6 In the 1994 elections, Republicans 
gained control of the House for the first time since 1954, and of the 
Senate for the second time since 1954.7 House and Senate Commit-
tees held extensive hearings in January, February, and March of 
1995, on capital gains rates, indexing the basis of capital assets for 
inflation, and related topics (the "1995 Hearings").8 The Contract 
with America Tax Relief Act of 1995 ("CW ATRA"), introduced as 
H.R. 1215, passed along partisan lines in the House of Representa-
tives on April 5, 1995, as Title VI of H.R. 1327, the Tax Fairness 
and Deficit Reduction Act of 1995.9 
After sketching the CW ATRA capital gains provisions, this arti-
cle examines the arguments on capital gains cuts which emerged in 
these hearings and House floor debates, most of which had been 
aired in earlier hearings and debates. Except for the last two cate-
gories of arguments in favor of capital gains cuts discussed below, 
all of the arguments reappeared in the House Ways and Means 
• Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201, 107 Stat. 457-61 (1993). Congress also enacted a limited 
capital gains preference for certain small business stock. See infra note 50. 
• Ceci Connolly, GOP Accentuates the Positive; Hopefuls to Sign Compact, 52 Cong. Q. 
Wkly. Rep. 2711, 2712 (Sept. 24, 1994); Editorial, The G.O.P.'s Deceptive Contract, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 28, 1994, at A20; Donald Lambro, Abandoning Clinton Agenda, Atlanta J. & 
Const., Sept. 6, 1994, at A7. 
7 Dave Kaplan & Juliana Gruenwald, Longtime "Second" Party Scores a Long List of 
GOP Firsts, 52 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 3232 (Nov. 12, 1994) (control of House changes); Phil 
Duncan, Republicans' Gains Matched Their Rosy Predictions, 52 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 3240 
(Nov. 12, 1994) (control of Senate changes). 
• See Unofficial Transcript of House Ways & Means Hearing on Republican Contract 
with America (Jan. 5, 1995)(testimony of House Speaker Newt Gingrich, R-Ga.), available in 
Fed. News Serv. (hereinafter Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 5, 1995); Unofficial Transcript of 
Hearings on the Methods of Estimating the Impact of the Federal Fiscal Policies on Federal 
Revenues before the Senate Finance Comm. (Jan. 24, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes To-
day 22-58 (Feb. 2, 1995) (hereinafter Senate Finance Hearings, Jan. 24, 1995); Unofficial 
Transcript of Hearing on Middle-Income Tax Proposals before the Senate Finance Comm. 
Mar. 2, 1995, available in 1995 Tax Notes Today 49-107 (Mar. 19, 1995) (hereinafter Senate 
Finance Hearing, Mar. 2, 1995). See also infra notes 16, 33-34, 36, 42, 47, 54, 63, and 80. 
• 141 Cong. Rec. H4318-19 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (Roll No. 295). 
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Committee Report on CW ATRA. 
A principal underlying thesis of this article is that the proposed 
50% exclusion of capital gains would produce inequitable results, 
because the annual capital gains realizations enjoyed by the top 
1% of families are, on average, more than 50% real or economic 
gains. For these families, such an exclusion would lower their effec-
tive rate of Federal taxation on realized income to the level of the 
effective rates of moderate income families. The effective rate cre-
ated by the exclusion would be considerably lower than other high 
income families without capital gains, thus violating the principles 
of horizontal and vertical equity. 
Conversely, the capital gains reported by the bottom 95% of 
families are, on average, all inflationary gains; a 50% exclusion is 
therefore not generous enough for them. The proposed inflation 
adjustment would avoid these inequities, but would induce high 
income families to avoid realization to a greater degree than the 
practice under current law, thus reducing revenues. Moreover, the 
traditional interest groups supporting capital gains preferences do 
not advocate indexing, because they either have little or no basis or 
do much better than inflation. Thus, if indexing were adopted 
alone, political pressure would likely arise quickly to replace index-
ing with a 50% exclusion, which could be done after a few years 
with no revenue loss. 
There are many solutions that avoid most or all of the above 
problems, but none has sufficient support for enactment in the 
current political climate. Consequently, the current 28% ceiling on 
individual capital gains should be maintained and no further pref-
erence should be. given at the current time. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CoNTENTIONS oF CAPITAL GAINS PROPONENTS 
In the 1995 Hearings, proponents of the capital gains cuts in the 
Republican Contract with America steadfastly maintained that a 
generic capital gains cut (some added indexing) is necessary either 
to unlock frozen capital assets for investment in starting up or ex-
panding young businesses, or to reward the entrepreneur and in-
vestors for the greater risk of new ventures. They also asserted 
that most capital gains, particularly in small businesses, farms, and 
residences, are due to inflation; fairness, they concluded, therefore 
requires indexing. 
Proponents claimed that most capital gains are realized by mid-
1995] Capital Gains Contentions 5 
dle income taxpayers, some of whom are pushed into high income 
status in a single tax year by the once-in-a-lifetime realization of 
gain which has accrued over a number of years, as in the case of a 
retirement sale of a small business, farm, or residence. They also 
made the claim that studies of the distribution of benefits of a cap-
ital gain cut are misleading, since substantial economic mobility in 
the United States makes it possible for an individual classified as 
lower income to achieve higher income status in a decade. In any 
event, they contended that capital gains cuts leading to economic 
growth benefit all Americans. 
Moreover, proponents argued that a generic capital gains cut 
would pay for itself by unblocking frozen sales, by building the 
economy through greater efficiency in investments, and by supply-
ing additional investment capital through reductions in capital 
gains taxes. Proponents claimed that a reduction in capital gains 
taxation, by increasing the rate of return on savings, would in-
crease savings. Some proponents reasoned that international com-
petition made a capital gains cut necessary, since our trade com-
petitors have little or no capital gains tax or, in rare instances, 
index for inflation. A minor theme was that a capital gains prefer-
ence was necessary to offset double or greater taxation of invest-
ments, particularly in corporate equities. 
This article concludes that all of these contentions are in error, 
in whole or in part. To the extent they are meritorious as a policy 
matter, the problems they address should be remedied by provi-
sions other than those currently before Congress. 
Ill. H.R. 1215: CoNTRACT WITH AMERICA TAx REDUCTION AcT 
("CW ATRA") 
A. 50% Capital Gains Deduction 
As introduced, H.R. 9, the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement 
Act of 1995, would have allowed all taxpayers, both individual and 
corporate, a deduction equal to 50% of net capital gain for the tax-
able year. It would also have repealed the maximum rate of 28% 
for non-corporate taxpayers ("individuals") under present law.10 
•• Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Treatment of Capital 
Gains and Losses (Comm. Print 1995) (hereinafter Capital Gains and Losses 1995); see also 
Joint Comm. on Taxation, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Description of the "Contract With 
6 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 15:1 
Thus, the effective rate on the net capital gain of an individual in 
the highest rate bracket would be 19.8%, and the effective rate for 
a corporation in the 35% bracket would have been 17.5%. H.R. 
1215's Contract With America Tax Reduction Act ("CW ATRA") 
modifications would continue to provide this 50% exclusion for in-
dividuals,11 and would further provide an alternative tax of 25% on 
the net capital gain of a corporation, if that rate is less than the 
corporation's regular tax rate.12 The 50% individual exclusion 
would apply to taxable years ending after December 31, 1994.13 
CW ATRA would repeal section 1202, ·enacted by the Omnibus 
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, which provides a 50% capital 
gain exclusion (against the existing 28% maximum individual capi-
tal gains rate) for sales of certain small business stock held for at 
least five years. 14 A taxpayer holding small business stock on the 
date of enactment could elect, within one year from such date, to 
have the current section 1202 apply, rather than the CWATRA 
provision, to any gain from the sale of such stock. 111 The election 
could result in a lower rate: since the 50% exclusion after five 
years is against 28% rather than the top ordinary rate, half of such 
exclusion is a tax preference item. 
In response to criticisms raised in the hearings over including 
collectibles in the 50% exclusion, CWATRA would make col-
lectibles ineligible for the 50% net capital gain exclusion;18 how-
ever, an individual could elect to apply a maximum rate of 28% to 
the net capital gain attributable to collectibles, in which case "in-
dexing" would not apply. 17 Otherwise, the individual maximum 
America Tax Relief Act of 1995" (Comm. Print 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 48-
10 (Mar. 10, 1995) (hereinafter Description of CW ATRA). 
11 H.R. 1215 was incorporated into the Tax Fairness and Deficit Reduction Act of 1995, 
H.R. 1327, as Title VI, Contract With America Tax Relief Act of 1995. H.R. 1327, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 141 Cong. Rec. H4264 (1995) (hereinafter CWATRA). 
,. CWATRA, supra note 11, at § 6311 (amending § 120l(a)). 
18 ld. at § 6301(0(1). 
u ld. at § 6301(d)(l)(A). Section 1202 is described infra note 50. 
•• ld. at § 6301(d)(l)(B). 
18 See Unofficial Transcript of W&M 'Contract' Hearing (Jan. 10, 1995), available in 95 
Tax Notes Today 12-76 (Jan. 19, 1995) (hereinafter Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995). 
Rep. Charles Rangel, D-N.Y., in referring to the application of the H.R. 9 capital gains 
provisions to collectibles, which included baseball cards, stated that he was there to work 
with the majority to make the right corrections: "We don't want people to laugh at this 
contract." 
17 CWATRA, supra note 11, at § 6301(a) (providing for new § 1202(d)). 
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28% capital gains rate would be repealed. 
CW ATRA would reinstate the rule applied prior to the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, requiring that two dollars of an individual's long-
term capital loss offset one dollar of ordinary income.18 This resur-
rected capital loss rule would not apply to losses arising in taxable 
years beginning before January 1, 1996.19 The $3,000 limitation for 
individual taxpayers under section 121l(b) on the deduction of 
capital losses against ordinary income would continue to apply. 
The capital gains deduction would not be treated as a tax prefer-
ence item for purposes of the alternative minimum tax. (Histori-
cally, the capital gains exclusion accounted for 80% of individual 
tax preference items.)20 Moreover, unlike the 1989 provision passed 
by the House and both the 1990 and 1991 Bush proposals,21 real 
estate depreciation would not be recaptured. 22 
'" Id. at § 6301(d)(13)(A) (amending § 121l(b)(2)). 
•• Id. at § 6301(f)(3). 
•• See Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 5524 (1969) (hereinafter 1969 
House Hearings) (statement of Under Secretary of Treasury Charles Walker); Tax Reform 
(Invited Panelists): Panel Discussion on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1975) (statement of Rep. John 
Duncan, R-Tenn.,); Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 42 (1976) (statement of Secretary of the 
Treasury William Simon) (hereinafter 1976 Legislative History); 121 Cong. Rec. 38676 
(1975) (remarks of Rep. William Steiger, R-Wis.); 122 Cong. Rec. 20232 (1976) (remarks of 
Chair Russell Long, D-La.); id. at 20240 (remarks of Senator Bennett Johnston, D-La.); id. 
at 30813 (remarks of Rep. Barber Conable, R-N.Y); id. at 20239 (colloquy between Sen. 
Walter Mondale, D-Minn., and Sen. Dick Stone, D-F~a.); S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 109 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3003-04 (stating that long-term capi-
tal gains "constitutes about seven-eighths of the income in the minimum base"). 
11 Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Proposals and Issues Relating to Taxation of Capi-
tal Gains and Losses, JCS-10-90, available in 90 Tax Notes Today 67-7 (Mar. 28.-1990) 
(hereinafter Capital Gains and Losses 1990); Capital Gains and Losses 1995, supra note 10, 
at 16; see also Majority Staff of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess., Legislative History of Ways and Means Democratic Alternative 12 (Comm. Print 
1990) ("[A] provision expanding the depreciation recapture rules is adopted in order tore-
duce the opportunities for tax shelters as a result of the capital gains rate reductions."). 
11 In the past, depreciation recapture for improved real estate was limited to the excess of 
accelerated depreciation over straight line. I.R.C. § 1250. The stated rationale was that the 
longer (useful) life of real estate and, hence, the greater impact of inflation, required more 
liberal treatment than the recapture of all depreciation, as required for personal property 
under § 1245. S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1964), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 22; H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1962). Were this valid, the 
current absence of accelerated depreciation for real estate under §§ 168(b)(3)(A) and (B) 
would justify no recapture, as is the case in CWATRA. The reality behind the 1964-1986 
excess rule was, however, the political clout of the real estate lobby, especially with the 
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B. Indexing of Basis for Inflation 
CW ATRA also would provide for an inflation adjustment to (i.e., 
indexing of) the basis of certain assets ("indexed assets"), for pur-
poses of determining gain upon a sale or other disposition of such 
assets held by individuals and pass-through entities,23 but not by C 
corporations. 24 H.R. 9 had originally provided for indexing of cor-
porate held assets, which could have created a deductible loss. At 
House Ways and Means Hearings, Rep. Sander Levin, D-Mich., 
queried whether the Republican majority was serious about this 
provision;211 apparently it was not, as evidenced by the deletion of 
the provision. 
Democratic Party. Also, personal property interests (big manufacturers, etc.) went along 
with full recapture under § 1245 in 1962; in exchange, they got Bulletin F, shorter lives for 
personal property, and the investment tax credit also inapplicable to real estate. President's 
1961 Tax Recommendations: Hearings before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 2, at 995, 997 (1961) (statement of Joel Barlow., representative of 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States). Real estate (developers more than plant own-
ers) fought recapture in 1961 and got no break from Treasury on depreciation, or from 
Congress on the investment tax credit. The recaptured gain is due to ordinary depreciation 
deductions reducing basis; therefore, tax benefit principles call for ordinary gain to that 
extent for improved real estate, just as for personal property. Any 50% capital gains exclu-
sion can rest only on the notion of a second-best offset for inflation. Therefore, an acceler-
ated over straight-line recapture rule for real estate would amount to double-dipping. Real 
estate should be treated just like any other capital or§ 1231 asset. Moreover, a no-recapture 
rule opens up the use of real estate as a tax shelter, although historically such conversion 
was a less important feature of shelterF., compared to deferral and leverage. George Cooper, 
The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Income Tax Avoidance, 85 Colum. 
L. Rev. 657, 679-680 (1985); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and 
Tax Arbitrage, 38 Tax Law. 549 (1985); John P. Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost 
Recovery, 40 Tax L. Rev. 483 (1985). See Joint Comm. Staff, Overview of Tax Shelters 1 
(1975) for the classic discussion of these three elements of tax shelters. While § 469 would 
continue to stop the sheltering of salary and portfolio income by most individual, passive 
investors, sheltering is still available to real estate operators and most corporations. I.R.C. 
§§ 469(a)(2) and (c)(7). 
•• CWATRA, supra note 11, at § 6302(a) (providing new § 1022). Such basis adjustments 
would not apply for purposes of depreciation or amortization, etc. Id. at new § 1022(a)(2). 
Assets held by, but not ownership interests in, trusts, estates, S corporations, regulated in-
vestment companies ("RICs"), real estate investment trusts ("REITs"), and partnerships 
would be eligible for indexing, to the extent gain is taken into account by taxpayers other 
than C corporations. Id. at §§ 1022(e) and (g). 
•• Former Under Secretary of the Treasury Ed Cohen, founder of the Virginia Tax Study 
Group, has described the issues that arise when indexing does not apply for loss purposes or 
to corporate assets. Edwin S. Cohen, The Pending Proposals to Index Capital Gains, 45 Tax 
Notes 103, 105 (Oct. 2, 1989). 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (colloquy between Rep. Sander 
Levin, D-Mich., and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Leslie Samuels). 
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H.R. 9 had originally covered assets acquired prior to 1995. The 
inflation adjustment would have been measured by increases in the 
gross domestic product ("GDP") deflator occurring after December 
31, 1994, regardless of whether the asset was acquired by the tax-
payer prior to that date. CW ATRA would limit indexing to assets 
acquired after 1994,26 but would provide for a "mark-to-market" 
gain recognition election for indexed assets held on January 1, 
1995 and not sold before the next business day. In the case of such 
assets, indexing would apply. 27 Also, principal residences held and 
used as residences on January 1, 1995 would constitute indexed 
assets.28 
Under CWATRA, assets eligible for the inflation adjustment 
generally would include corporate stock and tangible property con-
stituting either capital assets or property used in a trade or busi-
ness, provided they are held by the taxpayer for more than three 
years. 29 For this purpose, options, warrants, or other contract 
rights with respect to stock would not be considered stock. The 
inflation adjustment would not apply to stock in an S corporation 
or a partnership interest, or to stock in a foreign corporation, ex-
cept for common stock regularly traded on an established securi-
•• CWATRA, supra note 11, at § 6302(c)(l). 
17 Id. at § 6302(d). In 1989, Ways and Means Chair Dan Rostenkowski, D-ID., similarly 
proposed indexing for covered assets purchased after the effective date and held for 1 year, 
with a "mark-to-market" election for common stock already held and thus becoming eligible 
for indexing. Andrew Hoerner, Rumors and Opinions Fly on Competing Capital Gains 
Plans, 44 Tax Notes 839 (Aug. 21, 1989); Pat Jones, Stuck on Capital Gains, Ways and 
Means Action Slows to a Crawl, 44 Tax Notes 479 (July 31, 1989). This proposal was esti-
mated to raise over $1 billion in revenue in the first year, apparently due to such election. 
Hoerner, supra. The dissenting House Ways and Means Democrats stated that the CWA-
TRA mark-to-market for indexing results in a "one-time revenue pickup of $11.2 billion 
during the first two years." H.R. Rep. No. 84, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 270 (1995), available in 
95 Tax Notes Today 56-11 (Mar. 22, 1995). In 1989, a competing capital gain proposal sup-
ported by Rep. Bill Archer, R-Tex., was instead passed by a conservative coalition on the 
Ways and Means Committee and by a similar coalition in the House. 45 Cong. Q. Almanac 
114 (1989); 135 Cong. Rec. H6313-14 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989) (Roll No. 253). On the floor, 
Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, D-Me., proposed that the deficit-reduction mea-
sure be stripped down of hundreds of extraneous provisions, including the House's capital 
gains cuts. 45 Cong. Q. Almanac 109, 111 (1989). Ultimately, the Senate agreed, 87 to 7, on 
October 13. Id. On November 2, 1989, Senator Bob Dole, R-Kan., agreed in Conference to 
drop capital gains from the Budget bill, with President George Bush concurring; on Novem-
ber 21, 1989, the Conferees reached an agreement that contained neither capital gains nor a 
rate increase. Id. at 112-13. 
•• CWATRA, supra note 11, at§ 6302(e). 
•• Id. at § 6302(a) (providing new §§ 1022(a)(l) and (b)(l)). 
10 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 15:1 
ties market.30 Moreover, no inflation adjustment would be pro-
vided for non-participating preferred stock. Indexed assets would 
not include any mortgage or other creditor's interest in property; 
the basis of debt would similarly not be indexed. H.R. 9 had pro-
vided that a lessor's interest in property subject to a net lease 
would not be an indexed asset, but this was omitted in CW ATRA. 
No property using "neutral cost recovery" (as provided in Subtitle 
C, Part II of Title VI) would be an indexed asset. 31 
C. Ordinary Loss Deduction for Sale of Principal Residence 
CWATRA also would provide that losses from the sale or ex-
change of a principal residence would be treated as a deductible 
capital loss rather than as a nondeductible personal loss. 32 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE 1995 CoNGRESSIONAL CoNTENTIONS 
A. Risk Capital 
Capital gain proponents' most common argument in the 1995 
Hearings on the provisions currently before Congress has been that 
a generic capital gains cut would make more capital available to an 
entrepreneur who wants to start or expand a small business. 33 Pro-
ponents reasoned that start-ups are risky and that a capital gains 
preference is necessary to compensate for the high risk; they also 
contended that borrowing from financial institutions tends to be 
unavailable. 34 
•• ld. at § 6302(a) (providing new § 1022(b)(2)). 
•• H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 27, at 38. 
•• CWATRA, supra note 11, at § 6316 (providing new § 165(c)(4)). 
•• Unofficial Transcript of January 25 W&M 'Contract' Hearing (Jan. 25, 1995), available 
in 95 Tax Notes Today 20-36 (Jan. 31, 1995) (hereinafter Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 
1995) (statement of Chair Bill Archer). This was the second contention in H.R. Rep. No. 84, 
supra note 27, at 35; the first was that a capital gains cut would increase the savings rate of 
American households. See infra note 297 . 
.. Unofficial Transcript of January 24 W&M 'Contract' Hearing (Jan. 24, 1995), available 
in 95 Tax Notes Today 20-35 (Jan. 31, 1995) (hereinafter Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 
1995) (statement of Mark Bloomfield, President, American Council for Capital Formation); 
Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Dr. Hatsopoulos, Presi-
dent of Thermo Electron Corporation) (premium for risk). The House Ways and Means 
Committee report accompanying CWATRA, supra note 27, at 35, asserted that: 
American technological leadership has been enhanced by the willingness of individu-
als to take the risk of pursuing new businesses exploiting new technologies. Risk tak-
ing is stifled if the taxation of any resulting gain is high and the ability to claim losses 
1995] Capital Gains Contentions 11 
Opponents of a generic capital gains cut pointed out that very 
few of the benefits of a generic capital gains preference would go to 
venture capital or small business;8a rather, most capital gains real-
izations are from public stock or real estate.88 Historically, most 
investors who invest in venture capital funds have been tax exempt 
entities. 87 
is limited. The Committee believes it is important to encourage risk taking and be-
lieves a reduction in the tsxation of capital gains will have that effect. 
Professors Cunningham and Schenk dispute this risk stifling premise and argue, as does 
the Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, that, in any event, a capital gains preference is not 
well designed to remedy any such bias. Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The 
Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 Tax L. Rev. 319, 340-41 (1993) (citing Charls 
Walker & Marc A. Bloomfield, The Case for Restoration of a Capital Gains Tax Differen-
tial, 43 Tax Notes 1019, 1022 (May 22, 1989)); Capital Gains and Losses 1995, supra note 10, 
at 18-19. Professor Dodge suggests that general riskiness is far too broad; more appropriate 
targets would be the formation of new job-creating businesses by entrepreneurs and by new 
combinations of capital (as § 1202 was to do) or new technology. Joseph Dodge, Restoring 
Preferential Capital Gains Treatment Under a Flat Rate Income Tax: Panacea or Placebo?, 
44 Tax Notes 1133, 1139-40 (Sept. 4, 1989). See also James Porteba, Capital Gains Policy 
Towards Entrepreneurship, 42 Nat'l Tax J. 375, 383 (1989) (advocating distinguishing by 
enterprise size or due to high failure rate -62% in 6 years, and providing more substantial 
loss provisions, rather than a preference on gain realization). I agree. See infra note 71. 
16 In 1983, venture capital investments amounted to only 0.1% of total net worth of all 
non-financial corporations, and less than 1% of the market value of their equity. Treas. 
Dep't Report to Congress on the Capital Gains Tax Reductions of 1978, 139 (Sept. 1985), 
available in 85 Tax Notes Today 187-27 (Sept. 16, 1985) (hereinafter Tax Reductions of 
1978); see Porteba, supra note 34, at 382 (initial public offerings by venture backed firms 
averaged 1.1% of total capital gains realizations). Similarly, I estimate that the value of 
equities in small businesses are less than 15% of the equities in all corporations. In 1988, 
the 10,400 largest (and mostly public) corporations, out of a total of around 3.5 million 
corporations (including S corporations), held 84% of the corporate assets by adjusted basis; 
self-created goodwill would not be counted, and their stock trades much more frequently 
than stock in a close corporation. John Lee, President Clinton's Capital Gains Proposals, 59 
Tax Notes 1399, 1416 (June 7, 1995). Thus, the amount of annual realizations of close cor-
poration stock might not exceed 10% of total stock realizations. See infra note 101. 
88 Unofficial Transcript of Finance Hearings on Capital Gains (Feb. 15, 1995), available in 
95 Tax Notes Today 36-42 (Feb. 23, 1995) (hereinafter Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 
1995) (statement of Dr. Jane Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy Congressional 
Research Service) (stating that the vast majority of capital gains realizations are from ma-
ture corporations or real estate); Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at ii, iii, viii, 15, 16. 
•• See Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at viii; Capital Gains and Losses 1995, 
supra note 10, at 19 ("Since 1978, tsx-exempt entities (i.e. pension funds and non-profit 
institutions) have constituted the fastest growing source of new venture capital funds."). In 
the eyes of Chair John LaFalce, this made a generic capital gains exclusion an inefficient 
means of encouraging venture capital investment. Impact of Tax Simplification on the U.S. 
Economy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. 
on Banking and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 961, 1004 (1985) (hereinafter Impact of 
Tax Simplification Hearings); accord George R. Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital 
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While one lobbyist during the 1995 Hearings argued for a ge-
neric capital gains preference for corporate taxpayers, on the 
grounds that banks were becoming major players (6% to 13%) in 
the venture capital field,38 banks have had such a low effective tax 
rate due to other preferences that they have been dubbed func-
tionally tax exempt. 39 Moreover, beginning businesses generally 
rely upon capital from the entrepreneur and, to a lesser extent, 
family and friends. 40 
Gains Taxation: Realizations, Revenues, Efficiency and Equity, 48 Tax L. Rev. 419, 480 
(1993). 
aa Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of John Chapoton, 
representative of Alliance for Business Investment). Historically, corporations other than in 
the timber and plywood industries realized only 5% of their income from capital gains. 
Joint Publication of House Comm. on Ways and Means and Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Reform Studies and Proposals U.S. Treasury Dept., pts. 1 and 3, 102, 
434-38 (Comm. Print 1969) (hereinafter 1968 Tax Reform Study) (stating that the 16 largest 
timber and plywood corporations in the 1960's had more than 50% of their income from 
timber royalties; the largest five garnered 50% of such royalties; the largest one garnered 
25%). These patterns probably still hold true, as evidenced by the absence of any other 
witness calling for a preference for corporate held assets in the 1995 Hearings. In the House 
floor debate, one capital gains proponent sought to tie a drop in venture capital into the 
1986 repeal of a corporate capital gains preference (not a big source of contributions to 
venture capital funds, see supra note 35), but her main concern was capital gains treatment 
for timber royalties received by firms. 141 Cong. Rec., supra note 9, at H4219 (remarks of 
Rep. Jennifer Dunn, R-Wash.). The corporate sector in general is much more interested in 
easing, if not repealing, the § 55 corporate alternative minimum tax. See Ways & Means 
Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of William Sinclaire, Senior Tax Counsel, 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
•• Michael Barker, Must We Burn Gilder? Or, Taxes and the Entrepreneur, 27 Tax Notes 
541, 543 (Apr. 29, 1985). "This shifting of income inclusions to low-rate taxpayers while 
deductions are taken by taxpayers with higher effective marginal rates in a manner that 
reduces total taxes paid is known as 'tax arbitrage'." Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 
100th Cong., 1st Seas., Federal Income Tax Aspects of Corporate Financial Structures 78 
(Comm. Print 1989) (hereinafter Corporate Financial Structures). Such arbitrage is reflected 
in the ownership patterns of corporate stock and debt: as of the end of 1987, household 
ownership of stock was down to 60% (from 82% in 1967) with the rest held by functionally 
tax-exempt taxpayers (such as pension funds, banks, insurance companies and foreigners). 
Whereas households held only 8% of corporate debt, pension funds, banks and life insur-
ance companies held 57%, and foreigners held 13%. Id. The average effective rate on such 
interest income is 7%. Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 27 (1989) (hereinafter 1989 Senate LBO 
Hearing) (statement of Dr. Lawrence Summers, Harvard Professor of Economics); accord 
Hugh Calkins, The Inflation Subsidy in Interest, 42 Tax Notes 1267 (Mar. 6, 1989) (stating 
that the average effective rate is 7.3%, broken down by class of creditor). 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statements of: Mark Bloomfield, 
President, American Council for Capital Formation; Rep. Phil English, R-Pa.; and Karen 
Kerrigan, representative of Small Business Revival Committee); Tax Reductions of 1978, 
supra note 35, at viii, 144-46; Economic Growth and the President's Budget Proposals: 
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Proponents argued that a capital gains preference is necessary to 
unlock investments held by the entrepreneur, such as stock options 
in the public company currently employing the entrepreneur,u or 
by friends contributing capital. Proponents also argued that a capi-
tal gains preference was necessary to increase the back-end reward 
to investors or the entrepreneur when he or she sells out, in order 
to compensate for the greater risk in ·a new venture.42 
The Joint Committee on Taxation pointed out that, in fact, in-
creased entrepreneurial "activity has been a very small factor in 
previous market responses to changes in the taxation of income 
from capital."43 Representative Fortney "Pete" Stark, D-Cal., at a 
January 1995 House Ways and Means Hearing, speculated that: 
For an entrepreneur or for someone who's going to start up a busi-
ness and get going, the last thing you think about is what you're 
going to pay five or one or ten years in the future to capital gains 
. . . I always think that entrepreneurs are born, not made. I have a 
hunch that we're going to see entrepreneurs continue regardless of 
what we do with the capital gains taxes. 44 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 60-61 (1992) 
(statements of Robert Gilbertson, representative of American Electronics Association, and 
John J. Motley, representative of National Federation of Independent Business) (NFIB 
study reached same conclusion). 
•• Ways & Means Hearing-; Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Mark Bloomfield); 
Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at 146. 
•• See note 34 supra; Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statements of 
Paul Huard, representative of National Association of Manufacturers; William Sinclaire, 
representative of U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and Joseph Lane, representative of National 
Association of Enrolled Agents); Unofficial Transcript of House Small Business January 25 
Hearing on 'Contract' (Jan. 26, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 20-38 (Jan. 31, 1995) 
(hereinafter House Small Business Hearing, Jan. 26, 1995) (statement of Sydney Hoff-Hay, 
representative of Small Business Survival Comm.). 
•• Joint Comm. on Taxation, Methodology and Issues in the Revenue Estimating Process, 
JCX-2-95, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 23, 1995) (hereinafter Methodology in Revenue Esti-
mating 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 15-15 (Jan. 23, 1995). 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Pete Stark, D-
Cal.). For the related point that, in choosing the tax entity for a new venture, the proprietor 
is not concerned about the tax treatment of a sale years down the road, see Staff Recom-
mendations to Revise Subchapter C: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt 
Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 263, 273, 281 (1985) 
(statement of Peter Faber, former Chair of Tax Section of American Bar Association). But 
see id. at 328 (statement of Sam Thompson, tax practitioner and now Dean of University of 
Miami Law School); accord id. at 246-47 (statement of Ed Cohen, former Under Secretary 
of the Treasury); id. at 326-27 (statement of Professor Edward Roche). Rep. Pete Stark also 
believed that the availability of venture capital turned less on capital gains rates and more 
on the investment policies of major pension funds that have been "intrigued by diversifying 
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Stark laid the foundation for his assertion by asking members of a 
panel of entrepreneurs what the marginal capital gains rates were 
when they commenced their first start-up; they couldn't 
remember. 
For the rest of the hearing, witnesses who supported a capital 
gains cut addressed Stark's question. Most asserted that a capital 
gains preference was important at the margin, particularly for the 
"friend" investors;•~ however, two witnesses acknowledged the ac-
curacy of Stark's insight. "Sure, an entrepreneur will not be de-
terred, but it's just not fair if he realizes at the end of the day that 
a great portion of his winnings, for which he risked so much, are 
·going to be taxed away. There's a breaking of a social contract 
there . . . "46 The recurring theme was that investment should not 
... into venture capital." Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement 
of Rep. Pete Stark, D-Cal.). In 1978, the Department of Labor redefined fiduciary responsi-
bility to allow private pension fund managers to invest a relatively small amount of total 
plan assets in more risky venture investments. Barker, supra note 39, at 543 (other factors 
were inflation, the resurgent stock market, and the mergers and acquisition boom). State 
pension plans followed, with the result that private and public pension plans are the single 
largest source of new venture capital investments. Id. An economist commented on the issue 
of whether capital gains cuts were necessary to encourage investment in start ups: 
The image we have here is that the innovator who is taken with an idea is somehow 
planning ahead for capital gains, but the hundreds of millions of dollars at stake for 
those who are sitting on accumulated wealth somehow do not take it into account. 
The key point here is that capital gains are already favored over ordinary income. 
The argument that somehow capital markets are failing to recognize these marvelous 
opportunities for investment, and capitalists flowing in to secure blue chip stocks, is a 
vicious criticism of capitalism, which hinges on -and, I believe, prospers on- the 
ability of capital markets to allocate funds to projects that have the best expected 
rates of return. 
Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry Aaron, Di-
rector of Economic Studies at the Brookings Institute) (unofficial transcript corrected). 
•• E.g., Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of James Hoak, 
representing American Business Conference: 
Responding to Mr. Stark's statement, first. I think that he's wrong in his conclusion. 
I think it is possible that entrepreneurs-or it is likely that entrepreneurs on average 
would still begin businesses, but we're dealing at the margin. I think that it's the 
extra investments that Bob talked about that can create a larger savings and larger 
capital formation group in this country. Also, he's looking only at the entrepreneur. 
He's forgetting the outside capital sources.) 
Accord id. (statements of Rep. Dick Zimmer, R-N.J., and James Mann, CEO of SunGard 
Data Systems). But see supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statements of James Morgan, 
president-elect, National Venture Capital Association, and Robert Johnson, CEO of Black 
Entertainment Television). "Every time you have a [capital gains] transaction, a part of 
capital savings that is already out there is vacuumed u~ by the giant vacuum cleaner, 
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be punished.47 Opponents of an increase in the preference for capi-
tal gains espoused the contrary view that capital gains, particularly 
from equities, were already taxed lightly, as evidenced by: the 
deferral of recognition of accrued gains until realization, the step 
up in basis at death (50% of accruals in public stock48), the 28% 
cap on individual capital gains, and the holding of a substantial 
portion of equities by tax exempt entities. 49 
brought into the Treasury, and then disbursed on consumption items ... " (statement of 
Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex.). But see id. (statement of Robert Mcintyre, Director of Citizens 
for Tax Justice). · . 
.. Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Chair Bill Archer, 
R-T~x.): 
What's fair about a tax that punishes people who sacrifice and forego consumption, 
pay the income tax on their income, take the net and invest it, save it and then get 
punished by being taxed on the appreciation and value of those savings? And what's 
fair about a tax system that gets in the way of people who want to go out and create 
jobs? 
Accord Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Drew Hiatt, 
representative of National Businessowners Association); Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 
1995, supra note 36 (statement of Mark Bloomfield). A short response was supplied by Sen-
ator Kent Conrad, D-N.D.: 
One of the things that has always troubled me about the capital gains proposal is 
that, on equity grounds, it is a little hard for me to look somebody in the face that 
makes $ 30,000 a year of wage income, works hard, has a family and is paying at one 
rate. And to say that, on the other hand, there may be a wealthy individual, some-
body who has inherited his or her wealth, never worked a day in their lives, on their 
capital gains income they would pay a rate that is a fraction of what somebody pays 
who goes to work every day, perhaps at a modest salary. 
Unofficial Transcript of January 12 W&M 'Contract' Hearing (Jan. 12, 1995), available in 95 
Tax Notes Today 14-88 (January 23, 1995) (hereinafter Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 12, 
1995). See also 65 Cong. Rec. 2846 (1924) (statement of Rep. Oldfield, D-Ark). These views 
represent a long-standing American "ambivalence about earned and unearned income, sav-
ing and spending, and wealth in general." Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: 
American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 Ind. L.J. 119, 120 (1994). 
•• From 1949 to 1989, as much as two thirds of annual capital appreciation was not recog-
nized prior to death. With adjustments for owner-occupied housing gains excluded under 
§ 121, and corporate stock held by tax-exempts, taxable realizations were about 46% of 
accruals. Jane Gravelle, Limits to Capital Gains Feedback Effects, 51 Tax Notes 363, 364-65 
(Apr. 22, 1991). 
•• Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry Aaron, 
Director, Economic Studies Program, the Brookings Institute) (effective rate of 7.2%); Ways 
& Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Sander Levin, D-Mich.); 
id. (statement of Mr. Robert DeHaven, President and CEO of Quality Services, Inc., AEA) 
(existing preference estimated as a tax expenditure of $170 billion over the next 5 years); 
accord id. (statement of Robert Mcintyre, Director of Citizens for Tax Justice) (existing flat 
rate is equivalent to a 30% exclusion at the 39.6% bracket). Mervyn A. King and Don Ful-
lerton believe that the statutory rate should be reduced by half to account for the benefit of 
deferral, and by half again to account for the basis step up at death. Mervyn A. King & Don 
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As such, only a small portion of a generic capital gains prefer.: 
ence would apply to equity in small business. If the true goal is 
investment in small or start-up business, a capital gains preference 
specifically targeted to small business, or a rollover provision lim-
ited to reinvestment in small business, would appear more appro-
priate. Most capital gains cut proponents, while advocating a capi-
tal gains preference to benefit small business, ignored the capital 
gains preference targeted to small business under existing section 
1202,60 and the rollover of the proceeds of sales of public stock in 
specialized small business investment companies under existing 
section 1044.61 
A few proponents, however, did advocate that these provisions 
be liberalized, 62 be retargeted to manufacturing business63 or start-
Fullerton, The Taxation of Income from Capital (1984). See Andrew Hoerner, Tax Incen-
tives for Capital and Economic Growth: A Critique, 48 Tax Notes 813, 814 (Aug. 13, 1990). 
See generally Calvin Johnson, The Undertaxation of Holding Gains, 55 Tax Notes 807 (May 
11, 1992). 
•• Section 1202 provides a 50% exclusion for gain from the sale or exchange of original 
issue "qualified small business stock" held for more than 5 years. I.R.C. §§ 1202(a) and 
(c)(1). Half of this exclusion constitutes a tax preference item for the alternate minimum 
tax under I.R.C. § 57(a)(7). There is a cap of the greater of $10,000,000 (lifetime cap) or 10 
times basis. I.R.C. § 1202(b). Qualified small business stock has a size limit ($50,000,000 in 
aggregate gross asset.c;), an active business requirement, and a qualified business require-
ment (excluding personal services, financial business, farming, natural resource business, 
and hospitality business); certain types of corporations are excluded as well (for example, S 
corporations, DISCs, mutual funds, REITs, etc.). I.R.C. §§ 1202(c)(2), (d) and (e). 
61 Section 1044 provides for the tax-free rollover (in the form of non-recognition, substi-
tuted basis, and a tacked holding period) for the proceeds of the sale of public securities 
(stock or debt) reinvested within 60 days in a "specialized small business investment com-
pany" ("SSBIC"). I.R.C. § 1044(a). For individuals there is a $50,000 annual and a $500,000 
lifetime cap; for corporations, the cap is $250,000 and $1,000,000, respectively. I.R.C. 
§ 1044(b). A SSBIC is any partnership or corporation licensed by the Small Business Ad-
ministration under § 301(d) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. 
Professor Blum has argued for a universal non-recognition carryover basis rollover of the 
proceeds from dispositions of capital assets. Cynthia Blum, Rollover, An Alternative Treat-
ment of Capital Gains, 41 Tax L. Rev. 383 (1986). Professor Johnson points out that com-
plete tax-exemption of rolled-over proceeds is not on the current political agenda because it 
would lose revenue no matter how many additional sales were induced. Calvin H. Johnson, 
The Consumption of Capital Gains, 55 Tax Notes 957, 970 (May 18, 1992). This may par-
tially underlie the opposition of Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex., infra note 52. 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden, 
D-Ore.) (favoring 18-month tax-free rollover of proceeds of sale of stock into investment in 
small business in less burdensome manner than § 1044 SSBIC provision). Chair Bill Archer 
seemed to oppose expansion of such tax-free rollovers due to the burden of record keeping, 
and on the supposition that 95% of the proceeds of stock sales were reinvested anyway. Id. 
Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Mark Bloomfield) 
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ups in enterprise zones,114 be provided as a second-tier capital gains 
cut in addition to a generic capital gains cut,C111 or be provided if a 
generic cut was not passed.116 Some proponents of a capital gains 
(stating that most sales proceeds are reinvested). The empirical data is to the contrary. See 
infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text. See also House Small Business Hearing, Jan. 26, 
1995, supra note 42 (statement of Paul Pryde, President of Pryde and Company) (stating 
that §§ 1044 and 1202 should be perfected instead of cut); id. (statement of Craig Willet, 
CPA) (stating that "attaching a whole bunch of regulations to it and qualifications, will 
[not) help small business"; if generic cut is enacted, he advocated a second tier 100% exclu-
sion for small business stock held 5 years); accord id. (statement of Pete Linsert, representa-
tive of Biotechnology Industry) (stating that "drastic" restrictions on § 1202 rendered it 
useless for raising capital for biotechnology industry); id. (statement of Alan Sklar, CPA, 
representative of small business) (stating that he advocated extension of § 1202 to S corpo-
ration stock and an additional upfront $50,000 deduction for investment in small business 
stock, which resembles provisions in rejected 1990 Budget Accord). The 1990 proposed 25% 
(or $25,000) deduction for investment in small business stock would have cost $7.3 billion 
between 1991 and 1995, or over 60% of the 5-year total of $11.5 billion of "growth incen-
tives." Andrew Hoerner, Small Business Incentives: An Eight-Fold Path to Who Knows 
Where?, 49 Tax Notes 134 (Oct. 8, 1990); David Wessel & Jeffrey Birnbaum, Consolation 
Prize: Tax Shelters for Rich Could Return in Plan to Aid Small Business, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 
1990, at A1, Al8. The 1990 Budget Accord was not accepted by the House, in large part 
because of its regressive nature and rhetoric on the failure of trickle down during the 1980's. 
See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. H8699-8700 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. David Obey, 
D-Wis.); 136 Cong. Rec. H7792 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990) (statement of Rep. James Trafi-
cant, D-Oh.) ("The poor pay more taxes than they did 10 years ago. The rich pay less, and 
the President wants another big tax cut."); 136 Cong. Rec. H8944-45 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1990) 
(statement of Rep. Marty Russo, D-Ill.); 136 Cong. Rec. H8321 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1990) 
(Rep. Tom Downey, D-N.Y.); 136 Cong. Rec. at H8699-7000 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (state-
ment of Rep. David Obey, D-Wis.). One Member quipped that the 1980's "trickle-down" 
had been from the top 1 "lo doWn to the top 5% only; the remaining 95% of individual tax-
payers had not benefited. 136 Cong. Rec. H8927 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1990) (extension of re-
marks of Rep. George Miller, D-Cal.). A metaphor frequently used by the 1990 Budget Ac-
cord opponents was that the rich were at the 1980s party, but now they won't have to pay. 
E.g., 136 Cong. Rec. H8829 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Major Owens, D-N.Y.). 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statements of Rep. Bob Franks, 
R-N.J. (advocating a 2-step sliding scale for manufacturers), and Rep. Martin Meehan, D-
Mass.) . 
.. Ways & Means Hearing, Jan 12, 1995, supra note 47 (statements of Mayor Stephen 
Goldsmith, City of Indianapolis, and Mayor Edward Rendell, City of Philadelphia); Ways & 
Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Bob Johnson, CEO of Black 
Entertainment Network Holdings); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 
(statements of Rep. John Ensign, R-Nev., and Rep. John Porter, R-Ill.); Unofficial Tran-
script of January 11 W&M 'Contract' Hearing (Jan. 11, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes 
Today 13-69 (Jan. 20, 1995)(hereinafter Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 11, 1995)(statement of 
Rep. Mac Collins, R.-Ga.). 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Robert Beckman, 
representative of Emerging Companies Section of the Biotechnology Industry Organization) . 
.. House Small Business Hearing, Jan. 26, 1995, supra note 42 (statement of Alan Sklar, 
CPA). 
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cut seeking to aid small business opposed a cut targeted just to 
small business on the ground that they did not want the govern-
ment choosing favored investments. Proponents also, albeit less 
often, opposed a targeted cut on the ground that they could not 
trust the tax rules to remain constant. 07 A telling response to the 
first ground by a member of Congress was that a capital gains cut 
in itself involves an incentive/Government intervention. 08 The sec-
ond ground has too often been true in the last two or three decades 
with regard to the top individual ordinary income and capital gains 
rates. 
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy Leslie Samuels 
asserted that a generic capital gains cut and repeal of section 1202 
would draw capital away from small business investments. 09 The 
Administration believed that any "additional capital gains prefer-
ences for new investment . . . · should likewise be targeted and 
should meet the test of fairness, simplicity, and efficiency."60 The 
Administration believed that the CW ATRA capital gains cuts 
failed all of these benchmarks. According to Samuels, the distribu-
tion of t~ cuts under the Contract With America disproportion-
ately benefited families with income over $100,000 and hence 
would not meet the fairness test; indexing would make the tax law 
more complex; and capital gains preferences would encourage tax 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of James Hoak, repre-
sentative of American Business Conference) ("[l]f there's a five-year window or whatever 
and business doesn't feel it can count on the Tax Code remaining stable for five years, so 
therefore, when they're very specifically targeted, you may not produce much, because we 
can't rely necessarily on it staying there."); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 12, 1995, supra 
note 47 (statement of Rep. Jim Bunning, R-Ky.); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, 
supra note 33 (statement of James Mann, CEO of SunGard Data Systems) (stating that 
"investors and businessmen probably will make wiser choices on the investment of funds"); 
accord House Small Business Hearing, Jan. 26, 1995, supra note 42 (statements of Sydney 
Hoff-Hay, representing Small Business Survival Comm., and Dr. John Goodman, President 
of the National Center for Policy Analysis). A pattern of opposing provisions targeted to a 
group for which a generic benefit is ostensibly claimed smells of cloaking. 
08 House Small Business Hearing, Jan. 26, 1995, supra note 42 (statement of Rep. Ken 
Bentsen, D-Tex.) (stating that the Code "is full of incentives to direct investment"); accord 
id. (statement of Chuck Ludlam, representative of Biotechnology Industry Organization) 
(stating that we make choices in the Code all the time, and a targeted cut is not expensive); 
id. (statement of John Pryde, President John Pryde and Company) (stating that a targeted 
cut is not expensive). 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of Ass't Sec'ty Leslie 
Samuels). 
10 ld. 
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shelters.81 Proponents, however, argued that the proposed capital 
gains cuts were fair because they applied to all income brackets 
and sectors of the American economy; they argued that the cuts 
made economic sense because they reduced capital costs, pre-
vented the taxation of inflationary gains, and encouraged 
entrepreneurship. 82 
Practitioners who testified during the hearings pointed out that 
a substantial generic capital gains exclusion would increase com-
plexities in tax planning.83 The New York City Bar has long held a 
similar view as to a capital gains preference. 84 In the 1990 Congres-
sional debate on capital gains, practitioners,811 economists,88 and 
committee members87 testified that the 1986 repeal of the then-
generic capital gains preference had greatly simplified transac-
tional tax planning. 88 
81 ld. 
81 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Mark Bloomfield, 
President of American Council for Capital Formation). 
88 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Sheldon Cohen, 
former Commissioner); Unofficial Transcript of W&M 'Contract' Hearing (Feb. 1, 1995), 
available in 95 Tax Notes Today 24-50 (Feb. 6, 1995) (hereinafter Ways & Means Hearing, 
Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Thomas Terry, Chair of the Section of Taxation of the ABA); 
Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Ronald Pearlman, for-
mer Chief of Joint Committee Staff and Ass't Sec'ty for Tax Policy); id. (statement of Dr. 
Henry Aaron); Revenue Raising Options Required Under the Fiscal Year 1988 Budget Reso-
lution: Heaing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 120 
(1987) (hereinafter 1987 Senate Hearing) (colloquy between Dr. Joseph Minarik, Urban In-
stitute, and Chair Lloyd Bentsen, D-Tex.). The Joint Committee has provided examples of 
"portfolio effect," or the ability of taxpayers to convert ordinary income to capital gains. 
Methodology in Revenue Estimating 1995, supra note 43. See also Tax Reductions of 1978, 
supra note 35, at 27-28 (providing a list of planning complexities, some of which have been 
since remedied by statute). For references to past studies of conversion problems see Lee, 
supra note 35, at 1411 (studies by Randolph Paul and Stanley Surrey) . 
... New York City Bar Association, Comm. On Personal Income Tax, Report On Proposed 
Capital Gains Tax Rate Reduction (Sept. 1990) (hereinafter Proposed Capital Gains Tax 
Reduction), available in 90 Tax Notes Today 202-12 (Oct. 2, 1990). 
88 Impact, Effectiveness, and Fairness of the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Hearings Before 
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 173 (1990) (hereinafter 1990 
House Hearings on Fairness) (statement of James Holden, Chair of Section of Taxation of 
ABA). 
88 Id. at 112 (statement of Professor Alan Auerbach); id. at 171 (statement of Dr. Henry 
Aaron, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institute). 
87 E.g., id. at 206 (statement of Rep. (now Senator) Byron Dorgan, D-N.D.). 
88 The old complexities of transactional tax planning for capital gains were roundly and 
soundly criticized by the New York City Bar Association. Proposed Capital Gains Tax Re-
duction, supra note 64. For an excellent discussion of the rule and transactional complexi-
ties arising from a substantial capital gains preference see Cunningham & Schenk, supra 
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The stated goal of encouraging investment in small business 
would be met much more effectively and cheaply by broadening 
sections 1202, 1244 or 1044. Modifying section 1202's ten-times-ba-
sis limitation on capital gains eligible for the 14% rate would prob-
ably be the most appealing change to entrepreneurs, given the pat-
tern of sweat equity over capital investment. The $50,000,000 size 
limitation may also catch larger start-ups, particularly in the bio-
technology industries.69 An increase from $50 to $100 million in 
aggregate gross assets would not result in much additional revenue 
loss, and would still be comparatively smalP0 Section 1244's 
$100,000 joint return cap on ordinary losses from small business 
stock could be raised to a higher ceiling, say $500,000 or even 
$1,000,000, reflecting the riskiness of new ventures.71 Any opening 
up of section 1044 should lie more in broadening the categories of 
small businesses into which the proceeds of the sale of public stock 
could be rolled tax free, rather than broadening the category of 
capital assets qualifying for such roll over. Modifications along 
these lines, particularly as to section 1202, are much more likely to 
avoid a veto by President Bill Clinton, all other things being equal. 
B. Inflation 
The second most common argument in the 1995 Hearings in 
favor of either indexing or a generic capital gains preference was 
note 34, at 356-59; see also Daniel Shaviro, Commentary: Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 
Tax L. Rev. 393, 398-99 (1993). 
•• President Clinton's Proposals for Public Investment and Deficit Reduction: Hearings 
Before House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 102 (1993) (state-
ment of Rep. Robert Matsui, D-Cal.). 
70 Revenue and Spending Proposals for Fiscal Year 1990: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 189 (1989) (hereinafter 1989 Senate 
Hearings) (statement of Senator Dale Bumpers, D-Ark.) (stating that the Joint Committee's 
estimated $10 million ceiling would cost $40 million over a 5 year window; a $100 million 
ceiling would cost less than $500 million). Existing § 1202 was estimated to cost $700 million 
over 6 years. Rick Wartzman, Small-Business Tax Break Trails Hopes, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 
1993, at A3. See supra note 35, and Lee, supra note 35, at 1416, for support of $100,000,000 
in adjusted basis as an appropriate line for dividing big from small. 
71 See Porteba, supra note 34. I would provide higher ordinary loss ceilings for taxpayers 
who materially participate in the small business, partially on the rationale that they and 
their venture should not be treated conceptually as separate tax entities. John Lee, Entity 
Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal Service Corporations 
and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 57, 88-93 (1988). Of course, some or all of 
any gains upon the sale should be ordinary as well, to the extent they are attributable to 
such participation. 
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the unfairness of taxing "people on gains that are strictly due to 
inflation."72 Many claimed that taxpayers particularly resisted sell-
ing assets where the gain was largely due to inflation.73 The con-
sensus of witnesses was that universal indexing was conceptually 
correct, but difficult (at least politically), as the 1984 Treasury ex-
perience shows.74 An economist pointed out, however, that univer-
sal indexing would reduce the constituency advocating low 
inflation. 711 
•• Ways and Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Chair Bill Archer, 
R-Tex.); accord Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Sena-
tor Don Nickles, R-Okla.). Twice before, in 1978 and 1989, Chair Archer supported Ways 
and Means proposals that provided for the indexing of the basis of capital assets (while 
allowing a generic exclusion at the same time). A conservative coalition in the House passed 
the proposals over the objections of the Democratic Chair of the Ways and Means Commit-
tee, but the Senate and the Conference rejected them. See supra note 27 and infra note 98. 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 12, 1995, supra note 47 (statement of Dale Kettner, 
farmer) (noting a disincentive to sell farm equipment); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 
1995, supra note 34 (statement of William Sinclaire, representative of U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce); House Small Business Hearing, Jan. 26, 1995, supra note 42 (statement of Sid-
ney Hoff-Hay). H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 27, at 38, reasoned that "taxation of these 
inflationary gains discourages new saving and investors from selling old investments even 
when better investment opportunities present themselves. This retards economic growth 
and leads to an inefficient allocation of capital by the capital markets." 
•• Treasury I proposed a complete regime of indexing in lieu of various then-existing pref-
erences, including the then-sixty-percent capital gains exclusion. 2 Treas. Dep't, Report to 
the President, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, General Expla-
nation of the Treas. Dep't Proposals 1, 181 (1984) (hereinafter Treasury I). Its overriding 
objective was to subject real economic income from all sources to the same tax treatment. 
Id. at 13; 138 Cong. Rec. 3957 (1992) (remarks of Senate Finance Chair Lloyd Bentsen, D-
Tex.). One of the chief architects of Treasury I was then-Assistant Secretary of Treasury for 
Tax Policy Ronald Pearlman. Pearlman and economist Charles McLure were "allowed to 
design what they thought was a perfect tax system." Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Mur-
ray, Showdown at Guccl Gulch 46 (1987). "They called for a 'neutral' tax system, a system 
that does not influence private decisions." Id. There was much opposition to indexing in lieu 
of accelerated capital recovery. Joseph J. Minarik, How Tax Reform Came About, 37 Tax 
Notes 1359, 1367 (Dec. 27, 1987); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 11, 1995, supra note 54 
(statement of Dr. Michael Boskin, Stanford Professor and former Chair of President Bush's 
Council of Economic Advisers); Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 
(statement of Dr. Henry Aaron). Treasury stated that the principal opposition to capital 
asset indexing came from individual entrepreneurs and the venture capital industry. See 
Impact of Tax Simplification Hearing, supra note 37, at 963 (statement of Ass't Sec'ty 
Charles McLure); 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 70, at 50 (statement of Robert Mcin-
tyre, Citizens for Tax Justice) (stating that indexing would have required a much higher top 
individual rate, perhaps 40% or 45%, to meet the distributional equity requirement, and a 
series of very complex adjustments on both interest deductions and deferral of gains). 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Professor Michael 
Boskin). In 1978, Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal, pointing to Brazilian expe-
rience, criticized the House-passed Archer indexing provision (in addition to the then-ex-
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Tax professionals asserted that indexing is complicated. 76 House 
Ways and Means Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex., argued that taxpayers 
already had to maintain detailed records as to cost and improve-
ments.77 Assistant Secretary Leslie Samuels responded that, "ad-
ding the burden ... of keeping track of cost-of-living adjustments, 
inflation adjustments over a long period of time" would be signifi-
cant,78 giving the often cited example of mutual fund shares.79 
Significantly, the British indexing regime exempts almost 
$10,000 of gain a year and, hence, small taxpayers.80 After initial 
problems with losses, the British system does not currently allow 
them. 81 The Clinton Administration criticized the allowance of 
losses arising from indexing basis.82 Not surprisingly, the ability to 
take losses from indexing basis was omitted by the CW ATRA 
provisions. 
Assistant Secretary Leslie Samuels believed that the allowance 
for losses on the sale of a personal residence was unwise tax policy; 
losses on personal use property are generally not allowed under the 
Code. Furthermore, in some instances, such losses reflected a de-
isting 50% exclusion of gain) as institutionalizing inflation. Revenue Act of 1978: Hearings 
on H.R. 13511 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 163 
(1978) (hereinafter 1978 Senate Hearings) (statement of Secretary Michael Blumenthal). 
78 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Craig Willet, CPA); 
Ways & Means Hearing, Feb. 1, 1995, supra note 63 (statement of Deborah Walker, repre-
sentative of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants); Senate Finance Hearings, 
Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statements of Ron Pearlman and Senator Don Nickles, R-
Okla.). 
77 Ways & Means Hearings, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of Chair Bill Archer, 
R-Tex.); Howard Gleckman, I Want to Tear the Income Tax Out by Its Roots, Business 
Week, Mar. 6, 1995, at 34 (reporting that, in an interview, Chair Archer stated that with 
computerization, "I don't think the complexity will be that great"). But see Cohen, supra 
note 24, at 104. Rep. Archer had similarly argued in 1990 that a generic capital gains prefer-
ence would not create complexities. 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 65, at 27. 
78 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of Ass't Sec'ty Leslie 
Samuels). 
70 An Interview with Ronald A. Pearlman: Tax Policy and Product, 29 Tax Notes 1288, 
1290 (Dec. 30, 1985); Impact of Tax Simplification Hearings, supra note 37, at 1003 (state-
ment of Charles McLure, Deputy Ass't Sec'ty for Tax Analysis); H.R. Rep. No. 84 (dissent-
ing views), supra note 27, at 283. 
80 Unofficial Transcript of Finance Hearing on Asset Indexation (Feb. 16, 1995), available 
in 95 Tax Notes Today 36-41 (Feb. 23, 1995) (hereinafter Senate Finance Hearing, Feb. 16, 
1995) (statement of Christopher Dent, Senior Tax Manager for Price Waterhouse and ex-
pert on United Kingdom income tax system). 
81 Senate Finance Hearing, Feb. 16, 1995, supra note 80 (statement of Christopher Dent). 
81 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of Ass't Sec'ty Leslie 
Samuels and colloquy with Rep. Sander Levin, D-Mich.). 
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cline in the local real estate market; in others, it reflected real de-
preciation and other deterioration in the residence.88 Additionally, 
the decline in the fair market value of residences is a regional phe-
nomenon. This factor may lead Congress to drop the ordinary-loss-
on-sale-of-residence rule from any capital gains provision enacted 
this term. 
A wide range of witnesses criticized the nonindexing of debt, 
while indexing equities, on the grounds that it opens the door to 
tax abuse; these witnesses included tax professionals,8" econo-
mists8~ and some members of Congress.86 The British system has 
avoided this problem, since investment interest is nondeductible. 87 
An economist claimed that the market makes sure that arbitrage 
opportunities do not exist,88 but historically, high income individu-
als did indeed incur large amounts of debt to acquire or carry equi-
ties. 89 Chair Archer reasoned that indexing of debt would require 
both sides of the income-expense equation to be indexed.90 This 
•• Prepared Statement of Ass't Sec'ty Leslie Samuels for House Ways and Means Comm. 
Hearing, Jan. 11, 1995, available in 95 Tax Notes Today 7-39 (Jan. 11, 1995) (hereinafter 
Prepared Statement of Ass't Sec'ty Samuels) . 
.. Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Ron Pearlman, 
former Ass't Sec'ty and former Joint Committee on Taxation Chief of StafO; id. (statement 
of Michael Schier, representative of New York State Bar Association); Ways & Means Hear-
ing, Feb. 1, 1995, supra note 63 (statement of Deborah Walker, representative of AICPA). 
88 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Dr. Barry Bos-
worth, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute); Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, 
supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry Aaron); see Reed Shuldinger, Indexing the Tax Code, 
48 Tax L. Rev. 537, 641-43 (1993) (stating that the case for indexing debt is stronger than 
the case for indexing capital assets, but political pressure is for indexing the latter but not 
the former). 
•• 141 Cong. Rec. H4238 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. James Moran, D-Va., 
formerly a stockbroker selling tax shelters) (stating that if we don't index interest costs for 
inflation, there will be a built-in tax shelter which we will rue); 134 Cong. Rec. S3954, 3957 
(daily ed. Apr. 14, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Bill Bradley, D-N.J., and Finance Committee 
Chair Lloyd Bentsen, D-Tex, respectively). Another member of Congress kept challenging 
this notion. Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 11, 1995, supra note 54 (colloquy between Rep. 
Dick Zimmer, R-N.J., and Iris Lav, Associate Director of the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (colloquy between Rep. 
Dick Zimmer, R-N.J., and Michael Schier). 
•• Senate Finance Hearing, Feb. 16, 1995, supra note 80 (statement of Christopher Dent). 
88 Id. (statement of Alan Reynolds, Director of Economic Research, Hudson Institute). 
•• 1968 Tax Reform Study, supra note 38, at 84-86, 142-45 (stating that the combination 
of interest deductions and a capital gains preference reduced the effective rate for high 
income taxpayers with both to 10% ). This was the impetus for § 163(d), which undoubtedly 
has reduced this pattern. 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Feb. 1, 1995, supra note 63 (statement of Chair Bill Archer, R-
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view overlooks the fact that most lenders are either legally tax ex-
empt, such as pension funds and foreigners, or functionally tax ex-
empt owing to other preferences, such as financial institutions.91 
On the other hand, existing section 163(d) limitations on deduction 
of investment interest appear to substantially limit tax arbitrage 
opportunities from indexing capital assets. An individual's deduc-
tion of investment interest is limited to "investment income," 
which in this context includes "net gain attributable to the disposi-
tion of property held for investment."92 Thus, deduction of interest 
on indebtedness attributable to indexed stock would not be de-
ductible until the stock was disposed of (assuming no other invest-
ment income, including dividends, etc.), and the otherwise taxable 
gain from such disposition, which serves as the measuring rod for 
the deduction, would be reduced by the inflation adjustments.93 At 
the same time, indexing equities but not debt investments held by 
individuals is particularly unfair to the moderate income taxpayers 
because they disproportionately invest in such instruments.9" 
The Administration911 and others96 criticized the allowance of 
both a 50% exclusion (traditionally justified as a rough offset for 
Tex.). 
8
' See Barker, supra note 39, at 543; Lee Sheppard, Fear of Financing -LBO Contro-
versy, 42 Tax Notes 424, 426 (Jan. 23, 1989). See supra note 39. See Shuldinger, supra note 
85, at 644-45 (stating that under the "clientele effect," low-bracket or effective rate taxpay-
ers find it attractive to hold debt, while high bracket taxpayers find it attractive to borrow). 
•• I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(B)(ii). One opponent of indexing posited tax arbitrage by assuming 
that the investment interest was currently offset against other investment income. Ways & 
Means Hearing, Jan. 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Iris Lav, representative of Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities); accord Shuldinger, supra note 85, at 647. But other invest-
ment income presumably would not be indexed. 
•• I wish to thank my class on Small Business Planning in which this insight came out in 
a discussion of the continued viability of§ 1202. Note that to the extent capital gain is used 
to soak up investment interest, such gain cannot be offset by the 50% deduction. CW ATRA, 
supra note 11, at § 6301(a) (adding new § 1202(c)). See Shuldinger, supra note 85, at 647 
n.409 (discussing similar, existing-law provisions reducing capital gains subject to the top 
individual rate of 28%, where they are included in investment income for purposes of 
§ 163(d)) . 
.. Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 16, 1995, supra note 80 (statement of Ed Cohen, former 
Under Secretary of Treasury); 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 75, at 141 (statement of 
Sec'ty Michael Blumenthal). 
•• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of Ass't Sec'ty Leslie 
Samuels). 
" Ways & Means Hearing, Feb. 1, 1995, supra note 63 (statement of Deborah Walker, 
representative of AICPA). 
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inflation97) and indexing of basis for inflation "as too generous." 
Such "double dipping," in the words used by former Rep. (and 
subsequent Ways and Means Chair) Dan Rostenkowski, D-111., al-
most two decades ago to describe a similar Archer proposal,98 could 
create negative income and, hence, tax sheltering where an eco-
nomic or real gain existed. 99 
Different constituencies support a generic preference and index-
ing, with more support among the traditional interest groups for 
the former. 100 Recent hard data as to the composition of annual 
realizations of capital gains is unavailable, but perhaps illogically is 
seemingly politically unimportant in an interest group analysis. 
Around 50% of annual realizations consists of stock (both public 
and closely held101). 102 My guess108 is that gain from nonresidential 
•• See S. Rep. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6791, 6955; 128 Cong. Rec. 17535 (1982)(statement of Senate Finance Committee Chair Bob 
Dole, R-Kan.) (stating that the then-60% deduction was a rough offset for inflation); Ways 
& Means Hearing, January 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Michael Schier, represen-
tative of the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association); Revenue Revision 1942: 
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 77 Cong., 2d Sess. 262-63 and 1636 
(statements of Ass't Sec'ty Randolph Paul) (hereinafter House 1942 Hearings). See also 88 
Cong. Rec. A134 (1942) (extension of Remarks of Rep. Manny Keller, D-N.Y.); Revenue Act 
of 1934: Confidential Hearings on H.R. 7385 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 55 (1934) (statement of Dr. Roswell Magill, Under Secretary of 
Treasury) (hereinafter Confidential Senate 1934 Hearings). 
•• 124 Cong. Rec. 25471 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Dan Rostenkowski, D-lll.)(stating that 
since the 50% deduction was offset for inflation, indexing sponsored by Rep. Bill Archer, R-
Tex., was "double dipping"). The House passed the indexing proposal. 124 Cong. Rec. 
25474-75 (1978) (Roll No. 680, 249 yeas to 167 nays). The conservative coalition, as de-
scribed infra note 107, prevailed: the Republicans supported the indexing amendment 142 
to 1, with the Southern Democrats voting 59 to 26; the Northern Democrats opposed it 140 
to 48. 34 Cong. Q. Almanac 170-H (1978). The Senate passed instead a 70% exclusion. The 
Revenue Act of 1978, as enacted, compromised between the House's double-dipping index-
ing and the Senate's 70% deduction, with a 60% long-term capital gains deduction. Pub. L. 
No. 95-600, § 402, 92 Stat. 2763, 2867. In conjunction with the then-maximum ordinary rate 
of 70% on investment income, the compromise resulted in a maximum capital gains rate of 
28%. 
" Ways & Means Hearing, Feb. 1, 1995, supra note 63 (statement of Deborah Walker, 
representative of AICPA). 
100 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 65, at 163 (statement of Robert Mcin-
tyre, Citizens for Tax Justice) (stating that indexing would not benefit an entrepreneur 
whose business went up tremendously in value); id. at 299 (attachment by Rep. Wyden, D-
Ore.) (stating that woodland owners would not benefit as much from indexing); accord Ways 
& Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of William Siegel, President of 
the Society of American Foresters). 
101 Closely-held stock realizations probably constitute no more than 10% of the value of 
all common stock realizations. First, prior to the 1976 Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 70% of 
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real estate amounts to around 25%-35%,1°• and installment sales 
estate assets were public stock; only 6% of the estimated tax cost of the Senate estate and 
gift tax provision (which did not include carryover basis) was attributable to closely-held 
stock and farms. See 122 Cong. Rec. 25954-55 (1976) (remarks of Sen. George Hathaway, D-
Me., and Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.); Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Public Hearings 
and Panel Discussions Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
355 (1976) (statement of Robert Brandon, public interest group) (stating that untraded 
closely-held corporation stock totaled not more than $1.9 billion and marketable securities 
totaled not more than $14 billion, indicating at least a 10 to 1 ratio of public stock holdings 
to closely-held stock and farms). Second, the Small Business Administration estimates that 
only 10% of business finance resources currently goes to small business. Letter dated April 
3, 1995, from Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administra-
tion to Rep. Zoe Lofgren, D-Cal., reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. H4317-18 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 
1995). Third, as of 1988, the top 10,000 corporations out of around 3.5 million corporations 
held over 80% of total corporate assets by adjusted basis. See supra note 35. Fourth, public 
stock trades much more frequently than stock in a close corporation. Lee, supra note 35, at 
1416. Closely held small businesses appear more important to capital gains cut proponents 
than public stock based upon their rhetoric, but cloaking is at work here at least some of the 
time. 
••• Prepared Statement of Jane G. Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy Con-
gressional Research Service Before the Senate Finance Comm., Feb. 15, 1995, available in 95 
Tax Notes Today 32-38 (Feb. 16, 1995) (hereinafter Prepared Statement of Jane Gravelle) 
(stating that gains from equities range from about 20% to 50% of annual realizations, de-
pending on the relative performance of the stock market; much of the remainder is gain on 
real estate); Revenue Act of 1963: Hearings on H.R. 8363 Before the Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 197 (1963) (hereinafter 1963 Senate Hearings) (report-
ing that 41% of capital gains realizations in 1959 were from corporate stock); Congressional 
Budget Office, Effects of Lower Capital Gains Taxes on Economic Growth, 30 (Aug. 1990), 
available in 90 Tax Notes Today 181-1 (Aug. 31, 1990) (stating that "[i]n 1985, 46 percent of 
net capital gains was on corporate stock ... "). During the period between 1985 and 1989, 
sales of stock, securities, and partnership interests comprised about half of reported capital 
gains. Michael Haliassos & Andrew Lyon, Progressivity of Capital Gains Taxation with Op-
timal Portfolio Selection, Paper Presented at University of Michigan Tax Conference on 
Sept. 11, 1992, available in 92 Tax Notes Today 190-28 (Sept. 18, 1992). During years when 
the stock market performs relatively poorly, for example in the early and mid-1970's, this 
percentage is much lower due to the combination of less capital gain from corporate stock 
and the recognition of much more capital losses from stock. Tax Reductions of 1978, supra 
note 35, at 20. For example, in 1973, corporate stock accounted for 53.8% of capital asset 
transactions; gross capital gains from stock constituted 26.1% of such gross gains. Gross 
capital losses from stock, however, constituted 51.9% of such losses, while net capital gains 
from stock constituted only 14.8% of net capital gains. Id. at 16. These figures were under-
stated: the share of capital gain from partnerships and trusts (7.9% of net capital gains), 
and prior year installment proceeds (amounting to 14% of net capital gains), included a 
"large amount of sales of and/or gains from corporate stock [as well as from real estate]." ld. 
at 15. The figures for 1977 were essentially unchanged. ld. at 18-19. 
101 Lee, supra note 35, at 1410-11. 
, .. Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry Aaron) 
(stating that real estate industry is the source of about half of all capital gains); see Ways & 
Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Dr. Jane Gravelle, Senior Spe-
cialist in Economic Policy Congressional Research Services); Prepared Statement of Jane 
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gain, largely from closely held stock and real estate, amounts to 
10% to 15%. Timber and livestock, although politically important, 
amount to small percentages of total annual realizations.106 Due to 
rollovers and the $125,000 exclusion under section 121(b), annual 
realizations from the sales of residences may be ignored (except for 
coastal cities), although they are often mentioned by congressional 
proponents of preferential capital gains treatment. 108 Despite the 
actual composition of annual realizations of capital gains, congres-
sional hearings and floor debates disproportionately reflect the in-
terests of narrow constituencies. 
Over the last thirty years, the political base for increasing the 
capital gains preference, whether by a generic exclusion, or index-
ing, or both, has been a "conservative coalition" of Republicans 
and Southern Democrats.107 With the new Republican majorities in 
Gravelle, supra note 102. It is unclear whether these statements include residential real es-
tate. Cf. Ways & Means Hearing, Feb. 1, 1995, supra note 63 (statement of Rep. Gerald 
Kleczka, D-Wis.) (stating that 50% of all net investment is in residential real estate). 
••• In 1959, timber and other natural resource capital gains amounted to 2.1% of total 
long-term capital gain; livestock amounted to 5.7%. 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 102, 
at 197 (statement of Sec'ty Douglas Dillon). In 1973, net gains from timber amounted to 
0.6% of net gains; gains from livestock and farmland with unharvested crops amounted to 
0.4%. Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at 16-17. For 1977, the comparable figures 
were 1.3% and 0.5%. ld. at 18-19. 
108 Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at 98; 124 Cong. Rec. 25471 (1978) (remarks of 
Rep. Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill.). The median purchase price of a new home in 1993 was 
$126,500, see infra note 213, just above the excluded gain ceiling. 
,.., For a discussion of this political-science concept, defined as a majority of Republicans 
and Southern Democrats opposed by a majority of other Democrats, see Lee, supra note 35, 
at 1402 and n.lO. The first two decades of capital gains legislation, from 1921 through 1941, 
tell a somewhat different story. Rather than a coalition of Republican and Southern-Demo-
cratic special interests driving capital gains legislation, the income tax in the 1920's was 
intended to tax only the near rich and the rich. Marjorie Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital 
Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do With It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869,873 n.18, 908 n.235 (1985). 
Half or more of the very rich's income was from capital gains, where realizations clearly had 
been retarded by high rates at the end of WWI. The capital gains preference was enacted 
"to permit such transactions to go forward without fear of a prohibitive tax ... " H.R. Rep. 
No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 168, 176; Revenue 
Revision: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. lO-
ll (1920) (statement of Dr. Thomas S. Adams, Special Tax Adviser to Treasury, and father 
of the Revenue Act of 1921) (noting that from 1916 to 1918, during boom times, net income 
of individuals with over $300,000 in income dropped 60%, from $992,000,000 to 
$392,000,000); 61 Cong. Rec. 5201 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Hawley, R-Ore.,); id. at 5289 
(remarks of Rep. Green, R-Iowa). Thus, increased revenues were the articulated policy for 
the initial enactment of the capital gains preference. In the 1930's, in addition to the notion 
that lower capital gains rates increased revenues, capital gains tax legislation was also moti-
vated by the idea that "frozen capital," not invested in the stock market, perpetuated the 
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the House and Senate, the Democrats presumably are less impor-
tant except in veto override situations.108 The hearings and floor 
debates of the past two decades reveal that the capital gains pro-
ponents explicitly championed timberlot owners/09 small business 
owners and venture capitalists, farmers of both livestock and farm-
land, homeowners, and occasionally small investors in the stock 
market, roughly in that order.110 Over the years, and in the 1995 
Great Depression. S. Rep. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 
779, 783; accord Associated Press, Harrison Demands End of Profits Tax, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
13, 1938, at 1 (" '[I]f there is a sit-down strike upon the part of capital because of fear or the 
uncertainties of investment, ... we should break it if possible, and ... effective work should 
be done toward removing some of the barriers that are checking the flow of capital and 
credit into new investment and new industries.'") (quotation attributed to Senate Finance, 
Chair Pat Harrison, D-Miss.). In fact, frozen credit from lenders not making loans (rather 
than frozen capital) was a cause of the Great Depression. Federal Reserve's Second Mone-
tary Policy Report for 1992: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1992) (statement of Federal Reserve Board Chair-
man Alan Greenspan) (hereinafter 1992 Senate Banking Committee Hearing). 
108 Moreover, many of the more conservative Democrats have been replaced by Republi-
cans. See Robert Wells, A Longtime Voting Bloc Falls with Southern Democrats, 52 Cong. 
Q. Wkly. Rep. 3627 (Dec. 31, 1994). After the 1994 elections, Democrats in Congress became 
a minority in the South for the first time since Reconstruction. Juliana Gruenwald, Demo-
crats Face an Uphill Battle to Regain the House Soon, 53 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 295 (Jan. 28, 
1995). Rep. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., stated that there were probably only 11 Democrats left in 
the House who had voted for Bill Archer's capital gains cut in the past (presumably in 1989, 
not in 1978). Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33. 
108 The 1989 capital gains debate in the House provides the most clear identification, in 
the legislative history of capital gains, of the interest groups favored by the Conservative 
Coalition. Timber was their preeminent special interest. 135 Cong. Rec. H6280 (daily ed. 
Sept. 28, 1989) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay Thomas, D-Ga.) ("The people- I have heard from 
have not been people in investments, or wealthy people, but the landowners who worked the 
forest land in my district.''); id. at H6281 (remarks of Rep. Sonny Callahan, R-Ala.). See 
also id. at H6278 (remarks of Rep. Charles Rangel, D-N.Y.) ("[T]imber becomes the issue 
rather than the social needs of our country."). See Charles Krauthan1mer, Stealing from the 
Future, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1989, at A31; 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 65, 
at 164 (statement of Robert Mcintyre, Citizens for Tax Justice) (stating that timber is the 
most popular capital asset to the Ways and Means Committee). Two representatives from 
timber-growing districts opposed the 1989 capital gains cut, primarily on distributional 
grounds. See 135 Cong. Rec. H6282 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989) (remarks of Rep. Tim Valen-
tine, D-N.C.); id. at H6291 (Rep. Les AuCoin, D-Ore.). 
110 See Lee, supra note 35, at 1404. These special interests make it so difficult to pare 
many of the non-policy based culls identified by Professor Johnson. Calvin Johnson, Seven-
teen Culls from Capital Gains, 48 Tax Notes 1285 (Sept. 3, 1990). See Shaviro, supra note 
68, at 398. Timber and livestock are prime examples. Professor Surrey similarly proposed 
limiting capital asset status principally to corporate securities. Stanley Surrey, Def"mitional 
Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 985 (1956), in revised form in Staff of 
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Revision Compendium 1203-
32 (Comm. Prini 1959) (hereinafter Tax Revision Compendium). By the 1959 Panel Discus-
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Hearings and the House floor debate on CWATRA, small business 
was most important.m Although seldom mentioned in the hearings 
sions, at least Ways and Means Chair Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., manifesting a thorough knowl-
edge of the host of exceptions, had accepted the policy argument that the capital gains 
preference should be limited to traditional investment assets such as home, land or stock. 
Panel Discussions on Income Tax Revisions Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 693 (1960) (hereinafter 1959 Panel Discussions). He had noted in ear-
lier hearings that the statutory proliferation of categories of capital assets in effect lessened 
the channeling value of the preference. Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stabil-
ity: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy of the Joint Comm. on the Economic 
Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 326 (1955) (hereinafter 1955 Tax Policy Hearings). Chair Mills 
himself was receptive to definitional reforms, but he and other Representatives were cool as 
to taxation at death. 1959 Panel Discussions, supra, at 703-04, 711-13. Secretary Douglas 
Dillon too readily conceded that the definitional reforms, e.g., timber and coal royalties, did 
not involve much revenue, setting a dangerous precedent. President's 1963 Tax Message: 
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 88th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 606 
(1963) (colloquy with Rep. Howard Baker, R-Tenn.)(hereinafter 1963 House Hearings); see 
also 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 102, at 285 (colloquy with Senator Paul Douglas, D-
Ill.). In 1963, the House passed a compromised additional 10% capital gains cut (for a total 
60% exclusion), after a one-year holding period, for "classic" capital gains assets such as 
stock and land only, retaining a 50% exclusion after 6 months for all capital assets including 
"statutory" capital assets. H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 93-94, 96-97 (1963). Sec-
retary Douglas Dillon criticized the House two-step arrangement and two maximum rates as 
seriously complicating the capital gains portion of the tax return and the Code. 1963 Senate 
Hearings, supra, at 129. The Kennedy Administration opposed the House provision because 
it failed to provide for taxation at death of unrealized appreciation. See infra notes 319-20 
and accompanying text. The House provision died in Conference. In the end, Professor Sur-
rey was unable to implement his capital gains definitional reforms, even as President John 
Kennedy's and then-President Lyndon Johnson's Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, except 
for depreciation recapture (largely ineffective as to real estate improvements, due to the 
1964 compromise limitation of "r~capture" to the excess of accelerated depreciation over 
straight-line depreciation), see supra note 22, and ultimately withdrawal of capital gains 
treatment from service-favored compensation (lump-sum and employer stock distributions 
from "qualified" profit sharing and stock bonus plans, and qualified stoCk option plans) in 
1969. 
111 Senate Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Senator Charles Grassley, 
R-Iowa) ("It seems like the mail I get on the subject of capital gains comes mostly from 
farmers or small business people."); accord The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform 
Proposals: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
2803 (1978) (statement of Rep. Ed Jenkins, D-Ga.) ("[T]his is the main reason that most 
business people are working. They wish to retain something. when they finally dispose of the 
business. Perhaps many of them are also investors in land or other capital assets unrelated 
to their business. This is an extremely important issue to them in my district. . . . All my 
small businessman simply tell me don't do anything to hurt capital gains treatment."); id. at 
1253 (statement of Rep. Jenkins); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 
(1978) ("In addition, the committee believes that the present level of capital gains taxes has 
contributed to the shortage of investment funds needed for small businesses and for capital 
formation generally. Moreover, the committee believes that it is inappropriate to subject 
many once-in-a-lifetime gains on the sale of property, such as small businesses or personal 
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or debates on the floor, Republicans surely supported capital gains 
for public stock held by high income individuals, since such "enter- · 
prisers" constitute a key Republican constituent group. 112 Rare but 
revealing exceptions to this silence emerged when members of 
Congress opposed targeted capital gains proposals that would not 
benefit high income individuals or public stock.113 
residences, to the minimum tax."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7148. Compared to ear-
lier floor debate, the 1995 House debate on CW ATRA contained few specifics as to capital 
gains special interests. Timber was mentioned once, see supra note 38. Three members men-
tioned the capital gains cuts as freeing up capital and spurring investment in small business. 
141 Cong. Rec. H4218, H4220-21 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (remarks of Reps. Nancy Johnson, 
, R-Conn., Jan Meyers, R-Kan., and Phil English, R-Pa.). Again, the 1989 floor debate on the 
capital gains cut sponsored by Rep. Ed Jenkins, D-Ga., and Rep. Bill Archer, R-Tex., most 
clearly identified the other capital gains special interests of small business and high tech 
ventures, farmers (farm land and recurring sales of livestock) and occasionally residences. 
135 Cong. Rec. H6281 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989) (remarks of Rep. Beryl Anthony, D-Ark.) 
(beneficiaries of capital gains cut are homeowners, farmer, small businessman, small inves-
tor nest egg); id. at H6283-84 (remarks of Rep. Andy Jacobs., D-Ind.); id. at H6284-85 (re-
marks of Rep. Tom Campbell, R-Cal.) ("Northern California and the Silicon Valley is com-
posed of entrepreneurs, risk-takers who are willing to put their effort and their money on 
the line . . . Competitiveness means keeping American risk-taking in America ... capital 
gains is only the start."); id. at H6289-90 (remarks of Rep. Bill Frenzel, R-Minn.) (small 
high-risk start-up); id. at H6296 (remarks of Rep. Ron Wyden, D-Ore.) (small business/ 
jobs); id. at H6311 (remarks of Rep. Guy Vander Jagt, R-Mich.). 
111 See John Lee, "Death and Taxes" and Hypocrisy, 60 Tax Notes 1393, 1397 (Sept. 6, 
1993), for a discussion of the L.A. Times/Gallup Poll dissection of the voting electorate into 
11 factions, including "enterprisers" who were affluent, highly educated, 99% white, 60% 
male, mostly married, and concentrated in the suburbs, with strongly pro-business, anti-
government, and anti-welfare spending attitudes. In the late 1980s, enterprisers made up 
16% of all likely voters, and together with "moralists" (roughly equivalent to the Christian 
Right), composed the core of the Republican coalition. For a discussion of the alignment of 
the Christian Right with the Republican Party, see Laurie Goodstein, Mixing God and 
Politics Brings Out the Naysayers, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1995, at AI. 
118 For criticism of a "progressive" provision providing no additional preference at the 
top, see 138 Cong. Rec. S3683 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Connie Mack, R-
Fla.) ("[l]t fails to reduce the tax rate for those individuals who have large pools of capital 
.... "); id. at S3682 (remarks of Sen. Bob Kasten, R-Wis.) ("[K]eeping the tax rate high 
keeps that capital locked up and out of the hands of businesses who can grow and produce 
jobs."); 138 Cong. Rec. S3279 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1992) (remarks of Senator Steve Symms, 
R-Idaho) ("It seems to me once again we are going to soak the rich but this time they don't 
even get anything in return."). For criticisms of § 1202, see 138 Cong. Rec. H783 (daily ed. 
Feb. 27, 1992) (remarks of Rep. George Riggs, R-Cal.) (stating that§ 1202 did not provide a 
significant capital gains reduction "to help entrepreneurs attract the private venture capital 
necessary to grow a business ... "); cf. 138 Cong. Rec. S3106 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1992) (re-
marks of Sen. Pete Dominici, R-N.M.) (stating that every time Congress attempted to target 
a capital gains preference, it was wrong as often as it was right, and did as much harm as 
good); id. at S3633-34 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Bob Kasten, R-Wis.) ("The 
capital gains tax provision in the Finance Committee package would make the Tax Code 
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Perhaps most revealing was the voice of the capital gains "wan-
nabe," illustrated by a House Member in the floor debate on the 
1989 Archer-sponsored capital gains cut (including indexing): "We 
have found from talking to many constituents, who will not benefit 
immediately, that they do not want to preempt opportunity be-
cause they want to have this opportunity."114 In the 1995 Hearings 
and House floor debate on CW ATRA, Rep. Jim Ramstad, R-
Minn., recounted a story of a 17 -year old who said he liked a capi-
tal gains preference. When asked if he had any capital gains, the 
teenager answered "[n]o, not now, ... but someday I hope to."116 
Anecdotes in the 1995 Hearings focused almost exclusively on 
small business and the capital gains "wannabe's" (and, to a lesser 
degree, real estate), although timber and farming were also 
more complex while doing, in my view, very little to help reincentivize the small business 
sector of our economy."). 
114 135 Cong. Rec. H6295 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989) (remarks of Rep. David Dreir, R-Cal). 
"It is not only millionaires who want low rates, but also working and middle class people 
who dream of becoming millionaires in the land of opportunity." Kornhauser, supra note 47, 
at 169. 
110 141 Cong. Rec. H4215 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Jim Ramstad, R-
Minn.); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Jim Ram-
stad, R-Minn.); id. (statement of Jim Hoak, representative of American Business Confer-
ence) ("Most Americans believe that they can improve themselves and their family's eco-
nomic position."). Ranking member and former Chair Sam Gibbons, D-Fla., responded that 
a 17 year old would be better off playing the lottery because only 8% of Americans ever win 
anything on the capital gains tax cut. 141 Cong. Rec. H4215 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995). Chair 
Bill Archer, R-Tex., rejoined that over a five-year period studied by the Joint Committee, 
16% of the. taxpayers reported a capital gain, so that over a life time a very, very large 
percentage of Americans would have "some type of capital gain." Id. at H4231. The catch is 
that the top 2% accounted for 70% of the gains reported. The large number of taxpayers 
changing every year accounted for less than 10% of the gains over the five year period. See 
infra note 155 and accompanying text. So the chances of winning a capital gains prize of a 
small amount over one's lifetime may not be that bad. But to win a big capital gains prize 
you have to be in the top 2%. Furthermore, most Americans are probably aware by now of 
the decline in the standard of living of the bottom and part of the middle-income taxpayers 
over the past decade or two. See infra notes 173 and 192-7 and accompanying text. Never-
theless, the "wannabe" effect may underlie the results in public opinion polls described in 
Cunningham and Schenk, supra note 34, at 369 n.217, in which 44% to two-thirds of those 
polled favored a cut in the capital gains rate. The vocal students in my Small Business 
Planning course supported a generic capital gains preference in the hopes that some day 
they would have capital gains, as upon the sale of stock, to pay for their children's educa-
tion. They expressly did not care that high income individuals would reduce the rate on 
largely economic gains with such a preference. Also, one student volunteered that the more 
he heard the rhetoric of take from the poor and give to the rich, the less it mattered to him. 
It may be noteworthy that he regularly realized capital gains as a law student. 
32 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 15:1 
represented.116 
Residences constitute an old red herring. 117 This time the more 
sophisticated anecdote involved an atypical, under-age-fifty-five 
taxpayer who chose not to reinvest in a more expensive house.118 If 
the problem is the $125,000 ceiling under section 121, Congress 
should raise it or vary it regionally. Economists claim residences 
already garner too much of a preference. 119 
118 Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Senator Charles 
Grassley, R-Iowa) (farmers or small business); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra 
note 33 (statement of Rep. Ken Calvert, R-Cal.) (stating that capital gains preference gave 
his father incentive to expand restaurant business in 1970's and 1980's; retired lady won't 
sell 5 acres because of capital gains tax); id. (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden, D-Ore.) 
(Christmas tree farm); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of 
Rep. Mark Foley, R-Fla.) (stating that he passed on opportunity to sell family owned im-
proved real estate held for 20 years because tax liability would have been over $36,000); id. 
(statement of Rep. Mac Collins, R-Ga.) (stating that a constituent would not sell rural real 
estate because capital gains taxes too high). H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 27, states that 
taxation of inflationary gains discourages "investors from selling old investments even when 
better investment opportunities present themselves." 
117 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
118 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Ken Calvert, 
R-Cal); 141 Cong. Rec. H4222 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Dave Weldon, R-
Fla.) (stating that a single mother selling home to provide for herself and 7-year old son 
needed CW ATRA preference). When Senator Alan Simpson, R-Wyo., recounted an anec-
dote of a 60 year old waiter complaining to him in a restaurant about capital gains taxes on 
the sale of his home, Dr. Henry Aaron rejoined that a $125,000 exclusion was available. The 
Senator said he mumbled that to the waiter. "But he still was waiting. Maybe it was for his 
sister's house or something." Senate Finance Hearing, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36. 
110 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Dr. Barry Bos-
worth, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution); Prepared Statement of Dr. Henry Aaron 
to the Senate Finance Comm. Feb. 15, 1995, available in 95 Tax Notes Today 32-36 (Feb. 
16, 1995): 
Owner-occupied housing is the most tax favored asset under current law. The income 
from this asset, imputed gross rent, is excluded from the tax base. Owners are none-
theless permitted to deduct two expenses of ownership normally permitted only for 
income-generating assets, interest expense and property taxes. Capital gains on sale 
of a principal residence are excluded from tax if the owner purchases another house 
within two years. In addition, current law excuses the first $125,000 of capital gains 
on sale of a principal residence for homeowners over age 55 who sell their houses. The 
result of all of these concessions is the allocation of an excessive share of the U.S. 
capital stock to housing and too little to less favored assets. 
See also Congressional Budget Office, Deficit Reduction Options (Mar. 3, 1995), available in 
1995 Tax Notes Today 44-74 (Mar. 6, 1995) (stating that one-third of net private invest-
ment goes into owner-occupied housing). On the other hand, Canada has the same rate of 
home ownership, with no deduction for mortgage interest, but with a capital gains prefer-
ence for sales proceeds. ld. Ranking minority member and former Chair Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, D-N.Y., when told this by Chair Bob Packwood, R-Ore, responded "Oh, damn."" 
Senate Finance Hearing, Mar. 2, 1995, supra note 8. 
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Small business owners typically capitalize their ventures with 
minimum equity. High-tech venture capitalists similarly invest 
more sweat than cash equity and historically have done better than 
inflation;120 timberlot owners and farmers usually deduct most of 
their growing costs up front. Improved real estate, never men-
tioned in the debate, annually loses basis with depreciation. In 
contrast, high income churners on the public market have basis, 
but do not hold investments long enough to experience much infla-
tion.121 Thus, most, if not all, of the traditional interest groups pre-
fer a generic percentage exclusion to indexing of basis for 
inflation. 122 
Notwithstanding Chair Bill Archer's long commitment to index-
ing and its strong equity appeal, I expect to see it drop out of any 
final capital gains provision enacted by Congress this term. If Con-
gress approved the indexing of basis of capital assets for inflation, 
instead of a 50% individual capital gains exclusion, history indi-
cates that the above factors would give rise to political pressure to 
replace indexing with the preferred exclusion (at no revenue loss 
after several years of inflation). It took the proponents of a flat 
rate and short holding period only four years to replace the four-
step, ten-year, sliding-scale capital gains deduction of the Revenue 
Act of 1934 with a plan offering the better of a 50% deduction (for 
the small capital gains income taxpayer) or a 15% rate (for the big 
capital gains income taxpayer) after two years. It took some propo-
nents only four more years to pass the Revenue Act of 1942, which 
110 In 1985, venture capital representatives and entrepreneurs in general explicitly pre-
ferred a generic exclusion over indexing; this was one of the stated reasons for the Reagan 
Administration abandoning the indexing of the basis of capital assets proposed in Treasury 
I in favor of a 50% exclusion of capital gain. Impact of Tax Simplification Hearings, supra 
note 37, at 963, 1004, 1011 (statements of Ass't Sec'ty Charles McLure and Donald Acker-
man, representative of National Venture Capital Association, respectively). 
111 See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
111 Former Under Secretary of Treasury Ed Cohen pointed out at the Spring 1995 Tax 
Symposium that farmland and residences in expensive metropolitan. areas, both of which 
tend to have long holding periods, would benefit from inflation adjustments. While support-
ers of these two interests have been very vocal in the Congressional debates, see supra note 
110, the capital gain attributable to farmland is in the range of gains attributable to timber 
and in some years less. Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at 17-19. The amount attrib-
utable to residences is much larger, in the 15% range in the 1970's, and probably more 
today, but only a very small percentage of such gains are not shielded by the rollover provi-
sions of § 1034 or the § 121 $125,000 shield for taxpayers who have attained age 55. ld. See 
supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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offered the better of a 50% deduction or 25% rate after a six 
month holding period. This Act, which continued unchanged for 
over twenty-five years, remained only slightly modified for almost 
another decade, until the Revenue Act of 1978.123 
Several witnesses at the 1995 Hearings suggested a sliding-scale 
alternative to indexing, either because it is less complicated, 124 or 
because it serves as compensation for a lack of basis, as in the 
cases of the timber industry and small business. 1211 Chair Archer 
objected that a sliding scale would not make the taxpayer whole in 
118 The broad contours of the 1934 capital gains tax legislation, Pub. L. 73-216, § 117, 48 
Stat. 680, 714 (1934), were set by the Joint Committee's 1929 proposal of a two- to fifteen-
year sliding scale capital gains deduction, with a 100% deduction after fifteen years, bot-
tomed on: (a) the policy of approximating the tax payable, had the capital gain been real-
ized ratably over the holding period; and (b) the premise that a large part of capital gains 
"is derived from the taxation of appreciation in money value as distinct from actual value." 
Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, Supplemental Report on Capital Gains and 
Losses, vol. 1, pt. 7, at 2 (1929). The House Ways and Means Committee Bill dropped the 
later years' exclusions (including the 100% deduction) due to revenue needs. Confidential 
Senate 1934 Hearings, supra note 97, at 102-03 (statement of L. H. Parker, Chief of Joint 
Comm. Staff); H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 31 (1934) ("[T]he theory is that 
the gain or loss should be somewhat reduced in proportion to the time for which the capital 
asset has been held."). The Senate bill (adopted by the Conference) added a fourth 10% 
step at year 10, resulting in a maximum deduction of 70% and hence a maximum capital 
gains rate of 20.1% to closer approximate the 1921 Act's flat 12.5%. Confidential Senate 
1934 Hearings, supra note 97, at 107 (colloquy between Sen. Reed, R-Pa., Ranking Minority 
Member, and Dr. Roswell Magill). Under this sliding scale deduction, capital gains taxes 
were considerably less than if the gain were taxed each year as it accrued. Revenue Act of 
1938: Confidential Hearings on H.R. 9682 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 75th Cong., 
3d Sess. 11 (1938) (statement of Dr. Magill, Ass't to Sec'ty of the Treasury). In 1938, Con-
gress under the rationales previously discussed, see supra note 107, collapsed the sliding 
scale into only two steps: a thirty-three and one-third percent deduction, or a maximum 
effective rate of 20% at 18 months, and a deduction of 50%, or a maximum effective rate of 
15% at 24 months. Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 117(b), 52 Stat. 447, 501 (1938). In 1942, Congress 
went to a 50% deduction, or maximum rate of 25% at a 6 month holding period. Pub. L. 
No. 753, § 150, 56 Stat. 798, 843-44 (1942). "It has been shown that too high a capital gains 
tax will result in a loss of revenue to the Government." H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 29 (1942). The Report also asserted that too high a capital gains tax would "have the 
effect of discouraging taxpayers from investing in new or productive enterprises," reasoning 
that too high capital gains rates would discourage sales and hence reinvestment (in new and 
hence non-public stock). Id. at 29. The Report noted that with a top ordinary rate of 88%, 
"it is not believed that a moderate increase in the capital-gain rate will retard capital trans-
actions." Id. at 30. 
114 Ways & Means Hearing, Feb. 1, 1995, supra note 63 (statement of Deborah Walker, 
representative of AICPA). 
110 See Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Bill Stuckey, 
former member of Ways and Means, representative of Forest Farmers Association); id. 
(statement of Richard Herring, representative of National Small Business United). 
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high inflation years and that it would have a "cliff," or blocking 
effect.128 Under the sliding-scale capital gains deductions of the 
Revenue Act of 1934, substantial blocking did indeed occur, as 
high-income individuals tended to sell gain equities only at the last 
(ten year) step. 127 
Capital gain proponents argued that all realized capital gains 
consisted of inflationary gains, 128 which over the years is true on 
the average. But a radically different story, with strong design im-
plications, emerges when the data is broken down into realizations 
by high and low income individuals. All empirical studies to date 
show that inflationary gains tend to be a larger component of total 
realized capital gains among lower- and middle-income taxpayers 
than among high-income taxpayers.129 For example, in 1981, the 
more the individual's adjusted gross income. class exceeded 
$100,000, the greater was the percentage of real or positive capital 
gains to nominal capital gains; capital gains were more than 80% 
real at the $1,000,000 level. Conversely, the further the individual's 
adjusted gross income class fell below $100,000, the greater the real 
or economic loss per dollar of nominal gain. The following table180 
illustrates this phenomenon: 
118 Ways & Means Hearing, Feb. 1, 1995, supra note 63 (statement of Chair Bill Archer, 
R-Tex.); Senate Finance Hearing, Feb. 16, 1995, supra note 80 (statement of Michael Schier, 
representative of New York State Bar); Ways & Means Hearings, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 
34 (statement of Mark Bloomfield). 
'
07 Lee, supra note 35, at 1403. 
'"" Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Mark Bloomfield) 
(citing 1973 realizations in study by Martin Feldstein). 
118 Lee, supra note 35, at 1402; Shuldinger, supra note 85, at 558 n.75 (stating that tax-
payers of moderate income tend to dispose of capital assets at a real loss, while high income 
taxpayers tend to dispose of assets at a gain). Several Treasury studies of capital gains real-
izations in the early 1960s, the 1970s, and the early 1980s also concluded that the top half 
by income of these individuals realizing capital gains in most years have a real or economic 
gain of roughly 50% of the nominal gains reported. E.g., Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 
35, at 10, 11, 47 (stating that in 1977 only taxpayers with over $100,000 adjusted gross in-
come realized any real gains as to stock sales; for those with over $200,000, real gains were 
two-thirds of nominal gains). In all these studies, the higher the income bracket, the better 
the individuals' rate of return as to realized capital gains was in comparison to the rate of 
inflation. The lower half (in annual income) of the individual taxpayers annually reporting 
capital gains actually incur economic losses on the average. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxa-
tion, Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses, JCS-7-89, 26 (Mar. 11, 1989), available in 
1989 Tax Notes Today 58-7 (Mar. 14, 1989) (hereinafter Capital Gains and Losses 1989). 
18° Congressional Budget Office, Indexing Capital Gains 24, Table 5 (Aug. 1990), available 
in 90 Tax Notes Today 185-12 (Sept. 7, 1990) (hereinafter Indexing Capital Gains). See also 
Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at 10-12. 
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Adjusted Gross Income Class 
$ 100,000-199,999 
200,000-499,999 
500,000-999,999 
1,000,000 or more 
Percentage of Real Gains 
20% 
50% 
70% 
82% 
Note that for taxpayers with less than $100,000 in income, the rate 
of inflation exceeded their nominal gain. Considered alone, they, 
on average, reported tax gains, but suffered economic losses. Often, 
their economic losses equal the economic gains of the rich. Thus, 
the middle loses, but with the rich getting richer, it all averages out 
in the long run. 
This pattern of real capital gains and losses realizations may re-
flect, to a degree, a tendency of upper-income taxpayers to sell real 
estate and (gain) securities shortly after the long-term holding pe-
riod, whatever it is at the time.181 Both real estate and (gain) se-
curities tend to appreciate more than inflation.182 Individual tax-
payers below that upper income level tend to have held securities 
for longer periods and to have less real estate gains. Thus, dispari-
ties by income class (in the distribution of capital gains realiza-
tions and percentage of realizations consisting of economic gain) in 
the early 1980's were aggravated by the tendency of taxpayers in 
the lower quintiles who realized capital gains to have longer hold-
ing periods (reflecting less frequent sales), including the stagflation 
of the 1970's (high inflation and stagnating economy and stock 
market). On the other hand, the top quintile had shorter holding 
periods, tending to include only the lower inflation booming mar-
181 In the 1930's, under the ten-year sliding scale, 70% of the capital gains of individuals 
with income over $100,000 were from assets held over ten years, whereas only 25% of gains 
were from such assets in the case of individuals with incomes not exceeding $25,000. H.R. 
Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1942). In more recent years, realizations by high 
income taxpayers also tend to cluster in the first month after the long-term holding period 
has been met. Eric Fredland, John Gray, & Emil Sunley, Jr., The Six Month Holding Period 
for Capital Gains: An Empirical Analysis of its Effect on the Timing of Gains, 21 Nat'l Tax 
J. 467, 469-70 (1968)("[T]axpayers in higher tax brackets postpone their gain beyond the 
sixth month to a much greater extent than taxpayers in lower brackets [and the] proportion 
realized in the seventh month increases as AGI increases."). See H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 151-52 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645; James Repetti, 
The Use of the Tax Law to Stabilize the Stock Market: the Efficacy of Holding Period 
Requirements, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 591, 615 (1989) (citing academic studies for stock realizations 
which show clustering in seventh month when there is a six month holding period). 
181 Lee, supra note 35, at 1402. 
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ket years of the mid 1980s. 
The Joint Committee on Taxation has recently suggested that 
such difference in inflationary gains by income class may reflect 
the tendency of high income individuals to invest in more risky 
investments, which generate higher average returns to compensate 
for risk.183 It concluded that, "[a]ll else being equal, an exclusion 
might be expected to offer greater tax benefits to higher-income 
taxpayers (who invest in risky assets) than would indexing."184 A 
commentator has suggested that this pattern may reflect a ten-
dency of moderate-income taxpayers to invest in dividend-paying 
stocks, while high income taxpayers invest in growth (income-re-
taining) stocks.13a 
Under the CW ATRA capital gains proposals, these different pat-
terns of inflationary and real or economic capital gains at the dif-
ferent individual income levels would produce the following result: 
higher-income individuals would tend to benefit more from the 
50%-of-gain exclusion feature, while lower- and moderate-income 
individuals would tend to benefit more from the indexing feature. 
This would create the mirror image of the Revenue Act of 1942 
(and early 1954 Code), where Congress anticipated that high-in-
come individuals would use the alternative 25% rate, while indi-
viduals with small capital gains would use the 50% deduction.138 
As a matter of designing a capital gains preference, a case could be 
made for similarly giving individual taxpayers the greater of index-
ing or a percentage exclusion, but not both. 
Due to the compounding nature of indexing the basis of capital 
assets for inflation, the revenue losses are estimated to be much 
greater in the out years (six through ten) than in the five-year 
budget window.137 Since indexing of capital assets for inflation has 
••• Capital Gains and Losses 1995, supra note 10, at 31. There are many ways to structure 
relatively low risk investments so as to achieve capital gains treatment. An example is re-
tained earnings by mature corporations. Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at 56. 
Therefore, a capital gains preference is poorly targeted to offset a bias against risk. Id. See 
supra note 34. 
184 Capital Gains and Losses 1995, supra note 10, at 31. 
188 Roger Brinner, Inflation and the Definition of Taxable Personal Income in Sunley and 
Pechman, Inflation and the Income Tax 121, 135-37 (Henry Aaron ed., 1976); Shuldinger, 
supra note 85, at 558 n.75. 
188 Lee, supra note 112, at 1395-96. 
187 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16; Prepared Statement of Ass't 
Sec'ty Samuels, supra note 83. 
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never been enacted in the Code, CBO correctly notes that a com-
parison of the dynamic effects of indexing with those of an exclu-
sion cannot be inferred from historical data. It is highly uncertain 
whether indexing would have more of an unlocking effect than 
would an exclusion of the same average magnitude.188 In 1989, 
Treasury officials believed that it would not.189 In 1992, the Joint 
Committee Staff also apparently assumed that, under indexing, 
high-income individuals would be less likely to realize economic 
gains greater than inflation. They would therefore hold on to their 
capital assets (public stock) until more of the real gain was swal-
lowed by inflation, while selling all stock that failed to exceed in-
flation. These assumptions were based on a projected drop from 
80% to 60% in tax benefits in the short run (three years assuming 
a 3% rate of inflation), comparing basis indexing with a fixed. per-
centage of gain exclusion. 140 Any such blocking tendency surely 
would be increased by CW ATRA's three-year holding period for 
indexing. Capital gains revenues would tend to be further reduced 
by fewer realizations, which would tend to offset the reduction in 
revenue losses during the five-year budget window attributable to: 
(1) no inflation adjustment losses in years two and three, and (2) 
deemed realizations in year 1 from mark-to-market elections made 
to obtain indexed asset status for capital assets held on January 1, 
1995. 
Conceptually better solutions than indexing, with its blocking ef-
fects and complexities, would slant the benefits of any capital 
gains preference more to the middle- and iow-income taxpayers. 
The inflation gains for these taxpayers are greater and the prefer-
ence would tend to contribute less to blocking. (As long as step up 
in basis at death continues, any rate other than a 100% exclusion 
or annual accrual of unrealized appreciation tends to block realiza-
tions.) A "progressive" capital gains rate, with the percentage pref-
188 Indexing Capital Gains, supra note 130, at 31-32; see Capital Gains and Losses 1990, 
supra note 21, at 33. Professor Shuldinger believes that indexing will not create an incentive 
to sell appreciated assets; the continued value of deferral and the loss of a stepped up basis 
for indexing by failure to sell will be offset by the benefit of further deferral. Shuldinger, 
supra note 85, at 560-61. 
118 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 70, at 20 (statement of Deputy Ass't Sec'ty Dennis 
Ross). 
••• David S. Cloud & John R. Cranford, Liberal Democrats Prevail, Corporate Rate Cut 
Goes, 50 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 391, 393 (1992). 
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erence decreasing as the taxpayer's income increased, would serve 
as a very good "second-best" alternative to indexing the basis of 
capital assets to account for the rate of inflation. 141 This decreasing 
preference system would not result in taxpayers holding capital as-
sets longer in order to obtain a greater exclusion from an inflation 
adjustment, yet at each income level, it could be designed to ex-
clude an amount equal to the average inflation gain at that level. 
A provision containing such a decreasing preference system was 
passed by Congress in early 1992, but vetoed by President George 
Bush. That progressive schedule was designed by Chief of Joint 
Committee Staff Hank Gutman and Staff Economist Alan 
Auerbach for then Senate Finance Chair Lloyd Bentsen, D-Tex., 
(recently Secretary of the Treasury). The schedule capped the cap-
ital gains "permanent" rate on capital assets, other than small bus-
iness stock covered by a separate targeted preference (and "col-
lectibles"), at 28% for taxpayers whose ordinary income would be 
in the proposed 36% and above rate. The schedule also provided 
for (in the Conference version) a 0% capital gains rate for individ-
uals otherwise in the 15% ordinary-income bracket. These two po-
lar capital gains brackets roughly approximate the inflation gain 
on the average amount of capital gains reported at these two ex-
tremes of the income tax brackets,l42 namely 20% and 100%. 
I would modify the 1992 Conference progressive capital gains 
provision to more closely reflect economic income. To accomplish 
this goal, I would grant a 50% deduction at the current 31% 
bracket, because at this level, about 50% of reported capital gains 
consist of economic gain. A greater-than-50% deduction or exclu-
sion would be needed at the 28% bracket to mimic economic gain; 
I would use whatever appropriate fraction approximates the aver-
age inflation gain in capital gains reported at the 28% bracket.148 
The average inflation gain at this level is probably close to 100%. 
Such a provision, however, has no political support among Repub-
licans because it would not benefit high-income individuals,144 who 
generally realize the majority of capital gains. 
Another surrogate approach compensating for inflation, better 
••• Lee, supra note 35, at 1404-05. 
••• See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
, .. Lee, supra note 35, at 1404-05. 
••• See supra note 112. 
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than an across-the-board, 50% exclusion, would be to exempt an-
nual realizations below a certain ceiling, for example, $2,500 or 
$3,500. This provision also could be phased out beginning at ad-
justed gross income above, for example, $100,000. The ceiling pro-
vision resembles, in either form or effect, proposals by Senator 
Gaylord Nelson, D-Wis, in the 1970's, President George Bush in 
1989, and Chair Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., in 1990 (including the 
phase out), and a suggestion in the 1995 Hearings by Rep. Mel 
Hancock, R-Mo.146 This ceiling approximates the average capital 
gain of the infrequent capital gain realizer whose gain tends to be 
all inflationary.1" 8 This approach would also lack political support 
by Republicans because it would not provide much benefit to the 
high-income individuals who realize the bulk of capital gains year 
after year. 
C. Fairness and Bunching or King-For-a-Day 
At the time of the 1995 Hearings, the Clinton Administration 
had looked at the aggregate distribution of the tax cuts under the 
1995 Republican Contract: 50% were distributed to families with 
incomes over $100,000. This distribution reduces progressivity and, 
accordingly, failed the Administration's fairness test.147 In the 1995 
Hearings, opponents of a substantial generic capital gains prefer-
ence, looking back to a similar provision advocated by President 
George Bush, frequently maintained that 60% to 70% of the bene-
••• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (colloquy with Ass't Sec'ty Leslie 
Samuels); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. Mel 
Hancock, R-Mo.) (supporting zero capital gains "[m]erely to get rid of this asinine state-
ment that capital gains only benefit the rich."). For precisely the same reason, the 1989 
Bush proposals excluded capital gains entirely for an individual with less than $20,000 in 
income for the realization year, if he or she was not subject to the alternate minimum tax. 
1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 70, at 17 (statement of Deputy Ass't Sec'ty Dennis Ross). 
Ross further rationalized that such taxpayers are less responsive to rate changes, so "in the 
search for a more substantial incentive we went all the way to 100 percent." Id. at 182. 
Professor Dodge criticized the Bush provision because such lower income taxpayers will 
have little or nothing to invest. Dodge, supra note 34, at 1136. On the other hand, when such 
taxpayers (probably by-and-large retired) do dispose of capital assets, all of their reported 
gain on average is inflationary and thus should not be taxed. The Joint Committee Staff in 
1989 criticized the "cliff effect" of the Bush Administration's proposal. Capital Gains and 
Losses 1989, supra note 129, at 95. 
148 Lee, supra note 35, at 1405. 
147 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of Ass't Sec'ty Leslie 
Samuels). 
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fits of an individual generic capital gains preference would go to 
such high-income taxpayers. 148 This percentage reflects their share 
of capital gains realizations combined with their higher brackets. 
(For the reasons discussed above, only half of the benefits from 
indexing would go to such taxpayers. 149) Treasury scored 76.3 o/o of 
the benefits from the individual CW ATRA capital gains exclusion 
and indexing as benefitting taxpayers with "family economic in-
come" of $100,000 and above.1110 Treasury's distribution tables 
us Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Sander Levin, 
D-Mich.) (stating that in 1991, 65% of realized capital gains went to families reporting 
$100,000 or more in income). Citizens for Tax Justice estimates that "almost two-thirds of 
total capital gains reported on individual tax returns go to people whose incomes exceed 
$200,000. In contrast, three-quarters of tax filers earn incomes of $50,000 or less but report 
only 8.7% of total capital gains." Amy Hamilton, Tax Loopholes in Republican Contract 
Could Cost States Billions, Taxpayer Advocacy Group Charges, 95 Tax Notes Today 49-5 
(Mar. 13, 1995). Due to their higher brackets, more than two-thirds of the tax benefits of 
the proposed cuts would go to such high income taxpayers. "According to [House Minority 
Leader Richard) Gephardt, 76% of the capital gains cut would go to those earning more 
than $100,000 per year." Barbara Kirchheimer, Democrats to Limit Their Amendments to 
Archer Tax Bill, 95 Tax Notes Today 50-28 (Mar. 14, 1995). The Joint Committee Staff had 
estimated that 62.2% of the benefits of the 1992 Bush proposed cut in the capital gains rate 
(from 28% to 14%) would have gone to taxpayers reporting more than $200,000, and that an 
additional15.15% of the benefits would have gone to taxpayers reporting between $100,000 
and $200,000. Preliminary Distributional Effect of the President's Budget Proposal for Cap-
ital Gains, as contained in H.R. 4200 (Feb. 13, 1992), available in 92 Tax Notes Today 63-22 
(Mar. 23, 1992); 138 Cong. Rec. H405 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Richard 
Gephardt, D-Mo.) ("Its most significant idea for jumpstarting the economy is the tired and 
discredited capital gains cut, a proposal which conveys 70% of the benefits to people earn-
ing over $100,000.); 136 Cong. Rec. H8320 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1990) (remarks of Rep. (now 
Senator) Barbara Boxer, D-Cal.); id. at H8700 (remarks of Rep. David Obey, D-Wis.). This 
pattern should not be surprising since, as of 1983, the top 10% of families owned approxi-
mately 89.3% of all publicly traded stock held by individu~s. Democratic Staff of the Joint 
Economic Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Seas., Trends in the Distribution of Wealth Among Ameri-
can Families 24 (Comm. Print 1986). Indeed, the top 1% of families owned 31% of house-
hold net worth in 1983 (and 36% in 1989). Anne Fisher, The New Debate over the Very 
Rich, Fortune, June 29, 1992, at 42, 43; 1992 Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 
107, at 65 (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser, D-Tenn.). More recent data pegs the top 1% as 
owning 40% of all household wealth in 1989. Keith Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called 
Widest in West, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al. Currently, the top 1% hold 49% of pub-
licly held stock, 62% of business assets, 78% of bonds and trusts, and 45% of nonresidential 
real estate. Sylvia Nasar, Fed Gives New Evidence of SO's Gains by Richest, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 21, 1992, at A1, A17. This corresponds with the pattern of the top 1% annually realiz-
ing 50% or more of the capital gains reported by individuals. See infra note 231. 
••• Taxpayers making over $200,000 would have received half of the tax benefits of capital 
gains indexing. 138 Cong. Rec. H607 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1992) (remarks of Rep. David Obey, 
D-Wis.); Cloud & Cranford, supra note 140, at 393. 
••• Treas. Dep't, Estimated Effects on Receipts "Contract With America Tax Relief Act 
of 1995" Ways & Means Chairman's Mark (Mar. 13, 1995), available in 1995 Tax Notes 
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showed that the top 1 o/o of families (700,000 families, beginning at 
$349,438) receive 45.9% of such tax benefits; the top 5% (2,300,000 
families, beginning at $145,412) receive 66.5% of such benefits; and 
the top 10% (3,500,000 families, beginning at $108,704) receive 
73.9o/o.m Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex., claimed that Treasury's distri-
butions "grossly overstate the number of families in the upper-in-
come brackets benefitting from the proposed tax breaks."1112 This 
view reflects an article of faith held by many proponents of a capi-
tal gains preference, which is that the vast majority of capital gain 
realizations are "once-in-a-lifetime" events, so that bunching up 
makes middle-income taxpayers only appear to be wealthy, or 
"king-for-a-day".1113 
In 1990, then-Representative (now Senator) Byron Dorgan, D-
N.D., asked the Joint Committee on Taxation Staff to make a 
timed series study of a sample of capital gains realizations in the 
early 1980's. This study demonstrated that taxpayers accounting 
for sales in just one out of the five years sampled, while amounting 
Today 51-10 (Mar. 15, 1995) (hereinafter CWATRA Effects on Receipts). Capital gains cuts 
opponents relied on this figure in the CWATRA floor debate. 141 Cong. Rec. H4232 (daily 
ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. William Coyne, D-Pa.) ("This is no 'Mom and Pop' small 
business investment incentive."); id. at H4250 (remarks of Rep. Eva Clayton, D-N.C.); id. at 
H4253 (remarks of Rep. Maxine Waters, D-Cal.). The make up of "family economic income" 
is discussed infra note 168. 
101 CWATRA Effects on Receipts, supra note 150. 
'"" Eric Pianin & Dan Morgan, Tax-Cut Passed by House Committee; Democrats Appear 
to Be Making Inroads With Charge That. GOP Bill Favors Wealthy, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 
1995, at A4. This view is now incorporated into H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 27, at 36: 
The Committee rejects the narrow view that reductions in the taxation of capital 
gains benefit primarily higher-income Americans. Traditional attempts to measure 
the benefit of a tax reduction for capital gains are deficient. Typically, the classifica-
tion of individuals in such studies measure the individuals' incomes including any 
capital gains realized. Many Americans realize only one or two capital gains during 
their lifetime, for example upon the sale of family business upon retirement. Includ-
ing the gain on such a one-time sale in the income of the individual makes the indi-
vidual appear, for that one year, to be a higher-income taxpayer when, in other years, 
the taxpayer would appear to be solidly middle class. 
108 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Phil English, 
R-Pa.); id. (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden, D-Ore.) (stating that perception that capital 
gains cut will help "somebody who is clipping coupons and working out of a high-rise build-
ing in Manhattan" and will not help middle income small business person, entrepreneur, 
retired person is mythology); id. (statement of Rep. Jim Bunning, R-Ky.); Ways & Means 
Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. Wally Herger, R-Cal.) (vast major-
ity of sales in his district and in other members' districts); Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 
15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, R-lowa). This notion appears in 
H.R. Rep. No. 84, see supra note 152. 
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to 40% or so of the taxpayers with capital gains in the timed se-
ries, reported less than 10% of the capital gain over the period 
studied. Those individuals with multiple transactions, year-after-
year, obtained more than 81% of the tax benefits of the capital 
gains preference.164 More specifically, the 43.7% of the individual 
taxpayers in the sample who realized capital gains only once in the 
five-year period (1979 to 1983) had an average capital gain of 
$2,000 and realized only 9.8% of all capital gains realized by indi-
viduals in the period. On the other hand, the 15.7% of the individ-
uals who realized capital gains in all five years realized an average 
capital gain of $100,000 and 58.9% of total capital gains realized 
over the period. Those who realized such gains in at least four 
years out of the five-year period recognized 70.9% of the total dol-
lar value of reported capital gains. 11111 
These findings were confirmed by other researchers using the 
same model.1118 The same pattern obtained in subsequent years: 
[I]n 1985, 44 percent of all taxpayers who reported gains reported 
only one transaction and those transactions accounted for 21 per-
cent of the dollar value of all gains realized in 1985. Consequently, 
nearly 80 percent of all gains realized in 1985 were realized by 
those taxpayers who realized more than one gain in that year.1117 
In 1995, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation concluded 
that: 
Higher-income taxpayers generally hold a larger proportion of cor-
porate stock and other capital assets than do other taxpayers. 
,.. 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 64, at 216 (statement of Rep., now Sena-
tor, Byron Dorgan, D-N.D.) (asking the Joint Committee to complete a study on once-in-a-
lifetime sales); id. at 217 (statement of Rep. Andy Jacobs, D-Ind.); id. at 252 (statement of 
Sen. Bill Bradley, D-N.J.); id. at 248-49 (statement of Rep. Richard Gephardt, D-Mo.); id. 
at 273 (statement of Rep. Donald Pease, D-Oh.). 
'"" Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Explanation of Methodology Used to Estimate Pro-
posals Affecting the Taxation of Income from Capital Gains, JCS-12-90, 48-49 (Mar. 27, 
1990), available in 1990 Tax Notes Today 67-8 (Mar. 28, 1990) (hereinafter Methodology 
1990); Tax Incentives for Increasing Savings and Investments: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1990) (statement of Thomas Barthold, staff 
economist with Joint Comm. on Taxation) (hereinafter 1990 Senate Tax Incentive Hear-
ings). The same pattern was reported in Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at 4, 7. 
,.., See Haliassos & Lyon, supra note 102; see generally Andrew Hoerner, Economists Ex-
amine Whether Progressivity has Regressed, 56 Tax Notes 1520, 1521 (Sept. 21, 1992). 
••• Capital Gains and Losses 1995, supra note 10, at 30; Methodology 1990, supra note 
155, at 49. 
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Thus, while many taxpayers may benefit from an exclusion or in-
dexing for capital gains, a larger proportion of the dollar value of 
any tax reduction will go to those higher-income taxpayers whore-
alize the bulk of the dollar value of gains.1118 
An economist supporting a capital gains preference acknowledged 
that "there is no doubt in my mind that capital gains reductions 
benefit higher-income families compared with lower-income 
families. "1119 
There may be a grain of truth in the one-time event rhetoric; 
namely, small businesses and real estate are often sold on an in-
stallment-sale basis with payments received over a number of 
years. Treasury data from the early and late 1970's160 indicates 
that installment-reported capital gain amounted to between 9% 
and 14 o/o of net gains. 161 Thus, some one-time realizations could 
push an otherwise middle-income taxpayer into high income for a 
number of years. Installment reporting under section 453, however, 
would serve as an income averaging function, tending to compen-
sate for accrual over a number of years. 
One witness in the 1995 Hearings concluded that 75% of taxpay-
ers reporting capital gains had wage and salary income of less than 
$50,000 and that they reported 50% of the capital gains.162 Many 
capital gains cut proponents pointed to the fact that the large ma-
jority of individual returns showing capital gains (approximately 
108 Capital Gains and Losses 1995, supra note 10, at 30-31; Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 
24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Dr. Alan Sinai, capital gains proponent). 
100 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Dr. Alan Sinai, 
managing director and chief global economist, Lehman Brothers) (stating that growth and 
ability to compete internationally were more important to him than income distribution). 
Rep. Pete Stark, D-Cal., interjected that the capital gains cuts, if so important, could be 
paid for by budget cuts distributed more to upper income taxpayers, rather than to lower 
income groups as proposed. Id. See infra note 208. 
180 During this period of "stagflation" (denoting inflation while the economy lags), the 
stock market performed relatively poorly, which tended to inflate the percentage of realized 
capital gain attributable to sources other than equities. 
181 Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at 17, 19. 
181 Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Mark Bloom-
field). This approach has the flaw of treating as a low income taxpayer a taxpayer with high 
capital gains, but low ordinary income year after year. Andrew Hoerner, Class Conflict and 
the "Classifier," 47 Tax Notes 145, 146 (Apr. 9, 1990) (criticizing similar Treasury study); 
see Zodrow, supra note 37, at 488 (stating that such approach seriously understates the 
income of the wealthy, particularly at the very highest income levels); Methodology 1990, 
supra note 155, at 50-51. And this is a pattern at very high income ranges. See infra notes 
218 and 231. See infra note 162. 
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70% to 75%) are filed by middle- and lower-income taxpayers. 
This analysis is misleading because it ignores the very low percent-
age of realized gains (approximately 10%) that such taxpayers re-
ported.188 Some proponents, claiming that the Republican distribu-
tion numbers are better than the Democratic numbers/84 went on 
to say, albeit erroneously, that most of the capital assets are owned 
by people with $50,000 or less in income, or that they pay 70% of 
the capital gains taxes, or that 75% of the taxpayers in that in-
come class reported an item of capital gain in their returns (a pre-
108 141 Cong. Rec. H4231 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (statement of Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex.) 
(stating that 75% of all capital gains filings were by families with under $75,000 of income); 
Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. Philip Crane, R-
Ill.); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Jim Bunning, 
R-Ky.); id. (statement of Rep Phil English, R-Pa.); id. (statement of Karen Kerrigan); Ways 
& Means Hearing, Jan. 12, 1995, supra note 47 (statement of Carol Ball, representative of 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce); House Small Business Hearing, Jan. 26, 1995, supra note 42 
(statement of Chair Jan Meyers, R-Kan.); accord 136 Cong. Rec. H6277 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 
1989) (statement of Rep. Bill Archer, R-Tex.) (stating that 75% of taxpayers with capital 
gains had under $50,000 of other income, and high income distribution reflects one-time 
gain on sale of house, business or long-held stock); id. (remarks of Rep. Ronnie Flippo, D-
Ala.); id. at H6278 (remarks of Rep. Robert Lagomarsino, R-Cal.); id. at H6290 (remarks of 
Rep. Bill Frenzel, R-Minn.); cf. id. at H6279 (remarks of Rep. Bill Andrews, D-Tex.). One of 
the best answers to this misleading rhetoric is: 
What that carefully crafted statement means is that of the 8 million tax returns an-
nually [out of 110 million individual returns] which show any capital gains activity, 
roughly 70 percent --about 5.5 million- are filed ,by those with incomes below 
$50,000 . . . Using Joint Tax Committee figures -Bush uses Treasury figures-
there were 4.4 million returns containing capital gains filed by those earning under 
$50,000 per year. Under Bush-Archer-Jenkins, they would save $1.2 billion in taxes 
for an average of $280 each. That's 8% of the tax break under Bush-Archer-Jenkins. 
In contrast, there are 376,000 tax returns with capital gains by those earning over 
$200,000 per year. Under Bush-Archer-Jenkins, they would save $9.4 billion in taxes 
for an average of $25,000 each. 
Id. at H6283 (remarks of Rep. Donald Pease, D-Oh.). Professor Zodrow assumes that it is 
the dollar magnitude of capital gains realized and not the number of taxpayers who realize a 
capital gain, however small that is of primary importance in evaluating the distributional 
effects of a capital gains tax cut. Zodrow, supra note 37, at 485. 
, .. Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden, 
D-Ore.); House Small Business Hearing, Jan. 26, 1995, supra note 42 (statement of Chair 
Jan Meyers, R-Kan.) (stating that 70% of capital gains taxes paid by those with incomes 
less than $75,000); 141 Cong. Rec. H4188 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Jim 
Ramstad, R-Minn.) ("[F]ully three-quarters in value of all capital gains went to taxpayers 
earning less than $100,000 .... ); id. at H4236 (remarks of Rep. Jim Saxton, R-N.J.) ("[The] 
large majority of capital gains [taxes] that are paid are paid by low income and middle 
income people"). Cf. id. at H4253 (remarks of Rep. George Gekas, R-Pa.) ("75 percent of all 
people who earned $50,000 or less had an item of capital gains in their tax returns."). 
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posterous claim).1611 But as former Commissioner Sheldon Cohen 
pointed out: "If you looked at the dollars, it skews the other 
way."166 The 44% who reported a ga.in in only one in five years, 
together with the above moderate income returns, accounted for 
less than 10% of the capital gains reported. 
Moreover, inclusion of imputed income frorp owner-occupied 
housing in "income," for purposes of determining distribution of 
the benefits of a capital gains cut, was sharply criticized by Ways 
and Means Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex., as not understandable by 
American families. 167 Assistant Secretary Leslie Samuels re-
·••• Ways & Means Hearings, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden, 
D-Ore.). Cf. 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 65, at 263 (statement of Rep. 
Raymond McGrath, R-N.Y.) ("Now, we can argue whether or not there is a distributional 
problem with it. Some people say yes and some people say no."); id. at 27-28 (statement of 
Rep. Bill Frenzel, R-Minn.); id. at 268 (statement of Rep. Don Sundquist, R-Tenn.). In 
1995, Rep. Sander Levin, D-Mich., rejoined that it was no use obscuring the fact that distri-
bution of the benefits of a capital gains preference went to high income individuals. Ways & 
Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33. Professor Dodge also believed that capital 
gains proponents were attempting to confuse the issue. Dodge, supra note 34, at 1136. They 
appear to have confused themselves. See supra note 164. · 
••• Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34. 
187 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (colloquy of Ass't Sec'ty Leslie 
Samuels with Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex., and Rep. Andy Jacobs, D-Ind.). 
Once again you use the -what I believe the public totally discredited- family eco-
nomic income as a formula, which includes the so-called imputed rental value of your 
home if you own your own home to determine what income class you're in, that in-
cludes the imputed value of inside buildup of pension plans, life insurance, Keogh 
plans, IRAs and 401Ks to determine what. your income is in a pa.'1:icular year; and 
includes what is labeled as a lump sum income that you did not report. 
Now, how does the Treasury know how much income a family does not report? Can 
you look under their mattresses and into their bathrooms and all the other things 
that relate to their lives and be able to come up with some magic figure that "We 
know you didn't report this, therefore, we're going to include it to determine how, 
quote, rich you are." 
Id. (statement of Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex.). In the floor debate on CW ATRA, Chair Archer 
pointed to such imputation as the reason Treasury distribution figures were not "credible." 
141 Cong. Rec. H4215, 4231 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995). 
Mortimer Caplin, President John Kennedy's Commissioner of Internal Revenue and 
member of the Virginia Tax Study Group, recounts how Congressional leaders initially op-
posed Professor Surrey's appointment as Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, due to his pub-
lished statements on tax policy favoring, for example, imputed rental income to taxpayers 
occupying their personally owned residences (and, I suspect, "favoring" taxation of unreal-
ized appreciation at death or at least "carryover basis" as well). Accordingly, Congressional 
leaderS required a commitment that Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon would present 
Treasury's tax proposals. This story may partially explain the House Ways and Means 
Chair Wilbur Mills' compliments to Secretary Dillon on his 1963 presentations. 1963 House 
Hearings, supra note 110, at 688. See also id. at 1068 (statement of Harvard Business Pro-
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sponded that imputed income is a very small part of "family eco-
nomic income"168 (and not subject to tax). In a subsequent collo-
quy, Samuels pointed out that the practice commenced in the Ford 
Administration, two decades earlier.169 Archer also questioned why 
feasor Dan Throop Smith) ("The idea of presumptive realization of gains at death is an old 
favorite among some writers on tax theory, along with inclusion of rental value of owner-
occupied homes and employers' contributions to pension trusts in the individual tax base. It 
should be rejected, as these other theoretical proposals have been rejected."). 
188 Treasury constructs "family economic income" by adding the following to AGI: unre-
ported and underreported income; IRA and Keogh deductions; nontaxable transfer pay-
ments, such as Social Security and AFDC (food stamps); employer-provided fringe benefits; 
inside build-up on pensions, IRAs, Keoghs, and life insurance; tax-exempt interest; and im-
puted rent on owner-occupied housing. Capital gains are computed on an accrual basis, ad-
justed for inflation. CWATRA Effects on Receipts, supra note 150; James Nunns, OTA's 
Methodology for Distributional Analysis (Dec. 16, 1993), available in 93 Tax Notes Today 
259-27 (Dec. 23, 1993); Susan C. Nelson, Family Economic Income and Other Income Con-
cepts Used in Analyzing Tax Reform, Office of Tax Analysis, Dep't of Treas., Compendium 
of Tax Research 1987 (G.P.O. 1987). The economic incomes of all members of a family, 
which generally operate as an economic unit, are added to arrive at the family's economic 
income used in the distributions. The Joint Committee on Taxation makes similar adjust-
ments for "distribution" purposes in its annual income concept, called "expanded income," 
which include: (1) tax-exempt interest; (2) employer contributions for health plans and life 
insurance; (3) employer share of FICA tax; (4) workers' compensation; (5) nontaxable Social 
Security benefits; (6) the insurance value of Medicare benefits; (7) corporate income tax 
liability attributed to stockholders; (8) alternative minimum tax preference items; and (9) 
excluded income of U.S. citizens living abroad. Barthold, The JCT Distributional Analysis 
of OBRA 93 (Dec. 13, 1993), available in 93 Tax Notes Today 259-28 (Dec. 22, 1993). The 
Treasury adjustments more closely follow Haig-Simons precepts than does the JCT, partic-
ularly as to the accrual of capital gains and the imputation of rent. Joint Comm. on Taxa-
tion, Methodology and Issues in Measuring Changes in the Distribution of Tax Burdens 
JCS-7-93, at 89 n.147 (June 14, 1993), available in 93 Tax Notes Today 133-21 (June 23, 
1993) (hereinafter Measuring Changes in Distribution of Tax Benefits). See generally Jane 
Gravelle, Distributional Effects of Tax Provisions in the Contract With America As Re-
ported by the Ways and Means Committee (Apr. 3, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 
66-33 (Apr. 5, 1995)(hereinafter CRS Distributional Effects); Gene Steurle, The Distribu-
tional Effects of Tax Changes, 66 Tax Notes 2027, 2028 (Mar. 27, 1995). The Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation's figures show the middle class getting the largest percentage reduction in 
taxes under CWATRA, while Treasury's figures show the greatest reduction at the top, with 
an estimated benefit there three times greater than the JCT's. Martin Sullivan, Computer 
Bytes to Sound Bytes: JCT & Treasury Analysis of CWATRA, 95 Tax Notes Today 76-3 
(Apr. 19, 1995) (stating that two-thirds of difference attributable to treatment of corporate 
taxes). In addition to criticizing imputation of rent, Chair Bill Archer criticized annual ac-
crual of capital gain. 141 Cong. Rec. H4231 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) ("[S]ome people start 
their business early in life and do not show a capital gain until later when they sell their 
business. It may be many years. The Treasury figures show them as accruing giant gains 
each year, and of course when they do finally sell in a one time in a lifetime sale, they are 
declared to be rich."). 
108 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of Ass't Sec'ty Leslie 
Samuels). 
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the "burden tables" did not include the additional income taxes 
that high-income taxpayers would pay due to increased realizations 
induced by a capital gains tax cut.170 Samuels' response was that 
the distribution tables were based on static realizations, and there-
fore did not include "voluntary" induced realizations.171 
The CW ATRA House Committee Report asserts that another 
deficiency in the distribution studies is their classification only by 
current economic condition. "Studies show that there is substantial 
economic mobility in the United States. An individual who might 
be counted as lower income now may in a decade be higher in-
170 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (colloquy between Chair Bill 
Archer, R-Tex., and Ass't Sec'ty Leslie Samuels). Treasury, in 1990, measured the distribu-
tion of the benefits of a capital gains cut by a "dynamic distribution analysis," which took 
into account the increased capital gains taxes attributable to increased realizations induced 
by the tax cut. Fiscal Year 1991 Budget Proposals: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on 
Finance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1990) (statement of Ass't Sec'ty Ken Gideon). Chair 
Archer used such an analysis to show that the top 1% and the top 10% will pay greater 
taxes under the Republican Contract. Archer Releases Data on Tax Burden of Contract 
Items (Mar. 31, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 64-57 (Apr. 3, 1995). The increase 
appears attributable to increased capital gains realizations. CRS Distributional Effects, 
supra note 168. Opponents of the CW ATRA capital gains provisions argued that the in-
creased taxes reflected that " [ u]nder the Republican bill, the rich get richer so it is logical 
that they will pay additional taxes on the extra money they earn." 141 Cong. Rec. H4318 
(daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Jim McDermott, D-Wash.). 
171 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of Ass't Sec'ty Leslie 
Samuels). The Joint Committee Staff explained: 
In other words, this calculation measures only the benefit the taxpayer receives if he 
or she does not alter behavior. This is a conservative estimate of the actual benefit, 
because it does not assume a behavioral response. If taxpayers respond by realizing 
additional [capital] gains they will obtain even more benefit from the change, since 
taxpayers change their behavior only if the change makes them even better off. Thus, 
this calculation understates the benefit received by higher income taxpayers. In other 
words, Table 2 reports the distribution of the tax burden rather than the distribution 
of taxes paid. If a reduction in capital gains tax rates leads to greater realizations and 
tax revenue paid by high-income taxpayers, the distribution of taxes paid will have 
shifted more onto high-income taxpayers. However, an increase in the distribution of 
taxes paid does not imply that the tax burden on high-income taxpayers has in-
creased, because, as noted above, any additional tax paid in response to a capital 
gains rate cut results only from changed behavior. 
Capital Gains and Losses 1990, supra note 21, at 31-32; see also Measuring Changes in Dis-
tribution of Tax Benefits, supra note 168, at 7; Zodrow, supra note 37, at 491 (stating that, 
since increased realizations are voluntary, the "marginal benefits of the increased realiza-
tions must exceed the associated marginal capital gains tax costs incurred."); Jane Gravelle 
& Lawrence Lindsey, Capital Gains, 38 Tax Notes 397, 404 (Jan. 25, 1988); Steurle, supra 
note 168. CRS Distributional Effects, supra note 168, strongly criticizes the current JCT 
practice of basing distributional effects on induced realizations. 
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come."m Treasury in the Bush Administration, in response to ar-
guments leveled by Democrats with increasing effectiveness in the 
early 1990's concerning the failure of "trickle down,"178 reported 
that as much as one-third of the taxpayers who were at the bottom 
of the income scale in 1979 moved up the scale during the 1990's, 
and that, similarly, as many as one-third in the top 20% moved 
down the income scale during this period.174 
171 H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 27, at 36. 
178 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 65, at 275 (statement of Rep. Marty 
Russo, D-Ill.); accord, id. (statements of Rep. Richard Gephardt, D-Mo., and Sen. Bill Brad-
ley, D-N.J.). Commencing in 1990, Democrats successfully used the argument that the tax 
cuts of 1981 (and capital gains cut of 1978) had benefitted only the rich; the benefits had 
not trickled down to the middle- and lower-income taxpayers. Majority Staff of House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, Tax Progressivity and Income Distribution, 101st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2-4, 12-13 (Comm. Print 1990) (hereinafter Progressivity and Income Distribution); 
Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Tax Policy and the Macroeconomy: Stabilization, 
Growth and Distribution, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 29-30, 55 (Comm. Print 1991) (hereinafter 
Tax Policy and the Macroeconomy); Paul Taylor, Tax Policy as Political Battleground, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1990, at Al. See generally Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality 29-32 
(BasicBooks 1992); T. Edsall & M. Edsall, Chain Reaction 159-65, 219-20 (W.W. Norton & 
Co. 1991) (distributional effect by political affiliation). Some of this rhetoric appears supra 
note 52 and infra notes 192-98. The income at the top almost doubled, primarily due to 
speculative bubbles in the stock market and real estate. Michael Mandel, Who'll Get the 
Lion's Share of Wealth in the '90s? The Lions, Business Week, June 8, 1992, at 86. The 
increase in average income of the top quintile of households was due to the fact that the 
greatest changes overall were in the mix of incomes, with greatest increases in capital gains, 
dividend and interest incomes. The middle's share of these kinds of incomes remained low. 
The median after-tax income of the top 1 "lo of households increased 94% to over $500,000 
from 1978 to 1990; the telling statistics are that the rich's income from capital gains in-
- creased 171 "lo and that their dollar increase in interest income approximated the dollar in-
crease in capital gains. Matthew Cooper & Dorian Friedman, The Rich in America, U.S. 
News & World Rep., November 18, 1991, at 35 (212% increase in executive pay); Sylvia 
Nasar, Fed Gives New Evidence of SO's Gains for the Wealthiest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1992, 
at A1, A17. The decrease in average wage and increase in average hours reflects to a large 
degree, the increase in two working spouses households. Juliet Schor, The Overworked 
American 19-22, 25-6, 29-34, 39-41, 167-74 (BasicBooks 1991), concludes that over the past 
20 years the average number of annual hours increased from 1,786 to 1,949, or 163 hours; as 
much as 12% of the workforce holds 2 jobs. In 1990, nearly 60% of mothers with pre-school 
children worked; 75% of mothers with school age children worked. Felicity Barringer, New 
Census Data Reveal Redistribution of Poverty, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1992, at A14. Only 46% 
of mothers with pre-schoolers worked in 1980. Barbara Vobejda, A Nation in Transition, 
Wash. Post, May 29, 1992, at A1, A19. Sinlilarly, during this period per capita income para-
doxically went up 23% from 1977 to 1989, but real family income went up only 8.6%, with 
70% of the growth at the top 1%, and 95% at the top 5%. Paul Krugman, Disparity and 
Despair, U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 23, 1992, at 54. 
n• U.S. Dep't of the Treas. Office of Tax Analysis, Household Income Mobility During 
the 1980's: A Statistical Assessment Based on Tax Return Data (June 1, 1992) (hereinafter 
Treasury, Income Mobility); see 138 Cong. Rec. S9125 (daily ed. June 29, 1992) (remarks of 
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Thus, there was allegedly great income mobility during this pe-
riod.1711 These factual claims, however, while themselves accurate, 
present a distorted picture. An Urban Institute study on income 
class mobility released at about the same time concludes that there 
has been some income mobility decade by decade, but the degree 
of such mobility did not increase during the 1980's, and such mo-
bility to a large degree reflected the life cycle of workers.178 The 
Urban Institute study concluded: "While the poor can 'make it' in 
America and the wealthy can 'fall from grace,' these events are 
neither very common nor more likely to occur today than in the 
1970's."177 Many of the people in Treasury's bottom quintile in 
1979 were in fact middle- or high-income taxpayers, such as busi-
ness people or farmers with a bad year, and especially recent col-
lege graduates. Indeed, the average age of those in the bottom 
(first) quintile in 1979 who had risen to the top or fifth quintile ten 
years later was twenty-two; of those who had risen to the middle 
class, the average age was twenty-three. 178 With ages twenty-two 
and twenty-three as starting points for workers who moved up sub-
stantially in income, the increase in income over the decade of the 
bottom quintile reflected not only the work cycle, but also status 
changes, i.e., marriage and a two-earner household.179 Similarly, a 
Sen. Pete Dominici, R-N.M.); see generally Peter Gosselin, Back to the Future: Conserva-
tives Try to Redeem the Eighties as a Decade of Success, and a Roadmap to the Nineties, 
Boston Globe, May 3, 1992, at 77. 
176 From this, some argue that income redistribution makes no sense because: (a) differ-
ent players will benefit and suffer; {b) this shows some factor other than Republican poli-
cies, i.e., trickle down, was at work, and thus the tax cuts of the 1980s should not be re-
versed; or {c) in a repeat of social Darwinism well-suited to the 80s {both the 1880s and the 
1980s), this is simply the "creative destruction" of Schumpeterian capitalism, Joseph A. 
Schum peter, The Theory of Economic Development 131 {Harvard University Press 1934), at 
its best, tearing down to build 'anew. Furthermore, income disparity is necessary to fuel 
capitalistic competitiveness according to Kaus, supra note 173. This theme is ideologically 
woven into education and lifestyle choices of poor, etc., by R. McKenzie, The "Fortunate 
Fifth" Fallacy 28-9, 31 {Center for Study of American Business Policy Study No. 111, May 
1992). 
171 Isabel Sawhill & Mark Condon, Is U.S. Income Equality Really Growing? Sorting Out 
the Fairness Question, Urban Institute Policy Bites {June 1992). Under the work life cycle 
theory, "for rich and poor alike, earnings rise from the time individuals enter the work force 
through middle age- roughly doubling, in the average- and fall after retirement." 
177 Id. 
178 Steven Mufson, Treasury's Look at Income Mobility; Study Fuels Argument Over 
Who Benefitted from the Reagan Era, Wash. Post, June 3, 1992, at A17 {relying on Lee 
Price, a staff economist with the Joint Economic Committee). 
178 See Sylvia Nasar, One Study's Riches, Another's Rags, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1992, at 
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lot of the short-term turnover at the top (each year about 25% 
were not in that income class the year before): 
reflects reporting error, timing of income like capital gains, epi-
sodes of illness or unemployment and other transitory effects that 
have little to do with true mobility.180 • • • In the 1980's, it became 
easier for those in the middle class to become rich but harder for 
the rich to fall out of the top 10 percent. The explosive growth of 
pay for top professionals and managers in the era propelled lots of 
people into the ranks of the rich. More troubling was the finding, 
based on the same data, that it became harder to climb out of pov-
erty largely because of the stagnation and outright decline of real 
earnings among young, less-educated men.181 
Considering, for example, that the median age of the top 1% was 
fifty-three in 1981,182 looking ten years after 1979 at those who had 
been in the top 1% of taxpayers at that time, the median age 
would be at least sixty-three. In 1990, one would expect that a 
large percentage of this group had retired and therefore had lower 
incomes. "In other words, it is not a question of the poor getting 
poorer and the rich getting richer as much as the young getting 
older and the rich retiring." 188 
Notwithstanding the distribution of the benefits of a capital 
gains cut primarily to high-income families, or the top 2% of fami-
lies, and that 70% of the individual returns report no capital gains, 
there is still a political element beyond ideology. A large number of 
D1, Dl9. 
180 Sylvia Nasar, Rich and Poor Likely to Remain So, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1992, at D1, 
D5 (relying on University of Michigan Economist Joel Slemrod's paper, Tax Policy and the 
Economy, that would be published by National Bureau of Economic Research). 
181 ld. at D5 (relying on study by Duncan, Smeeding, and Rogers that would be published 
in "Inequality at the Close of the 20th Century" by the Levy Institute). 
181 Fisher, supra note 148, at 44. 
181 Mufson, supra note 178. Even the Treasury "Assessment" itself concluded: 
Taxpayers whose incomes rise in the income distribution over time tend to be · 
younger at the beginning of the sample period than households whose incomes stay 
constant or fall in the income distribution over time. This pattern is consistent with 
intuition about life-cycle patterns in earnings. 
Taxpayers falling into lower-income quintiles over time tend to be older . . . Tax-
payers who were in the fifth quintile in 1979 and first quintile in 1988 had an average 
wage share of 37 percent, likely indicating partial or full retirement for many such 
taxpayers ... [T]he wage share for individuals starting and remaining in the fifth 
quintile over time is approximately 80 percent in each year of the sample. 
Treasury, Income Mobility, supra 174, at 1, 6, 7. 
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middle-income taxpayers see themselves as potential beneficiaries 
of capital gains cuts; they are the "wannabes".18• Members of Con-
gress frequently claim to hear their voices. 
Solutions more tightly focused on these classes of taxpayers in-
clude: (1) capital gains income averaging;1811 (2) a lifetime gain of, 
for example, $200,000, exclusive of public stock and subject to a 
50% deduction, as the House passed in 1990;186 or (3) liberalized 
sections 1044 and 1202, as discussed above. A 30% generic exclu-
sion would also be more fair than the current flat 28%, which pro-
vides the equivalent of a 30% exclusion at the 39.6% rate (coinci-
dentally, equal to the average inflation gain at that income level), 
but no exclusion for the 28% and 15% brackets187 (where, ironi-
cally, most or all of the gain is inflationary on the average). Again, 
some or all of these would not be that expensive, but have little or 
184 Andrew Hoerner, supra note 162, at 147 (asserting that 11 million returns with average 
annual incomes of less than $70,000 reported capital gains); see Ways & Means Hearing, 
Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Mark Bloomfield) ("[T]here's a heck of a lot of 
middle-class people who have capital gains, too."); Ways and Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, 
supra note 33 (statement of Rep. John Ensign, R-Nev.). Add the wannabes and you have a 
substantial number of voters, although not much of the realized capital gain. 
••• Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry 
Aaron). 
188 In the 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 65, at 260-61, Rep. Tom Downey, 
D-N.Y., argued that due to the appeal of doing something for the once-in-a-lifetime sale, 
and the thread having been pulled on the fabric of the 1986 Act when the House passed a 
generic capital gains cut in 1989, the "Northern Democrats" would lose without an alterna-
tive to the Bush Administration's generic capiial gains proposals. He suggested a lifetime 
exclusion of, for example, $60,000 of capital gain, with an income cap of, for example, 
$200,000 or $150,000. Others agreed with the concept and strategy. Id. at 249, 267, 270. This 
was the origin of Ways and Means Chair Dan Rostenkowski's 1990 Middle Class Capital 
Gain Proposal: a 50% capital gain deduction with a lifetime cap of $100,000 in deductions 
applicable to assets such as farms, typical small businesses, homes, and timber, but not to 
public stock. In addition to the lifetime cap, $1,000 in capital gain from all sources except 
"collectibles" would have been excluded annually, but this exclusion covering public stock 
was phased out over $100,000 to $150,000 in taxable joint return income; Ways & Means 
Democratic Alternative (Oct. 12, 1990), available in 90 Tax Notes Today 210-8 (Oct. 15, 
1990). This provision passed the House on strictly partisan lines with 90% of the Democrats 
for, and 95% of the Republicans against. 136 Cong. Rec. H10296 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) 
(Roll No. 474); 41 Cong. Q. Almanac 150-H (1990). The "Middle Class Capital Gains" provi-
sion died in Conference, as Chair Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., apparently intended. Rosty 
threatens Combat with Bush over Top Rate Increase, 90 Tax Notes Today 212-13 (Oct. 17, 
1990). 
107 Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Chair Bill Archer, 
R-Tex.); id. (statement of David Lietzke, representing Bay Networks) (stating that generic 
deduction a lot more fair and much more populist than 28% ceiling which only benefits top 
two brackets); Lee, supra note 35, at 1400. 
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no special interest constituency important to capital gains propo-
nents. The history of prior analogous tax cuts targeted solely to 
small businesses and farmers, 188 the special interest groups most 
often articulated by proponents of a generic cut as needing tax re-
lief, suggests that they are not the true, or perhaps not even the 
primary, intended beneficiaries of a capital gains cut. 189 
Capital gains proponents and the CW ATRA Committee Report 
claim that a reduction in capital gains leads to increased invest-
ment, which in turn leads to greater productivity and higher wages, 
thus benefiting all individuals.190 The premise that substantially 
all of the tax savings from capital gains cuts will be reinvested is 
188 In 1976, the liberal coalition in the Senate proposed an estate and gift tax reform 
amendment strictly limited to closely-held businesses and farms. 122 Cong. Rec. 25950, 
25953-54 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.). Despite the fact that rhetoric 
for the general Estate and Gift Tax "Reform," greatly raising the exemption, focused almost 
exclusively on closely-held farms and businesses (which obtained only 2% of the benefits of 
the expansion), id., the Kennedy amendment was roundly defeated, 78 to 6. ld. at 25956 
(Roll No. 490). Senator Edward Kennedy, again in 1981, sought to limit similarly the pro-
posed increase in the unified estate and gift tax credit to estates and donors with interests 
in small farms and businesses. 127 Cong. Rec. 17124 (1981) (remarks of Sen. Edward Ken-
nedy, D-Mass.) ("Only 15 percent of the relief [of the committee provision] goes to family 
farms, and approximately 15 percent more goes to small businesses."). Ranking minority 
member of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Russell Long, D-La., pointedly argued 
that Kennedy's amendment meant "that a person who dedicates his life to serving the pub-
lic in public office is unworthy of equal tax treatment with a small businessman or farmer." 
ld. at 17126. Senator Kennedy's amendment was defeated this time 87 to 9. ld. at 17127 
(Roll No. 217). Similarly, a 1992 amendment sponsored by Senator Bob Kasten, R-Wis., 
allowing farmers alone a tax-free roll over of the proceeds of the sale of farm assets into an 
IRA (to be paid for by extension of customs user fees and elimination of the statute of 
limitations on collection of defaulted student loans) was opposed both on equity grounds, 
"and on fairness grounds with relation to other business people". 138 Cong. Rec. S3641, 
(daily ed. Mar. 13, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Bill Bradley, D-N.J.). This amendment more 
narrowly failed on a partisan vote, 53 to 45. ld. at S3643 (Roll No. 49); 50 Cong. Q. Wkly. 
Rep. 760 (Mar. 21, 1992) (Republicans favored 34 to 9, while Northern and Southern Demo-
crats opposed, 30 to 8 and 14 to 3, respectively). Section 1202 constitutes a rare exception to 
this pattern and was not subject to a separate vote in 1993, although similar provisions had 
been in earlier years. 
189 See Lee, supra note 112, at 1399 and n.38 (noting allegations by commentators and 
then Rep. (now Sen.) Barbara Boxer, D-Cal., that real Republican agenda in capital gains 
cuts is taking care of their core constituency of the wealthy). See supra note 112 and infra 
note 247. 
100 House Small Busine.ss Hearing, Jan. 26, 1995, supra note 42 (statement of Dr. John 
Goodman, CEO of National Center for Policy Analysis); H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 27; 
138 Cong. Rec. H454 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Tom Campbell, R-Cal.); id. 
at 138 Cong. Rec. H573 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Dan Burton, R-Ind.). 
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highly questionable. 191 The historical record is clear, however, that 
the 1978 and 1981 capital gains cuts did not translate into higher 
wages for moderate- and lower-income taxpayers. Indeed, wages 
adjusted for inflation have been falling at the middle and bottom 
income levels over the past two decades.192 This was the basis for 
the failure of trickle-down rhetoric of the Democrats in the early 
1990's. During his 1992 presidential campaign, in television "de-
bates" campaign speeches, and his book-program Putting People 
First: A National Economic Strategy for America,198 Democratic 
Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas charged that the 1979 to 1990 
stagnation in income of the middle 40% of households and the 
drop in income of the bottom 40%, while the income of the top 
20% alone increased (doubling at the top 1 o/o level), were due to a 
failed. economic policy: trickle down economics. Governor Clinton 
described trickle down economics as "[t]he economic philosophy 
. . . that you make the economy grow by putting more and more 
wealth into the hands of fewer and fewer people at the top, getting 
government out of the way, and trusting them to make the right 
101 See infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text. 
181 There is no agreement as to why inequality is rising faster in the United States than 
elsewhere. Explanations include falling wages for unskilled workers as automation 
spreads, low tax rates on the rich during the 1980's, relatively low minimum wages, the 
decline of trade unions and the rapid rise in the 1980's of the stock and bond markets 
in which rich people are heavily invested. . . . \:Vhile incomes rose for the most ~flu­
ent two-fifths of the nation's households as the economy expanded in 1993, the rest of 
the country suffered from falling incomes, after adjusting for inflation. 
Bradsher, supra note 148, at 04. The pre-tax changes in income are apparently due in part 
to increased pay for skills (particularly those attained through education) and decreased pay 
for lack of skills, which in turn may reflect, to some degree, the globalization of the economy 
with the economic principle of "factor price equalization" coming into play. Lester Thurow, 
Head to Head 52-3 (William Murrow & Co. 1992); H.R. Doc. No. 177, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 
101-02, 112-13 (1992). See also supra note 173. The argument of capital gains proponents, 
"that wages have stagnated in large part because we have a Tax Code that penalizes people 
who invest, people who invest, people who save, people who take risks to create new jobs 
... ," 141 Cong. Rec. H4216 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Dick Zimmer, R-N.J.), 
is just another variant of the trickle down argument. Wages at the bottom stagnated when 
capital gains taxes were cut before, in 1978 and 1981. The argument of a capital gains cut 
opponent comes closer to the mark: "Corporate America has exported our jobs overseas for 
cheap labor. As trade unions have been beaten back, hard-earned benefits like health cover· 
age, pensions and family leave have eroded. . . . [I]n the 1980's, [payroll] taxes have in-
creased on working class Americans." Id. at H4252-53 (remarks of Rep. Maxine Waters, D-
Cal.). 
108 Bill Clinton, Putting People First, 1-2 (1992). 
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decisions to invest and to create jobs."194 Clinton liked to encapsu-
late this aspect of the 1980's distribution of income in the follow-
ing statistic derived from the New York Times: 
During the 1980s the wealthiest one percent of Americans got 70 
percent of income gains. By the end of the decade, American CEOs 
were paying themselves 100 times more than their workers. Wash-
ington stood by while quick-buck artists brought down the Savings 
and Loan industry, leaving the rest of us with a $500 billion bill. 
While the rich cashed in, the forgotten middle class- those peo-
ple who work hard and play by the rules- took it on the chin. 
They worked harder for less money and paid more taxes to a gov-
ernment that failed to produce what we need.1911 
'" Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at Montgomery College RE: Education and Eco-
nomics, Rockville, MD, Sept. 2, 1992. 
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon popularized trickle down economics the first 
time as he induced Congress to reduce the individual elite or "class" Federal income tax 
maximum rate from 73% to 25% in steps from 1921 to 1925. Pub. L. No. 67-98, §§ 210 
(normal tax of 8%) and 211 (maximum surtax of 50% on net income over $200,000), 42 Stat. 
227, 233, 237 (1921); Pub. L. No. 69-20 §§ 210 (maximum normal rate of 5%) and 211 (max-
imum surtax of 20% of net income in excess of $100,000), 44 Stat. 9, 21-23 (1926). Corporate 
taxes were reduced as well, and with the Mellon-added disparity at the shareholder level, 
between dividends taxed at ordinary rates and capital gains then taxed at 12.5%, corpora-
tions greatly reduced their dividend rate and increased by 50% the percentage of earnings 
retained (invested in mostly excess capacity, it turned out), while the rich engaged in orgies 
of speculations. In 1925, only 2.5 million individuals paid income taxes, and the top 10,000 
(with incomes exceeding $100,000, or $700,000 today) paid almost half of the Federal income 
taxes; their capital gains income from sales of publicly traded stock equalled the ordinary 
income reported that year. Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Proposed Revision of the Revenue Laws, 1938, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 90 (1938) (here-
inafter Vinson Report); Revenue Revision, 1938: Hearings Before the House Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 116-21 (1938). In contrast to this class tax, the 
masses paid regressive excise taxes on soft drinks, movies, cars, etc., producing far more 
revenue than the individual income tax. Revenue Act of 1932: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932) (statement of Secretary of the Treasury 
Ogden Mills). See Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 149. Moreover, as in the 1980s, the wages 
for the working folk declined. Lee, supra note 112, at 1397 n. 22a. The deflationary period 
following the bursting of the those speculative bubbles is known as the Great Depression. 
'"" Clinton, supra note 193. See Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 158 n.190. The source of 
Clinton's statistic was Sylvia Nasar, The 1980's: A Very Good Time for the Very Rich, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 5, 1992, at A1 (stating that the top 1% earned 60%; later CBO corrected unad-
justed figure to 70%). See generally Sylvia Nasar, The Richest Getting Richer: Now It's a 
Top Political Issue, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1992, at D1 (quoting Dee Dee Myers as stating 
that Clinton "was reading the paper that morning and went crazy . . . The story proved a 
point he had been trying to make for months, so he added the statistic to his repertoire"). 
For a critique of Clinton's numbers, see David Lauter & James Gerstenzang, Accuracy of 
Bush, Clinton Accusations Varies, L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1992, at 36 ("One set of numbers 
show the top 1% absorbed 70% of the income gains of the 1980s. By another measure, the 
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Governor Clinton added that, "for the first time since the Roaring 
'20s, the top one percent of the American people now control more 
wealth than the bottom 90 percent."198 In the Third Debate Gover-
nor Clinton opened197 with this factual assertion: "middle-class 
Americans are basically the only group of Americans who've been 
taxed more in the 1980s and during the last 12 years, even though 
their incomes have gone down, the wealthiest Americans have been 
taxed much less, even though their incomes have gone up."198 
D. Revenue 
The Joint Committee Staff has found that the capital gains re-
lief in Republican Contract, as originally proposed, would cost 
$53.9 billion over five years and $170 billion over ten years.199 The 
Joint Committee Staff scored the capital gains proposals, as modi-
fied on March 9, 1995, as losing only $31.7 billion over the first five 
years,200 with most of the change attributable to a scaled-back cor-
porate capital gains provision.201 Treasury put the capital gains 
top 1% took less -44% of the total gains."). 
1
"" Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at Montgomery College, supra note 194. 
197 The question asked was whether voters should be concerned whether Clinton's 
promises (such as to reform health care, reduce the deficit, and guarantee a college educa-
tion) could be kept with financial pain only for the rich. Much later in the Debate, Gov. 
Clinton pledged not to raise taxes on the middle class to pay for investment incentives, if 
taxes on the rich and foreign subsidiaries would not pay for such incentives. 
198 Clinton, supra note 193, at 2. Substitution of lower-income for middie-income Ameri-
cans would render Gov. Clinton's statement in the Third Debate more factually accurate, 
but less politically sound. Since the 1970's, Republicans have wooed the (formerly) Demo-
cratic white, lower, middle, and working class (male voters) with the mantra that the tax-
and-spend Democrats exact higher taxes from them to give to the minorities. See Lee, supra 
note 112, at 1396-97. 
199 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, Analysis of Estimated Effects 'on Fiscal Year 
Budget Receipts of the Revenue Provisions in the "Contract with America" (H.R. 6, H.R. 8, 
H.R. 9, H.R. 11), JCX-4-95 (Feb. 6, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 26-12 (Feb. 8, 
1995) (hereinafter Estimated Effects). For 1995-2000, the estimated losses were: $21.7 bil-
lion for the 50% individual capital gains deduction; $15.1 billion for the corporate prefer-
ence; $11.2 billion for indexing; $700 million for the capital loss deduction as to residences; 
and an offset of $5.2 billion when all of the capital gains provisions are estimated together 
as an entire package. For 2001-05, the breakdown was: $73.4 billion for the 50% individual 
capital gains deduction; $30.3 billion for the corporate preference; $45.2 billion for indexing; 
$1.6 billion for the capital loss deduction as to residences; and an offset of $19.8 billion 
when all of the capital gains provisions are estimated together as an entire package. 
••• CWATRA Effects on Receipts, supra note 150. 
101 Barbara Kirchheimer, House Tax Package Includes New Mix of Corporate Tax Relief, 
95 Tax Notes Today 48-1 (Mar. 10, 1995). 
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costs of original proposals at $60.9 billion and $183.1 billion, re-
spectively. 202 Treasury scored CW ATRA's capital gains provisions 
considerably lower, however, losing only $11 billion over the five-
year budget window and $91 billion over the ten-year window.208 
The significance of the above findings is that the "pay-as-you-
go" or "paygo" procedures of OBRA 1990, as extended by OBRA 
1993,204 require revenue decreases to be offset by: (1) increases in 
revenues, which is unlikely due to the Republican aversion to tax 
increases,2011 or (2) decreases in spending, so there is no net in-
crease in the deficit. 206 In the former case, present indications are 
that, by and large, the congressional spending decreases will be 
targeted at lower- and middle-income taxpayers, not at a Republi-
can constituency. This will resurrect the charges that the poor will 
be paying for a capital gains tax cut for the rich, otherwise termed 
"Robin Hood upside down".207 "This perk for the privileged would 
••• Prepared Statement of Ass't Sec'ty Samuels, supra note 83. 
••• CWATRA Effects on Receipts, supra note 150 . 
... Barbara Kirchheimer, Reconciliation Perspective: A Look Back To See Where We're 
Headed, 59 Tax Notes 158 (Apr. 12, 1993); Alexander Polinsky, What is the Deficit Trust 
Fund?, 60 Tax Notes 1295, 1296 (Sept. 6, 1993). 
••• Senate Finance Committee Chair Bob Packwood, R-Ore., has suggested paying for a 
capital gains cut with a lower cap on the deductibility of home mortgage interest. See infra 
note 213. 
""" Senate Finance Hearings, Feb. 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Senator John 
Breaux, D-La); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan. 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. 
Robert Matsui, D-Cal.). 
••• 141 Cong. Rec. H4240 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Kweisi Mfume, D-
Md.); accord id. at H4244 and H4253 (remarks of Rep. John Dingell. D-Mich.). See Peter 
Gosselin, House GOP seeks $188 Billion in Tax Cuts: Proposals are similar to those in 
party's election contract, The Boston Globe, March 10, 1995, at A1; Fred Stokeld, Gore 
Charges GOP Tax Cuts Would Help Rich, Increase Deficit, 95 Tax Notes Today 65-5 (April 
4, 1995). The apex of the class warfare debate was reached in the floor debate on the failed 
October 1990 Budget Accord. See Lee, supra note 112 at 1399 n.39; supra note 52. The 
political base for this tactic may be reemerging. Richard Morin, Public Growing Wary of 
GOP Cuts, Wash. Post, March 21, 1995, at A1 ("Among the public's biggest worries: that 
the Republican majority in Congress will cut too deeply and too quickly into social pro-
grams to finance tax cuts and other benefits to wealthy Americans."). This rhetoric appears 
to lie in large part behind the initial (but not permanent) split among the House Republi-
cans over lowering the ceiling on the CW ATRA family tax credit. See Michael Wines, 
G.O.P. Dissidents Want Narrower Family Tax Credit, N.Y. Times, March 22, 1995, at A1; 
Eric Pianin, House Republicans Retreat on Tax Cut, Wash. Post, March 22, 1995, at A1; 
Kenneth Cooper and Helen Dewar, Unity Lags on Remaining Parts of "Contract", Wash. 
Post, March 28, 1995, at A4 (targeting child credit to families earning up to $95,000, rather 
than $200,000, "'will be more effective in winning the equity argument', said Rep. Rick 
La2lo, R-N.Y."); Eric Pianin, Domenici to Attack Deficit and Ignore GOP Tax Cut, Wash-
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be bad public policy on any day, in any context. But because it is 
funded by taking food from the mouths of children and heat from 
the homes of senior citi~ens, it is a true affront to fairness and 
decency. " 208 
Whether any tax cuts, including capital gains, will pass the Sen-
ate is dubious, since many Senate Republicans, in addition to Sen-
ate Democrats, are on record as preferring deficit reduction to tax 
cuts.209 Similarly, a coalition of moderate Republicans and con-
ington Post, March 29, 1995, at A4 ("Some moderate Republicans also fear that Democratic 
criticism that the tax cuts would largely benefit the wealthy at the expense of programs for 
the poor and children is beginning to stick."); Alissa Rubin, Unity Frays within House GOP 
over Family Tax Credit, 52 Cong. Q. Wkly Rep't 857 (March 25, 1995) (" 'I want something 
that defangs Democrats' charges that we are the party of the rich.' said Rep. Henry J. Hyde, 
R-Ill.''). 
••• House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, D-Mo., News from the House Democratic 
Leader (March 9, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 48-21 (March 10, 1995); accord 
141 Cong. Rec H 2991 (daily ed. March 10, 1995) (remarks of Minority Leader Richard 
Gephardt, D-Mo.); see House Ways and Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 
(statement of Rep. Pete Stark, D-Cal.). The Clinton Administration also has adopted this 
theme: 
The president rejects the idea, rejects the idea of targeting the most vulnerable in our 
society -our children, needy families, the homeless- in order to pay for these tax 
cuts, especially for tax cuts that are benefiting the wealthiest. . . . [l)n the end I 
think we have one fundamental question to ask of the Republicans: How can they 
justify, how can they justify, providing almost a quarter of a trillion dollars in tax 
benefits to the most privileged in our society, by cutting the most vulnerable in our 
society -kids and school lunches? 
Transcript of White House Briefing, Fed. News Serv., March 10, 1995 (statement of White 
House Chief of Siaif Leon Panetta). These quotes widely appeared in the news media. See 
also Pianin and Morgan, supra note 152. 
••• David Rosenbaum, A House G.O.P. Leader Sets $200 Billion in Tax Cuts, N.Y. Times, 
March 10, 1995, at A16; Tim Poor, Republicans Announce Tax-Cut Plan; Sponsors Pledge 
'A New Day'; Democrats Promise a New Fray, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 10, 1995 at 
A1 ; Michael Wines, Republican Says Senators Put Deficit Over Tax Cut, N.Y. Times, 
March 20, 1995, at All; Barbara Kirchheimer, Finance Majority Prefers Deficit Reduction 
to Tax Cuts, Packwood Says, 95 Tax Notes Today 55-1 (March 21, 1995). President Bill 
Clinton would likely veto the Act, under the "Robin Hood upside do'Wn" rhetoric, if it were 
a freestanding bill with payments from reduction in spending aimed at the bottom and mid-
dle. Jerry Gray, Republicans Push Their Plan Ahead with the Budget Cuts, N.Y. Times, 
March 17, 1995, at Al. His veto probably would be sustained, with the Southern Democratic 
component of the conservative coalition in the House largely replaced by Republicans. 
CWATRA is much more likely, however, to be included in a Budget Reconciliation Act (if 
for no other reason than to avoid the Senate filibuster provisions restricting debate to 
twenty hours for such acts). In that case, we would have the mirror image of 1990. 136 Cong. 
Rec. H10285 (daily ed. October 16, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Tom Downey, D-N.Y.) ("For 10 
years we have attempted to get the public's attention about the basic unfairness of the 
Republican package, and George Bush has finally handed it to us. He has decided that he 
would rather shut down the Government of the United States than to tax the wealthy."). 
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servative Democrats vowed early in the development of CW ATRA 
to block it unless the tax cuts were linked to progress on reducing 
the deficit.210 This threat proved hollow, because House Leader 
Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., played the Republicans-go-back-on-a-prom-
ise-as-to-taxes-at-their-peril card. The final compromise (the 
Upton-Castle-Martini-Solomon amendment), while prohibiting the 
tax cuts from taking effect until Congress first adopts a budget 
resolution projecting a balanced budget by the year 2002,211 did 
not contain any enforcement mechanism. 212 
Another solution would be to pay for the capital gains cut with a 
revenue increase, particularly one aimed at high-income taxpayers. 
Former Chair Bob Packwood, R-Ore., had suggested paying for a 
capital gains cut with a cap on deductibility of interest on home 
mortgages above $250,000.213 This would raise around $10 billion 
Would President Bill Clinton veto that act and shut down the Government to avoid giving a 
capital gains cut to the Rich, or, more accurately, to avoid giving a "middle class" tax cut 
that goes too high? I suspect not. 
110 Eric Pianin, Bipartisan Group Challenges House's Gop's Tax Package, Wash. Post, 
March 25, 1995, at A13 (stating that tax cuts would take effect once OMB certified that 
Congress had approved a budget plan that would eliminate the deficit by 2002; if an annual 
target were missed, the tax cuts would be revoked the following January); Michael Wines, 
Gingrich Acknowledges That Tax-Cut Plan Is in Trouble, N.Y. Times, March 29, 1995, at 
A17; Eric Pianin, House GOP Leaders, Moderates Near Tax Cut Compromise, Wash. Post, 
March 31, 1995, at A28 (agreement on certification trigger, not on "more onerous require-
ment" of revocation if target missed); Eric Pianin, GOP Claims Accord on Tax Cut, Wash. 
Post, April 4, 1995, at A1 (only watered down version of trigger agreed upon). 
111 141 Cong. Rec. H4192 (daily ed. April 5, 1995) (remarks of Chair of Rules Committee 
Gerald Solomon, R-N.Y.). 
111 Id. at H4206 (remarks of Rep. Charles Stenholm, D-Tex., and Rep. Benjamin Cardin, 
D-Md.). Rules Chair Gerald Solomon countered that the Upton-Castle-Martini-Solomon 
amendment required, pursuant to the budget resolution trigger to the tax cuts, that a recon-
ciliation bill must be enacted which keeps the commitment to a balanced budget glide path 
with real spending cuts. Id. at H4193 and H4205; accord id. at H4238 (remarks of Rep. Fred 
Upton, R-Mich.); id. at H4208 (remarks of Rep. William Martini, R-N.J.); see id. at H4242 
(remarks of Rep. Peter Thorkildsen, R-Mass.) (one of twenty-three members linking much 
needed tax cuts with the specific plan to eliminate the deficit in 7 years). 
118 Kirchheimer, supra note 209; Senate Finance Hearing, March 2, 1995, supra note 8. 
The median price of new homes sold in the United States was $126,500 in 1993; only 9% of · 
new home sales were in excess of $250,000. Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax 
Reform, Final Report with Reform Proposals and Additional Views of Commissioners (Jan-
uary 30, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 33-43 (February 17, 1995). Only 3% of 
existing mortgages exceed $250,000. Senate Finance Hearing, March 2, 1995, supra note 8 
(statement of Chair Bob Packwood, R. Ore.). One member of the Virginia Tax Study Group 
with experience on the Senate Finance Committee Staff opined that Packwood was an 
"army of one" on this issue. 
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over the five-year window. 214 Considering whether or not to imple-
ment this deductibility cap, Packwood argues, depends upon 
whether "you want to have bigger mansions or better ma-
chines?"2u Such an approach would probably remove the objection 
of those who want to use spending savings to reduce the deficit, 
and would answer the increasingly effective Robin-Hood-upside-
down rhetoric. It probably would not result in a reduction in the 
effective rate at the top. Note that the decline in value of "man-
sions"218 would, on the average, balance the increase in value of 
other capital assets. 
The proposed capital gains preferences, if paid for by spending 
cuts aimed at the middle and bottom, would lower the effective 
rate at the top. Prior to the Revenue Act of 1978, the top individ-
ual ordinary rate was 50% on earned income and 70% on invest-
ment income. The effective rate at the top, however, was around 
35%,217 due to the use of tax preferences, principally the capital 
gains preference and tax shelters. The effective rate at the top in 
the early 1960's had also been in the 35% range,218 despite a nomi-
.,. General Accounting Office, Addressing the Deficit (March 15, 1995), available in 95 
Tax Notes Today 52-44 (March 16, 1995) (stating that there would be $9.2 billion in reve-
nue gains between 1996 and 2000 from limiting interest deductibility to the first $300,000 in 
mortgage indebtedness on principal and second residence); Congressional Budget Office, 
Deficit Reduction Options, supra note 119 (same); Joint Committee on Taxation, Issues In-
volved in Possible Revenue Options to Reduce the Federal Deficit 18 (JCs-20-92 June 4, 
1992), available in 92 Tax Notes Today 118-11 (June 8, 1992) ($14.7 billion 1993-97 from 
$300,000 principal cap)_ A 50% generic capital gains cut (19.8% maximum rate) for individ-
uals could probably be brought down close to this estimate with, for example, full recapture 
for § 1250 property and by subjecting part of the exclusion to the AMT. The Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation estimated that the full § 1250 recapture provision, proposed in 1990 as part 
of the Bush Administration's capital gains cut (19.6% top individual rate versus currently 
proposed 19.8% rate), would have raised revenues by $10.3 over the five-year budget win-
dow (1990 to 1995). Methodology 1990, supra note 155, at 10 . 
.,. Kirchheimer, supra note 209 (quoting Packwood, speaking to the National Association 
of Manufacturers). 
118 A member of the Virginia Tax Study Group believed that the decline in value of 
"mansions" down the line would depress the value of the housing stock below $250,000 
mortgages, even though such residences would retain their preference. 
017 Progressivity and Income Distribution, supra note 173, at 2 (top 1% of families paid 
35.4% of their income in Federal taxes in 1977). 
••• The effective rate on "amended taxable income" (narrower than family economic in-
come, consisting of taxable income after personal deductions increased by excluded portion 
of capital gains, exempt interest and excess percentage depletion) of $100,000 to $200,000, 
was 37.8%; of $200,000 to $500,000, was 37.9%; of $500,000 to $1,000,000, was 35.8%; and of 
over $1,000,000, was 32.7%. 1968 Tax Reform Study, supra note 38, pt. 1, at 81-86, and pt. 
2., at 142-45; 110 Cong. Rec. (Part 2) 1438 (1964) (remarks of Floor Manager Sen. Russell 
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nal top rate of 91% for the same reason. The 1980's opened with 
President Ronald Reagan's Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
("ERTA"). As a practical matter, ERTA enacted the maximum 
capital gains tax rate under President John F. Kennedy's 1963 pro-
posed capital gains tax cut from two decades earlier, but with none 
of Kennedy's equitable limitations. (Carryover basis, not even a 
second-best substitute for Kennedy's proposed taxation of unreal-
ized appreciation at death, enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 
with a delayed effective date and then retroactively postponed, 
had been finally repealed by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax 
Act of 1980.219) ERTA's reduction of the maximum, regular tax 
rate on investment income from 70% to 50%,220 with no adjust-
ment to three-year-old, 60% capital gains deduction applicable to 
all capital assets, immediately reduced the maximum capital gains 
rate from 28% to 20%.221 Congress also enacted an across-the-
board, 25% reduction in individual rates phased in over three 
years, as well as enacting indexing of tax brackets, exemptions and 
the standard deduction.222 
At the same time, the 1981 Act altered capital recovery methods 
(ACRS), which now encompassed real estate depreciation, by ac-
celerating rates and adopting much-shorter-than-true-economic 
Long, D-La.) (effective rate at $1,000,000 or more is 27%; 75% of total income at that level 
is from capital gains); Lee, supra note 35, at 1403-04. This pattern of increasing concentra-
tion of capital gains income the higher the income scale, see also note 231, infra, is as old as 
the capital gains preference. See, e.g., House 1942 Hearings, supra note 97, pt. 1, at 253 
(statement of Ass't Sec'ty Randolph Paul). For a complete breakdown of personal income 
by sources and income classes (and numbers of taxpayers in each class) for 1921, see Reve-
nue Act of 1924: Hearings on H.R. 6715 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 68th Cong., 
1st Sess. 304-06 (1924) (tables submitted by Sen. Andrieus Jones, D-N.M.).Assistant Secre-
tary Stanley Surrey, testifying at the end of President Johnson's lameduck administration, 
revealed that for about 75% of the individual taxpayers with over $1,000,000 in actual an-
nual income, the effective income tax rate clustered in the area between 20% and 30%, as 
compared with about 60% of the individual taxpayers in the group between $20,000 and 
$50,000 of actual income, who clustered in the same effective rate range. Moreover, while 
the effective rate increased with actual income as to taxpayers up to $50,000, and flattened 
from $50,000 to $100,000, above $100,000 the effective rates began to decrease. He further 
testified that these figures did not appear to be a one-shot phenomenon as to high income 
individuals. The capital gains preference constituted the primary reason for these low effec-
tive rates. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 20, pt. 4, at 1592, 1598-99. 
119 Pub. L. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 229. 
••• Pub. L. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176-82 (1981) . 
.. , S. Rep. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1981). 
••• Pub. L. 97-34, § 104, 95 Stat. 172, 188-90 (1981). 
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useful lives for depreciation purposes. 223 This resulted in virtually 
complete sheltering of: (1) portfolio and business income by many 
more high- and even middle-income individuals,224 and (2) busi-
ness income by big corporations.2211 As a result, payment of income 
taxes by both high income individuals and big corporations became 
virtually voluntary. By 1985 (in an increase from the low point of 
1982), the effective rate for the top 1% was 24.9%, when the maxi-
mum rate was 50%.226 From the 1960's to the early 1980's, one-
••• Id. at § 201, 95 Stat. 172, 203-19 (1981); 37 Cong. Q. Almanac 91 (1981); 127 Cong. 
Rec. 15768 (1981) (remarks of Senate Finance Chair Bob Dole, R-Kan.). 
••• Of 260,000 individual returns in 1983 with "positive income" in excess of $250,000, 
11% paid less than 5% in Federal income taxes and 76.4% paid less than 30%. Sixty-four 
percent of these 260,000 returns showed partnership losses, a major, but not the only, cause 
of the low effective rates. While Treasury could not break out tax from economic losses, the 
largest sources of deductions in these loss partnerships were interest, depreciation and de-
pletion. "For sheer magnitude of losses real estate operators and lessors of buildings domi-
nate all other industries." High-Income Taxpayers and Related Partnership Tax Issues: 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 12-13 (1985) (statement of Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Ron-
ald Pearlman). 
••• "[I]n 1955, corporate income taxes represented 27.3 percent of total tax receipts .... 
In 1989, it was down to 10.5 percent." Decline of Corporate Tax Revenues: Hearing Before 
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990) (statement of Chair Lloyd 
Bentsen, D-Tex); id. at 4 (stating that by 1986, percentage of corporate taxes as a percent-
age of Federal total revenue receipts had dropped to 5.1 %; thereafter, the declining trend 
reversed) (statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Analysis Harvey Rosen). See 
Lee, supra note 71, at 129 n.324 (noting that corporate taxes had declined from 27% of total 
budget receipts in 1950 to 8% in 1985). For a discussion of the causes, see Hearing on De-
dine of Corporate Revenues, supra, at 5-6 (showing that primarily corporate pre-tax profits 
were lower than estimated, due to higher wages, salaries, and interest payments than ex-
pected) (statement of Harvey Rosen), and id. at 11 (stating that 58% of shortfall was due to 
CBO overestimating corporate profits -the overestimation being due to error in the model, 
increased debt financing, and underestimation of depreciation deductions; 42% was attribu-
table to other factors, such as ESOPs and increased use of S corporations) (statement of 
Director of Congressional Budget Office Robert Reischauer). 
••• Progressivity and Income Distribution, supra note 173, at 29; Congressional Budget 
Office, The Changing Distribution of Federal Taxes: 1975-1990 47 (1987); see generally Lee, 
supra note 71, at 70-71 n.43 and 130 n.334. Former Senator Floyd Haskell, D-Col., pointed 
out that the policy/political principle of distributional equity under which upper income 
taxpayers could not receive a greater tax cut than middle- and lower-income taxpayers had 
the effect of freezing in place the erosion of effective rates at the top. Floyd Haskell, Tax 
Reform, 35 Tax Notes 301, 305 (April 30, 1987); see also Kies, supra note 2, at 183. Oppo-
nents of a renewed capital gains preference argued, in the 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, 
that the 1986 Act had only partially restored individual progressivity to the pre-1981 level. 
1990 Hearings on Fairness, supra note 65, at 124 (statement of Dr. Henry Aaron, Senior 
Fellow, the Brookings Institution) (high-water mark of progressivity was in early 1960's); id. 
at 142 (written statement of late Joseph Pechman). A renewed capital gains preference with 
80% of the tax benefits going to taxpayers with over $100,000 in income, id. at 345 (state-
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quarter of the high-income taxpayers paid an effective rate much 
closer to the nominal rates (e.g., 50% to 60% in the early 1960's), 
and three-quarters paid a much lower effective rate than the aver-
age effective rate. 227 This constant pattern has strong implications 
for horizontal equity.228 By 1990, various provisions had raised the 
top effective rate back to 27%,229 primarily due to the repeal of the 
ment of Rep. Marty Russo, D-Ill.), id. at 525 (statement of Chair Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill.) 
(two-thirds of tax benefits go to those making over $200,000), would have eliminated that 
partial restoration. 
••• See supra note 218. At amended taxable income levels over $100,000, high tax individ-
uals paid an effective rate of 60% to 65%, while low tax individuals paid an effective rate of 
between 20% and 30%. 1968 Tax Reform Study, supra note 38, pt. 1, at 82; 110 Cong. Rec. 
(Part 2) 1439 (1964) (remarks of Floor Manager Senator Long, D-La.)(stating that average 
effective rate for high capital gains income taxpayers with $1,000,000 or more in income was 
20%, while effective rate for such taxpayers with low capital gains income was 50%). 
••• 1969 House Hearings, supra note 20, pt. 4, at 1592 (statement of Ass't Secretary of the 
Treasury for Tax Policy Stanley Surrey) ("Fairness it seems to me comes down to two 
things -one, that as between people who have different levels of income, one higher and 
one lower, the person with higher income should pay a progressively greater tax [i.e., 'verti-
cal equity']; and, second, as between people who are at the same level of income and who are 
similarly situated, they should pay the same tax [i.e., 'horizontal equity']."). Cunningham 
and Schenk, supra note 34, at 363-64, after summarizing the literature, conclude that hori-
zontal equity is a corollary of vertical equity, which they would balance against efficiency; in 
effect, the conclusion is that tax rules should interfere as little as possible with economic 
decisions. Id. at 367. They also discuss perceptional equity, id. at 368, which clearly moved 
Senator Russell Long, D-La., in 1964. See also supra note 47. Cunningham and Schenk con-
clude that a strong factor is whether a proposal lessens the gap between the statutory rate 
and the effective rate on income. Cunningham and Schenk, supra note 34, at 372. I agree, at 
least as to realized income. Lee, supra note 35, at 1410. Cunningham and Schenk look at 
accrued but unrealized capital gains and conclude that a preference, by increasing realiza-
tions, raises the effective rate on all accrued capital gains, thus lessening the gap. Cunning-
ham and Schenk, supra note 34, at 373 Their analysis parallels the results of the "dynamic 
distribution analysis" advocated by the Bush Administration in 1990, which takes account 
of the increase in capital gains taxes paid as a result of induced realizations. See supra note 
170. Shaviro, supra note 68, at 408, maintains that horizontal equity can not be measured 
purely on tax payments and effective tax rates on (undertaxed) income. The initial violation 
of horizontal (and vertical) equity arose from not taxing accrued, but unrealized capital 
gains; a capital gains preference makes a taxpayer with capital gains even better off. "She 
voluntarily agrees to pay more tax than previously because she regards the added tax pay-
ments (and complexity costs) as worth the reduction of lock-in." Shaviro, supra note 68, at 
408; accord supra note 171; Daniel Halperin, Commentary: A Capital Gains Preference is 
not EVEN a Second-Best Solution, 48 Tax L. Rev. 381, 387 (1993). A capital gains prefer-
ence lowers the effective rate on realized income, with the inequitable results at the top 
income levels set forth in the text. Cf. Revenue Increase Options: Hearings Before the 
House Comm. on Ways and Means, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1987) (colloquy between 
Mark Bloomfield, President of American Council for Capital Formation, and Rep. (now 
Sen.) Byron Dorgan, D-N.D.). 
••• Progressivity and Income Distribution, supra note 173, at 2-4, 12-13; Tax Policy and 
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capital gains preference and to the Passive Activity Loss limita-
tions of section 469. The 1993 increases in rates at the top to 36% 
and 39.6% raised the top effective rate back to 33%.230 The pro-
posed CW ATRA capital gains preference would probably lower 
that rate by two to four percentage points231 and reintroduce at the 
top the substantial horizontal disparities as to realized income of 
earlier decades. 
the Macroeconomy, supra note 173, at 5, 29-30, 55. Thus, the Federal income tax system 
remained somewhat progressive, but less than in prior decades. Tax Policy and the 
Macroeconomy, supra at 67-68. See generally 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 
65, at 140 (written statement of late Joseph Pechman); Richard Musgrove, Progressivity 
Reconsidered, available in 92 Tax Notes Today 190-27 (September 18, 1992). This brought 
the nominal top rate and top effective rate closer together than any time since the institu-
tion of the capital gains preference in 1921; with the top capital gains rate at 28% as well, 
horizontal disparities at the top probably disappeared also. See Lee, supra note 35, at 1410. 
••• Ways and Means Democrats, Highlights Republican Tax Package (March 9, 1995), 
available in 95 Tax Notes Today 50-52 (March 14, 1995) (hereinafter Highlight of GOP Tax 
Package). While this increased vertical equity (although not fully back to the 1960's through 
1970's level), with the top capital gains rate remaining at 28%, it was at the cost of horizon-
tal equity. Lee, supra note 35, at 1410; cf. Shaviro, supra note 68, at 415-16. 
••• President George Bush's reproposed 19% maximum rate on capital gains would have 
lowered the effective income tax rate of the wealthy by four percentage points. 136 Cong. 
Rec. H7790 (daily ed. September 25, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Donald Pease, D-Oh., based on 
a report issued on September 24 by the Democratic Study Group). The Ways and Means 
Committee predicted only a 2% reduction in the effective rate. Progressivity and Income 
Distribution, supra note 173, at 56. The aggregate change under all of the CWATRA provi-
sions is estimated to lower the effective rate at the $200,000 and up range (top 5%) from 
30% to 25.7%. Highlight of GOP Tax Package, supra note 230. The Joint Committee on 
Taxation estimates that the aggregate effect of the CW ATRA tax cuts will !ower the effec-
tive tax rate at the $200,000 and over income level from 29.8% to 28% in 1996 (twice the 
percentage point reduction of most lower income levels). Distributional Effects of the Tax 
Provisions Contained in the Contract with America Tax Relief Act of 1995 (March 8, 1995), 
available in 95 Tax Notes Today 52-12 (March 16, 1995). Almost all of that reduction is 
from the capital gains cut (from 29.8% to 28.1 %). ld. The reduction would be even higher at 
the top 1% range, due to the greater percentage of capital gains income the higher the 
income range, Allen Manvell, Basic Statistics on Capital Gains in The Capital Gains Contro-
versy: A Tax Analysts Reader 13 (J. Andrew Hoerner ed., 1992) (stating that, at $100,000-
$200,000 of adjusted gross income level, 9% of income consists of capital gains; at $200,000-
$500,000 of AGI, the percentage is 14%; at $500,000 to $1,000,000 of AGI, the percentage is 
20%; and at levels of AGI of $1,000,000 and above, the percentage is 34%). The top 1 o/o of 
returns (by adjusted gross income) reported around 50% of the realized capital gains in the 
1950's and 1960's, dropping to the 30% to 40% in the 1970's, and climbing back to 55% in 
1982 through 1985. Congressional Budget Office, How Capital Gains Tax Rates Mfect Reve-
nues: The Historical Evidence 30-1 (1988), available in 88 Tax Notes Today 61-79 (March 
18, 1988); see 141 Cong. Rec. H4208 (daily ed. April 5, 1995) (remarks of ranking minority 
member and former Chair Sam Gibbons, D-Fla.). The agenda of some of the supporters of 
CW ATRA was to eliminate two-thirds of the 1993 increase in taxes at the top. ld. at H4219 
(remarks of Rep. Jim McCrery, R-La.). 
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The political implications of scoring a capital gains cut as a reve-
nue loser played a major role in stymieing President George Bush's 
proposed capital gains cut in 1990; some members of Congress are 
currently faced with the same problems.232 Then, Treasury's esti-
mates showed a revenue gain, while the Joint Committee's showed 
a revenue loss of almost the same amount.233 Only the Joint Com-
mittee's estimates counted for scoring purposes under House rules. 
The House Republicans, like the proverbial elephant, have a long 
memory on this issue.234 House Speaker Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., ful-
minated about estimators who for ideological reasons fudge: 
"There are some people who have a passion for more money for 
Washington and less money for America." He asserted that the 
leadership could "reshape the bill to work within . . . honest 
estimates. "2311 
••• Joint House and Senate Budget Committee Hearing on "Congressional Budget Cost 
Estimating," January 10, 1995, available in 95 Tax Notes Today 7-36 (January 10, 1995) 
(prepared opening statement of Chairman John Kasich). 
I d. 
A view shared by a number of Members in both parties is that the tax rate on capital 
gains should be reduced. Efforts to reduce this tax rate have been stymied in part by 
revenue estimates indicating a large loss of revenue. This is in sharp contract [sic] 
with the view that such a tax reduction is largely self-financing. The problem is that 
estimators have adopted certain rules and conventions to guide their estimating pro-
cess. In particular, one rule -not sanctioned by Congress- is to omit from the 
budget estimates the stimulative effects of proposed policies on economic growth. 
Such static modelling (when estimates do not include these growth-inducing effects) 
is what, in part, accounts for the large revenue losses associated with the capital gains 
tax reduction. 
188 See infra note 251. 
... Alissa Rubin, "Dynamic Scoring" Plan Exposes Deep Divisions Within GOP, 52 Cong. 
Q. Weekly Rep. 3500 (December 10, 1994). 
••• Ways & Means Hearing, January 5, 1995, supra note 8. Ranking minority member and 
former Chair Sam Gibbons, D-Fla., subsequently referred to this as "shoot the messenger." 
Ways & Means Hearing, January 10, 1995, supra note 16 (colloquy with Ass't Sec'ty Samu-
els). Gingrich's sentiments parallel other members' anti-academic/government employee 
criticism of witnesses testifying as to costs or other disadvantages of the capital gains pro-
posals. Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. Jon 
Chrisiansen, R-Neb.) (questioning Professor Alan Auerbach as to whether he had ever been 
in the private sector); Ways & Means Hearing, January 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement 
of Rep. Mac Collins, R-Ga.) (remarking, upon determining that Dr. Jane Gravelle had only 
worked for Congressional Research, Treasury and taught, "[t]hat was pretty evident by your 
comments."); id. (statement of Rep. Jon Christiansen, R-Neb.) ("It's almost unanimous that 
it's the lifetime government employee, and the lifetime professor who has never, never been 
out in the real world, almost unanimously oppose a capital gains reduction .... [W]hat is it 
that we're missing?"). The answer may be that they, unlike most of the other witnesses, are 
not supplicants. The tenor of these remarks immediately reminded me of Governor George 
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The Democrats also have long memories about rosy "estimates" 
that were to pay for tax cuts through resultant growth in the econ-
omy,236 as in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, a "Riverboat 
Gamble," which gave birth to the flood of deficits.237 They are wor-
ried that "the sort of supply side extremist type of approach may 
come back and advocate that the whole problem will go away and 
the tax cut will pay for itself."238 In fact, however, the Staff esti-
mates had not made macroeconomic assumptions in t981; their er-
ror arose from projecting a continuation of high inflation and not 
foreseeing the severe 1981 to 1982 recession.239 Reagan Administra-
tion officials did, however, make macroeconomic or supply side as-
sumptions in the 1981 Hearings. Administration witnesses in the 
hearings on the President's tax proposals argued that the resulting 
increased incentives, under "supply side economics,"240 would lead 
to higher output in the economy, generating increased tax revenues 
making tax shelters relatively less attractive. 241 Coupled with 
Wallace, D-Ala., ranting against "pointy-headed bureaucrats" in his 1968 campaign for 
President . 
.... Ways & Means Hearing, January 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Dr. Barry Bos-
worth) (remembering the same situation in the early eighties); Ways & Means Hearing, Jan-
uary 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. Robert Matsui, D-Cal.); accord 141 Cong. 
Rec. H4213-14 (daily ed. April 5, 1995) (remarks of ranking minority member and former 
Chair Sam Gibbons, D-Fla.). 
181 Joint Budget Hearing (January 10, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 7-33 (Janu-
ary 10, 1995) (opening statement of Rep. Martin Sabo, D-Minn.). Cf. Ways & Means Hear-
ing, January 5, 1995, supra note 8 (statement of Ranking minority member and former 
Chair Sam Gibbons, D-Fla.) ("I will not go down the road again, having made the mistake 
once, of voting for tax reductions and just taking an empty promise that we're going to get 
the spending cuts."); Barbara Kirchheimer, Finance Majority Prefers Deficit Reduction to 
Tax Cuts, 95 Tax Notes Today 55-1 (March 21, 1995) (same simile by Chair Bob Packwood, 
R-Ore.). See supra note 210 and accompanying text. President Ronald Reagan's first budget 
message to Congress contained "over optimistic" macroeconomic offsets to proposed tax 
cuts, projecting a $342 billion increase in Federal receipts over the period from 1981·to 1986. 
Methodology 1990, supra note 155, at 7 n.lO. Instead, total receipts rose just $170 billion, 
and only after substantial revenue increases in 1982 and 1984. Id. 
188 Ways & Means Hearing, January 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Dr. Michael 
Bosworth). 
••• Senate Finance Hearings, January 24, 1995, supra note 8 (colloquy between Chair Bob 
Packwood, R-Ore, and William Nisaken, Chairman of the Cato Institute). 
••• Tax Aspects of the President's Economic Program: Hearings Before the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 397-400 (1981) (statement of 
Professor Arthur Laffler, University of Southern California) (hereinafter 1981 House 
Hearings). 
••• Id. at 14 (statement of Sec'ty Don Regan); see Reagan Tax Cuts Face Hungry Con-
gress, 12 Tax Notes 422 (February 23, 1981); 127 Cong. Rec. (Part 12)'15768 (1981) (remarks 
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spending cuts, higher real economic growth, and lower inflation, 
such increases would allegedly permit balancing of the budget at a 
lower level of taxation. 242 Such results, however, were not based on 
traditional econometric models but on an "economic scenario" in-
stead.243 The floor debate echoed that the ERTA tax cuts would 
increase savings and lead to dynamic growth and greater 
productivity. 244 
Many Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee and on the 
floor were quite skeptical of these assumptions in 1981, particu-
larly the effects of the across-the-board cuts on savings rates.246 
They were right.246 OMB Director David Stockman bragged that 
supply-side economics was merely a cover for the trickle-down the-
ory, in order to bring down the top ordinary and capital gains 
rates.247 
of Chair Bob Dole, R-Kan). 
••• 1981 House Hearings, supra note 240, at 17 (Sec'ty Don Regan); id. at 57, 61, 70 (state-
ment of OMB Director David Stockman) (a spending control plan is an essential and indis-
pensable anchor, and "combination of incentive-minded tax rate reductions and firm budget 
control is expected to lead to a balanced budget by 1984"); id. at 115, 118 (statement of 
Chairman of President's Council of Economic Advisers Murray Weidenbaum). 
••• 1981 House Hearings, supra note 240, at 17, 42, 54 (statement of Sec'ty Don Regan); 
id. at 56 (statement of Director of OMB David Stockman); id. at 42 (statement of Sec'ty 
Don Regan) ("What we did in fact was create our own scenario."). 
••• 127 Cong. Rec. 18051 (1981) (remarks of Rep. Kent Hance, D-Tex.); id. at 18079 (re-
marks of Rep. Clarence Brown, R-Oh.); id. at 17834 (remarks of Sen. William Roth, R-Del.); 
id. at 17975 (remarks of Sen. Steve Symms, R-Idaho) ("The tax reductions will be more 
than paid for by spending reductions, additional revenues from faster economic growth, and 
higher levels of private saving and investment."). 
••• 1981 House Hearings, supra note 240, at 44 (statement of Rep. Sam Gibbons, D-Fla); 
id. at 44-5 (statement of Rep. J.J. Pickle, D-Tex.); id. at 54-55 (statement of Rep. Tom 
Downey, D-N.Y.); id. at 73, 131 (remarks of Rep. Donald Pease, D-Oh.); id. at 74 (remarks 
of Rep. Robert Matsui, D-Cal.); 127 Cong. Rec. 18073 (1981) (remarks of Donald Pease, D-
Oh.). See id. at 17977 (remarks of Sen. George Mitchell, D-Me.); id. at 17854 (remarks of 
Senator Tom Eagleton, D-Mo.) ("In Coolidge's time, it was called 'trickle down.' In Rea-
gan's time, it is called 'supply side,' but there is not a scintilla of difference between 
them."); id. at 17965 (remarks of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.). For a sketch of trickle 
down in the 1920's and 1980's, see supra notes 173 and 194. 
••• Staff of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Background Materi-
als on Federal Budget and Tax Policy for Fiscal Year 1991 and Beyond 21 (Comm. Print 
1990); Supply-Side Theory Revisited: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1985) (statement of Dr. Henry Bosworth, Senior Fellow, the Brookings 
Institute) (stating that financing the Deficit takes two thirds of all private savings which 
have stayed in the range of 8% to 9%). 
147 William Greider, The Education of David Stockman, Atlantic Monthly 27, 47 (Decem-
ber 1981). See 141 Cong. Rec. H4216 (daily ed. April 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Ron Klink, 
D-Pa.) (David Stockman later said that trickle-down economics "was a Trojan horse just 
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Today, capital gains proponents again claim that the proposed 
capital gains cut will pay for itself through unblocking sales, thus 
promoting efficiency in the capital market.248 The record shows 
that from 1954 to 1988, capital gains realizations pretty well 
tracked both GNP and stock market activity, rather than rate 
changes.249 This has been the case for a number of years, going 
back to the 1920's. 2110 The most extensive modern discussions on 
whether a generic capital gains cut would increase or decrease rev-
designed to bring down the top rate"; CWATRA is a "Trojan elephant"); cf. id. at H4214 
(remarks of Rep. Robert Matsui, D-Cal.). See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
••• Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Mark Bloom-
field); House Small Business Hearing, January 26, 1995, supra note 42 (statement of Rep. 
Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md.); H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 27, at 35 (noting that induced sales, 
but not macroeconomic effects, were accounted for by Congressional estimates). Some com-
mentators maintain that the most serious argument in favor of a capital gains preference is 
its reduction of the "lock-in effect" arising from taxing capital gains only upon realization 
(as contrasted with the ideal of annual accrual) and from not taxing unrealized appreciation 
upon death (an alternate ideal rule). Cunningham and Schenk, supra note 34, at 344, 375 
(stating that best approach would be annual accrual or such taxation at death; preference is 
"second best" solution provided it raises revenue); cf. Shuldinger, supra note 85, at 559 
(indexing by reducing lock-in adds to economic efficiency). Professor Halperin argues, based 
upon the economic literature, that lock-in does not substantially affect the mix of societal 
investment. Halperin, supra note 228, at 386 and n.28. (As appears to be the case on all 
aspects of capital gains taxation), the economic literature is mixed on this point, according 
to Professor Zodrow, but interindustry effects on capital allocation are small in any event. 
Zodrow, supra note 37, at 467-69, 484-93. See also infra notes 288-96 and accompanying 
text. 
••• 1990 Senate Tax Incentives Hearings, supra note 155, at 63 (stat~ment of Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation Chief of Staff Ronald Pearlman); Methodology 1990, supra note 155, at 
24-28 (1954-1988); see also 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 70, at 29 (statement of Joint 
Committee on Taxation Chief of Staff Ron Pearlman) ("The decision to sell a capital asset 
and to realize a gain or a loss is largely a discretionary decision on the part of an investor. In 
fact, we know very little about why investors choose to buy and sell assets. We do know, 
that taxes are only one of many factors that enter into their decision making process."). See 
generally CBO, Historical Evidence of Capital Gains Cut Revenues, supra note 231, at xv, 
24-30; 1987 Senate Hearing, supra note 63, at 92, 96-98, 107 (statement of Dr. Joseph 
Minarik, Urban Institute) ("Over the long haul, through tax increases and tax decreases, 
capital gains realizations have tended to follow the growth of the economy with further 
upward and downward swings propelled by the stock market."). But see id. at 108 (state-
ment of Mark Bloomfield, President American Council for Capital Formation) (stating that 
capital gains revenues increased 243% from 1978 to 1985, while the Dow only increased 
92%, and the economy only increased 77%). 
••• Confidential Senate 1934 Hearings, supra note 97, pt. 3, at 105-06, 110 (statement of 
Under Secretary Dr. Roswell Magill); House 1942 Hearings, supra note 97, at 256-57; id. at 
1628-30, 1642-43, 1647 (charts) (statement of Assistant Secretary Randolph Paul) (historical 
fluctuations in revenues from capital transactions reflected market conditions rather than 
capital gains tax rates). · 
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enues are the 1989 and 1990 Senate Hearings. In these hearings, 
the Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation disagreed as to 
the revenue effects of the Bush Administration's various capital 
gains proposals.261 Joint Committee Chief of Staff Ronald Pearl-
man's most telling point in the 1989 Senate Finance Committee 
Hearings was the historical record. For the Bush Administration's 
projections to have been borne out, realizations would have had to 
have doubled for the four-year revenue period (1991 to 1995) to 
the $1 trillion level of the period from 1978 to 1987. This period 
included the capital gains cuts in 1978 and 1981, the push in 1986 
and 1987 to sell before the Tax Reform Act of 1986's scheduled 
rate increases, the 1980's stock market boom, the leveraged buy-
out mania, and a boom in the real estate market.262 A witness at 
the 1995 Hearings pointed out that "[i]f you are going to raise rev-
enue by cutting the capital gains tax in half, you are going to have 
to double realizations. And this is going to be a change that cer-
tainly we have not experienced historically."263 
Capital gains cut proponents, on the other hand, pointed to the 
substantial increase in capital gains revenues from 1978 through 
1985 as evidence of the unlocking effect of the capital gains cuts in 
1978 and 1981.264 Indeed, the 1978 capital gains cut had been sold 
to Congress as a revenue raiser.266 House Speaker Newt Gingrich, 
""' Ways & Means Hearing, January 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Dr. Michael 
Boskin, a Stanford University professor and former chairman of President Bush's Council of 
Economic Advisers) (stating that Treasury scored 30% exclusion as gaining $12 billion over 
five year window; the Joint Committee scored the exclusion as losing $12 billion). The ac-
tual numbers were $12.5 billion and $11.4 billion. Methodology 1990, supra note 155, at 2; 
Congressional Budget Office, Budget Estimates: Current Practices and Alternative Ap-
proaches (January 12, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 7-16 (January 11, 1995) (here-
inafter CBO, Budget Estimates). 
••• 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 70, at 30 (statement of Chief of Staff Ron Pearl-
man); Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry 
Aaron) (one of the biggest bull markets and a real estate boom of very considerable propor-
tions); Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Dr. Allen 
Sinai) (effect of stock market boom on realizations). Professor Zodrow points also to dra-
matic reduction in brokerage fees, increased importance of mutual funds with faster turno-
ver of portfolios, explosion of LBO's, and introduction of capital gains reporting require-
ments resulting in increased compliance. Zodrow, supra note 37, at 448. 
••• Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Jane 
Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy Congressional Research Service) . 
... Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36; Ways & Means Hearing, 
January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (Statement of Mark Bloomfield). 
••• The Finance Committee, in justifying the 1978 capital gains cut stated that: 
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for instance, believed that the 1978 capital gains cuts had in fact 
raised revenues, while the estimators had forecast losses. 2156 The 
Treasury and the Joint Committee, however, both found that the 
1978 capital gains cut actually lost revenue when examined under a 
"timed -series" analysis. 2157 Moreover, the increased realizations of 
lower capital gains taxes will markedly increase sales of appreciated assets, which will 
offset much of the revenue loss from the tax cut, and potentially lead to an actual 
increase in revenues. In addition, the improved mobility of capital will stimulate in-
vestment, thereby generating more economic activity and more tax revenue. Six for-
mer Secretaries of the Treasury have informed the committee that they believe lower 
capital gains taxes will raise, not lower, revenues. 
S. Rep. No. 1263, supra note 97, at 192; cf. H.R. Rep. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 
(1978), reprinted 1978 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6955. 
•oe Ways & Means Hearing, January 5, 1995, supra note 8 (statement of House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich, R-Ga.) ("[A]ll government estimates were explicitly wrong on the Jimmy 
Carter capital gains tax cut, and literally wrong to such a degree that it wasn't a question of 
scale; they had a negative number for their estimate when it was a positive number. So they 
were saying it will cost us money if we cut capital gains under Jimmy Carter, and in fact we 
made money."). See supra note 235 (similar bias). One Member of Congress apparently con-
fused this story with the story of the capital gains cut proposed by President John Kennedy 
in 1963. Ways & Means Hearing, January 12, 1995, supra note 47 (statement of Rep. Jim 
Bunning, R-Ky.). 
••• According to Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Ronald Pearlman, 
while the 1985 Treasury Report on the 1978 Capital Gains cuts showed revenue gains from 
the 1978 capital gains cut under the "cross-section" analysis now used by Treasury, the 
"time series" data, then used by Treasury and still used by the Joint Committee Staff, 
showed revenue losses after the first year or two. 1990 Senate Tax Incentives Hearings, 
supra note 155, at 67. Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at ix, 186, more ambiguously 
states that the time-series estimates indicate a revenue increase in the first year after the 
1978 cut, "but significantly smaller increases or small reductions in federal revenue in sub-
sequent years." More specifically, by the third year after the cut, revenues were estimated to 
be less than they would have been absent the cut. The 1981 cut under this analysis lost 
revenue from the gun. Id. at 179. The study did not assume macroeconomic effects. Id. at 
vii. In short, the evidence was mixed as to the effects of the 1978 and 1981 capital gains 
cuts, and the Treasury economists did not feel that there was justification for a firm conclu-
sion that lowering the rate would raise revenue. Andrew Hoerner, Treasury's Capital Gains 
Estimates: Mr. Economist Goes to Washington, 44 Tax Notes 141, 142 (July 10, 1989). Trea-
sury later redid its time series studies, concluding that they did not as strongly support the 
conclusion that the 1978 and 1981 capital gains cuts lost revenue over time. Michael Darby, 
Robert Gillingham, & John Greenlees, The Direct Revenue Effects of Capital Gains Taxa-
tion: A Reconsideration of the Time-Series Evidence, Treasury Dep't, 2 Bulletin (June 
1988). 
The cross section analysis looks at a large group of taxpayers horizontally across a single 
year, whereas the time series looks vertically through a period of time at aggregate taxpayer 
data. 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 70, at 31 (statement of Thomas Barthold, Joint 
Committee Staff Economist). Since a capital gains tax cut generally spurs a one-time surge 
in realizations of capital gains that otherwise would be realized in future years, a "time 
series" approach appears preferable as a matter of theory. Professor Zodrow critiques both 
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1978 through 1985 coincided with the above-mentioned stock and 
real estate booms. 2118 Capital gains cut proponents have also 
pointed to the contrast between the post-1986 drop off in capital 
gains realizations and that of the early 1980's, as evidence of the 
blocking effect of high capital gains rates. 2119 Rep. Glenn Poshard, 
D-Ill., objected to comparing 1985 and 1992 because they repre-
sented the peak and trough of an economic cycle. 260 Economists 
prefer to measure from peak to peak, or from trough to trough, in 
order to achieve an accurate representation. 261 Furthermore, the 
huge surge in realizations in 1987, which were taken to avoid the 
coming increase in the maximum individual capital gains rate 
(from 20% to 28%), reduced realizations that would otherwise 
have occurred in later years. 262 
The Treasury and Joint Committee Staff, when estimating reve-
nue effects of a capital gains cut, do take into account the behav-
ioral effects or additional realizations induced by such a cut. 268 For 
example, for President George Bush's 1990 proposed 30% exclu-
sion, the Joint Committee estimated that induced realizations 
methods, concluding that the conflicts in studies, as well as more recent studies separating 
permanent and temporary changes (lower than most for the former and higher than most 
for the latter), "should give pause to those who propose cuts in capital gains tax rates on the 
grounds that they are likely to result in long-term revenue increases." Zodrow, supra note 
37, at 452-54, 461; CBO, Historical Evidence of Capital Gains Cut Revenues, supra note 231, 
at 6 (stating that cross section analysis has many more observations, i.e., returns, but does 
not separate tax rate changes from other factors and does not separate permanent and tran-
sitory effects of rate changes). 
... During the 1980s, both public stock and real estate values increased greatly during the 
speculative boom. Fisher, supra note 148, at 44; Sylvia Nasar, Even Among the Well-Off, the 
Richest Get Richer, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1992, at Dl. 
••• Prepared Statement of Mark Bloomfield, President of American Council for Capital 
Formation before the Senate Finance Committee February 15, 1995, available in 95 Tax 
Notes Today 32-37 (February 16, 1995); Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra 
note 34 (statement of Mark Bloomfield) . 
... House Small Business Hearing, January 26, 1995, supra note 42 (statement of Rep. 
Glenn Poshard, D-Ill.). 
••• Martin Tolchin, Republicans Say Poor Gained Under Reagan, N.Y. Times, July 7, 
1989, at B4 (relying on Dr. Isabel Sawhill, Urban Institute). 
••• Methodology 1990, supra note 155, at 28 n.27; Gravelle, Limits to Feedback Effects, 
supra note 48; Prepared Statement of Jane Gravelle, supra note 102. 
••• Ways & Means Hearing, January 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of Ass't Sec'ty 
Leslie Samuels). Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex., is reported to have thought that the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation used a static methodology, while Treasury used a dynamic methodology. 
Barbara Kirchheimer, Archer Wants Mini-reconciliation for Contract's Taxes, Spending, 95 
Tax Notes Today 3-2 (January 5, 1995). Both use microeconomic assumptions (induced re-
alizations); neither use macroeconomic assumptions. 
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would offset 78% of the loss.264 (The chief difference in the Joint 
Committee and Treasury estimations for the Bush proposals was 
in the rate of elasticity, defined as the percentage change in real-
.izations divided by the percentage change in tax rates.) Induced 
realizations under the Republican Contract's proposed 50% exclu-
sion are estimated to lower the "static" loss in the five-year budget 
window by 60%.2611 The catch is that the Joint Committee believes 
that after an initial surge in realizations (50% of the baseline dur-
ing the initial five-year budget window266), most taxpayers will set-
tle into a permanent level of lower realizations, although at a rate 
still higher than would be expected in the absence of a rate reduc-
tion. 267 But the proposed generic capital gains rate cut would still 
lose revenue over the five-year budget window and beyond.268 Iron-
ically, while the Republican Bush Administration tried to enact a 
capital gains cut resisted by a Democratic Congress, now a Repub-
lican Congress is pushing a cut equally resisted by the Democratic 
Clinton Administration. These actions, coupled with the hope of a 
capital gains cut in the near future, have been dampening realiza-
tions. 269 Some opponents of an increased capital gains preference 
believe that Joint Committee on Taxation estimates are assuming 
too high a rate of induced realizations, with the result that revenue 
losses for a 50% generic exclusion may be twice as high as the 
Committee estimates. 270 
Capital gains proponents have argued that both the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation and the Congressional Budget Office have his-
torically erred in calculating capital gains revenues. 271 Opponents 
184 Methodology 1990, supra note 155, at 10 (noting that $78.4 billion was generated from 
induced realizations, compared with a $100.2 billion static loss from 1990 to 1995); CBO, 
Budget Estimates, supra note 251. 
••• Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Jane 
Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy CRS). 
188 Methodology in Revenue Estimating 1995, supra note 43 . 
••• ld. 
••• See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text. 
••• Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry 
Aaron); Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. Mel 
Hancock, R-Mo.). 
••• Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Jane 
Gravelle, Director Senior Specialist in Economic Policy CRS). 
171 House Small Business Hearing, January 26, 1995, supra note 42 (statements of Dr. 
John Goodman, CEO National Center for Policy Analysis, and Sydney Hoff-Hay); 138 Cong. 
Rec. S3809 (daily ed. March 11, 1992) (remarks of Sen. William Roth, R-Del.) ("The CBO 
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of dynamic scoring, on the other hand, argue that CBO estimates 
of revenue gains from new tax provisions have tended to err on the 
high side, so that increasing the estimates for feedback effects 
would likely aggravate this tendency and worsen the deficit. 272 
Other opponents argued that the Joint Committee estimations 
were high because they did not take sufficiently into account the 
effect of temporary surges on the permanent level of realizations. 
The consequences of this defect were that overestimation of in-
duced realizations would considerably understate revenue losses. 278 
As has been the case for almost two decades, many capital gains 
cut proponents have maintained that macroeconomic or feedback 
effects under dynamic scoring would generate revenue gains rather 
than losses. 274 Treasury does not take into account macroeconomic 
feedback effects or induced growth in the economy because "there 
is not a consensus among the economists about what the effects 
will be with respect to any proposal, including the reaction of the 
Federal Reserve Bank to various proposals that would potentially 
have an effect on the economy."2711 Similarly, the Joint Committee 
does not take into account macroeconomic or feedback effects, as-
suming instead that tax law changes will have no overall effect on 
economic aggregates such as gross domestic product.276 The Joint 
Committee has noted that, if growth in productivity were to result 
and Joint Tax Committee's estimate of capital gains was off by over 100 percent."). Senator 
Bob Kasten, R-Wis, a capital gains proponent, attacked the Joint Committee on Taxation 
figures as flawed (both CBO and the Joint Committee used the same economic models), 
because they were "static." 136 Cong. Rec. S13882-83 (daily ed. September 28, 1990; id. at 
S14160 (pointing out four large mistakes in estimation from 1978 to 1990). In fact, these 
estimates are not static; they take account of microeconomic, but not macroeconomic 
changes. 
••• Senate Finance Hearing, February 16, 1995, supra note 80 (statement of Professor 
Alan Auerbach). As a matter of logic, it is not so clear that this undercuts dynamic scoring. 
One could argue that the tax increases fell short because they failed to take account of the 
negative impact on the economy, just as tax cut estimates fail to take account of the positive 
impact upon the economy. 
178 Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36; Ways & Means Hearing, 
January 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Dr. Jane Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Eco-
nomic Policy CRS) (stating that revenue losses might be triple JCT estimates). 
n• Ways & Means, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Dr. Allen Sinai). 
170 Ways & Means Hearing, January 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement. of Ass't Sec'ty 
Leslie Samuels); Ways & Means Hearing, January 11, 1995, supra note 54 (s_tatement of Dr. 
Barry Bosworth, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution) ("[E]ven among academics 
there is a wide disagreement on exactly how big these incentive effects will be."). 
178 Methodology in Revenue Estimating 1995, supra note 43. 
74 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 15:1 
from changes in the capital stock due to a capital gains tax cut, "it 
would occur slowly at first, with most of the effects outside the 
five-year budget window."277 While changes in entrepreneurship 
would be more likely to occur within this budget window, "[s]uch 
activity had been a very small factor in previous market responses 
to changes in the taxation of income from capital."278 
Many economists testifying in 1990 found surprisingly little ef-
fect one way or the other from elimination of the capital gains 
preference in the 1986 Code.279 Their findings cut against the argu-
ment of capital gains proponents that a generic capital gains cut 
would stimulate the economy.280 Most economists and some mem-
bers of Congress believe that it would be more effective to reduce 
the deficit and hence serve to decrease the long-term interest 
rate.281 As in the past, some pointed to the minuscule role of ven-
ture capital investments in the context of total capital assets. 282 
Note that the 1978 capital gains cut, which timed-series studies 
show to have lost revenue, was justified in part on dynamic-feed-
back forecasts predicting that it would raise revenue. 283 
117 Id. 
178 Id.; Ways & Means Hearing, January 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Dr. 
Michael Boskin) (believing that capital gains cut will increase supply of entrepreneurs, but 
"it is the thing economists have the most difficulty quantifying"). 
••• 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 65, at 166 (testimony of Dr. Henry 
Aaron). Professor Alan Auerbach pointed out the minuscule role of venture capital, etc. in 
the context of total capital gains realizations. ld. at 166. See also id. at 247, 254 (statements 
of Sen. Bill Bradley, D-N.J., and Rep. Richard Gephardt, D-Mo.). Cf. id. at 26 (debate 
between Reps. Bill Archer, R-Tex. and Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., over complexity). 
180 Supra note 274 and accompanying text; Ways & Means Hearing, January 25, 1995, 
supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Ken Calvert, R-Cal.). 
181 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 65, at 248 (statement of Sen. Bill Brad-
ley, D-N.J.); Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of former 
Commissioner Sheldon Cohen); Ways & Means Hearings, January 25, 1995, supra note 33 
(statement of Dr. Jane Gravelle). 
181 Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry 
Aaron); 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 65, at 166 (statement of Dr. Alan 
Auerbach). 
••• In 1978, the Senate Finance Committee believed that the combined level of direct and 
indirect capital gains taxes contributed to a slower rate of economic growth with fewer real-
izations and a shortage of investment funds. This was an oblique reference to the intense 
debate on use of "feedback effects" in revenue estimates. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 75, at 179 and 197 (statement of Sec'ty Michael Blumenthal); id. at 211 (statement of 
Chair Russell Long, D-La); id. at 452 (statement of former Treasury Secretary Henry 
Fowler); id. at 495 (statement of Samuel Cohn, Committee for Capital Formation through 
Dividend Reinvestment); id. at 688 and 697 (statement of Martin Feldstein, National Bu-
reau of Research and Economics, Harvard University). 
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While initially there appeared a move among the writers of the 
Republican Contract to force dynamic scoring,284 it appears now 
that scoring by Joint Committee (and Treasury), albeit more open, 
will continue to take into account microeconomic effects while ig-
noring macroeconomic effects. 2811 The major barrier to a 
macroeconomic look was the lack of consensus as to its effects. In 
the words of Former Finance Chair Bob Packwood: "at some stage, 
[the overall revenue effect] is almost Greek. I have heard enough 
economists and enough people testify."286 The concern over the ef-
fect of optimistic assumptions on market interest rates (and the 
Federal Reserve) which, if incorrect, would cause an increase in the 
deficit,287 was probably the determinative reason for not address-
ing macroeconomic considerations. 
The Ways and Means Report states that reduction in the capital 
gains tax should improve the efficiency of the capital markets; all 
economists agreed that a capital gains cut would reduce "lock-in" 
and increase realizations. The Report concludes that such unlock-
ing would permit monies to flow to new, more highly valued uses, 
thus improving the efficiency of the capital market.288 For more 
than fifty years, capital gains cut proponents have claimed that 
unblocking would permit capital to flow from sales of public stock 
to new companies.289 That case has never been made. Despite 
claims of capital gains cuts proponents that the CW ATRA 50% 
generic capital gains cut "would free up capital for small business 
.... Barbara Kirchheimer, "Contract" Hearing Foreshadows Partisan Debate on Esti-
mates, 95 Tax Notes Today 4-1 (January 6,.1995). 
••• Chair Bob Packwood, R-Ore., has indicated that the CBO and JCT are not going to 
change to macroeconomic scoring now. John Godfrey, Packwood Embraces Status Quo After 
More Warnings on "Dynamic" Estimates, 66 Tax Notes 638 (January 30, 1995); Ways & 
Means Hearing, January 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Dr. J.D. Foster, Tax Founda-
tion) (stating that it is going to take a while to get dynamic scoring). 
••• Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36. 
••• Ways & Means Hearing, January 10, 1995, supra note 16 (statement of Rep. Charles 
Rangel, D-N.Y.); Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of 
Rep. Charles Rangel); John Godfrey, Economists Discourage GOP from Adopting "Dynamic 
Scoring," 66 Tax Notes 303 (January 16, 1995) (quoting Greenspan saying, "[s)hould finan-
cial markets lose confidence in the integrity of our budget scoring procedures, the rise in 
inflation premiums and interest rates could more than offset any statistical difference be-
tween so-called static and more dynamic scoring"). 
188 H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 27, at 35. 
••• See H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1942); House 1942 Hearings, supra 
note 97, vol. 1, at 262-63, and vol. 2, at 1652-55 (colloquy between Ass't Sec'ty Randolph 
Paul and Rep. Frank Crowther, R-N.Y., and Rep. Harold Knutson, R-Minn., respectively). 
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and entrepreneurs, providing the economy with seed corn. . . , "290 
realizations from public stock do not flow to new venture capital or 
to closely held businesses (unless they are from public stock held 
by the entrepreneur herself). 291 As Senator Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., 
father of the section 1202 targeted small business stock preference 
slated for repeal by CW ATRA, stated in the aftermath of the 
House's passage of CW ATRA: "I have never understood what eco-
nomic benefit this country derives when somebody sells General 
Electric and uses the money and buys DuPont stock."292 The Small 
Business Administration also regards a generic capital gains cut as 
"rewarding non-productive speculation in real estate or the stock 
market .... " 293 The facts behind this rhetoric are that most ma-
ture corporations raise outside capital these days through debt, not 
through common stock offerings. 294 Not surprisingly, therefore, less 
••• 141 Cong. Rec. H4211 (daily ed. April 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Phil English, R-Pa.). 
••• See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
••• 141 Cong. Rec. S5297 (daily ed. April 6, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Dale Bumpers, D-
. Ark.); accord 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 70 at 132 (statement of Senator Dale Bump-
ers, D-Ark.) (asking, why give investors in public stock a tax break for something they are 
already doing without any tax break?); 141 Cong. Rec. at H4209 (daily ed. April 5, 1995) 
(remarks of ranking minority member and former Chair Sam Gibbons, D-Fla.) ("They are 
just swapping their equities around between each other .... There is no creation of addi-
tional capital. It is just a game there. So it is bad economic justice, it is bad social justice."); 
Harold Pepperell, "Rush" Exposes the Capital Gains Tax Cut Hoax, 66 Tax Notes 1200 
(February 20, 1995). These "speculation" criticisms do not apply to original issue stock. 
From 1984-1990, however, net corporate equity issues were negative (with the bulk due to 
debt-financed acquisitions). Treas. Dep't, Integration of Individual and Corporate Tax Sys-
tems-Taxing Business Income Once 8-9 (January 1992) (hereinafter Integration of Individ-
ual and Corporate Tax). 
••• SBA letter to Rep. Zoe Lofgren, D-Cal., supra note 101. 
... Before 1986, publicly traded corporate debt and common stock were issued in roughly 
equal amounts; in 1987, new corporate debt issues were ten times new stock issues. State-
ment of Professor Calvin Johnson, Three Errors in the "Neutral Cost Recovery System" 
Proposal, for the House Ways and Means Committee Hearing on January 24, 1995 and au-
thorities cited at n. 32 (January 26, 1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 20-39 (January 
31, 1995). The same ratio of ten-to-one debt to equity new issues holds true today. Monthly 
Roundup; Some Improvement, Investment Dealer's Digest 30 (March 20, 1995) (stating that 
February debt offerings raised $38.9 billion, down 51% from a year ago; new equity issues 
raised $4.2 billion, down from $8.8 billion a year ago). Initial public offerings range from 
one-third to one-half of total common stock underwriting. Anita Raghavan, Slack Under-
writing Activity Takes Its Toll on Wall Street, Chicago Sun-Times, April 4, 1995, at 50 
(stating that, according to Securities Data in the first quarter of 1995, initial public offerings 
plunged to $3.8 billion, a 54% drop from a year ago, while total common stock underwriting 
slid 35% to $12.3 billion). Thus, only a small fraction of new offerings of debt and stock 
consist of common stock of mature companies. 
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than 3% of the action on Wall Street consists of public offerings of 
new common stock.2911 Initial public offerings make up one-third to 
one-half of total new common stock offerings,296 most of which 
probably could qualify under section 1202 as to non-corporate pur-
chasers and thus obtain a preference under current law. To the 
extent this is not so, the remedy is to amend section 1202, not to 
repeal it and replacement it with a wasteful generic capital gains 
preference. 
Economists agreed that capital gains cuts would increase the 
value of existing capital assets, but they could not agree on the 
effect that this increase would have on savings. Proponents of 
course argued that it would lead to increased savings;297 others, 
however, did not believe that a persuasive case had been made in 
the literature.298 In the leveraged buy-out mania, 40% to 59% of 
the proceeds were invested in consumer durables;299 therefore, 
some economists reasoned that a cut in the capital gains rate, 
which would result in an increase in the value of capital assets, 
••• Harold Pepperell, Should Capital Gains Taxes Be Raised?, 62 Tax Notes 379, 380 
(January 17, 1994). 
188 See supra note 294. 
••• Ways & Means Hearing, January 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Dr. Norman 
Ture, Institute for Research of the Economics of Taxation); H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 
27, at 35 ("Testimony by many economists before the Committee generally concluded that 
increasing the after-tax return to saving should increase the saving rate of American house-
holds"). Some of the economists so concluding include purchases of consumer durables in 
savings (which is an economic convention, but not the aim of capital gains cuts proponents). 
Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry Aaron) 
(stating that Dr. Michael Boskin's estimates of savings resulting from capital gains cuts 
includes purchases of consumer durables). 
••• Ways & Means Hearing, January 25, 1995, supra note 33 (colloquy between Dr. Jane 
Gravelle and Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex.). Archer reasoned that when the Government col-
lected a capital gains tax, there was less money to be employed in the market place; Gravelle 
responded that empirical studies did not show that changing tax rates resulted in increased 
aggregate savings. See generally Zodrow, supra note 37, at 469-78; Johnson, Consumption of 
Capital Gains, supra note 51, at 961-63; Prepared Statement of Jane Gravelle, supra note 
102 (discussing conflicting literature on the issue of whether higher returns increase or de-
crease savings rate); Joint Committee on Taxation, Description and Analysis of S. 612 (Sav-
ings and Investment Incentive Act of 1991), 37 (JCS-5-91) (May 15, 1991) (substantial disa-
greement in both theoretical and empirical studies) (hereinater Savings and Investment 
Incentives). The consensus is, however, that to the extent a capital gains cut loses revenue, 
savings will go down due to growth in the deficit and thus dissaving will occur. Ways & 
Means Hearing, January 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of former Commissioner Shel-
don Cohen); Zodrow, supra note 37, at 469; Cunningham and Schenk, supra note 34, at 378-
80. 
188 Johnson, supra note 49, at 962. 
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could lead to more consumption. 800 The benefit of an increased 
savings rate from a tax reduction at the top, claimed by the Rea-
gan Administration in 1981, had not panned out.801 Total net pri-
vate personal saving, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 
declined from the 1960's and 1970's historically high averages of 
4.7% and 5.5%, respectively, to 4.5% for the 1980's, and 3.4% for 
1990 to 1994.802 This decline in savings might be attributable to 
such demographic factors ·as the bulge of baby boomers during 
their consumption/child raising years808 (which could reverse as 
they enter middle age and begin to save for retirement804). There-
cent decline in savings, however, is in savings by the older Ameri-
cans, 8011 which may be attributable to an increase in the availability 
of insurance and Social Security benefits, reducing the necessity 
•oo Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry 
Aaron); accord Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Dr. 
Alan Auerbach). Similarly, with current full production, an individual tax cut would proba-
bly lead to more consumption. Senate Finance Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 8 
(statement of Dr. Alan Auerbach). Capital Gains and Losses 1995, supra note 10, at 17, cites 
a study indicating that taxpayers use accrued gains on personal residences (at least through 
refinancing and home equity loans) to finance increased consumption more often than 
reinvestment. 
••• Staff of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Background and 
Materials on Federal Budget and Tax Policy for Fiscal Year 1991 and Beyond 100 (Comm. 
Print 1990); Eric Toder, Comments on Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 66 Tax 
Notes 2003, 2008 (Table 2) (March 27, 1995) (hereinafter Proposals for Fundamental Tax 
Reform); note 244 supra . 
.., Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, supra note 301 at 2008; Joint Committee on 
Taxation, Description and Analysis of Tax Proposals Relating to Individual Saving Sched-
uled for a Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance 72 (JCS-3-95) (February 8, 
1995), available in 95 Tax Notes Today 27-38 (February 9, 1995) (hereinafter Individual 
Saving 1995) (noting that decline in U.S. savings rate greater than decline in Japan and 
Germany, but comparable to decline in savings rates in France and Italy). 
••• Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. Mac Col-
lins, R-Ga.) (stating that he just went through 15 years of raising children with expenses for 
toys and now tuition); Savings and Investment Incentives, supra note 298, at 59 . 
... Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, supra note 301, at 2008; Individual Saving 
1995, supra note 302, at 72 (cautioning that others note that in the past demographic 
changes have not been successful in predicting changes in savings). Many pin their hopes on 
boomers beginning to reach traditionally peak savings years. Lowell Bryan and Diana Fer-
rel, The Savings Surge, Wall St. J., November 7, 1994, at A14; Susan Scherreik, Goodbye 
Cyclicals, Hello Growth Stocks, Or so the Analysts Say, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1994, at A36. 
••• Congressional Budget Office, Baby Boomers in Retirement 30 (September 1993) (here-
inafter Boomers); Sylvia Nasar, Older Americans Cited in Studies of National Savings 
Slump, N.Y. Times, February 21, 1995, at A1 (noting a decline in savings by those age 55 
and older). 
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for private savings;806 the decline may also perhaps be attributed 
to the flattening of real incomes. 807 Also, the sharp decline in inter-
est rates in 1993 and 1994 may have caused the elderly to dip 
deeper into savings to maintain their standard of living. These de-
mographic factors indicate the CW ATRA savings provisions are 
likely to have little effect on the personal savings rate. 808 The most 
direct way to increase savings is likely to be to reduce the federal 
budget deficit. 809 
The more effective, policy-based solution to revenue losses and 
blocking is either taxation of unrealized appreciation at death, 810 
or taxation of annual accrual of appreciation in public equities. 811 
History discloses that the special interests under whose name a 
capital gains preference is currently sought would bitterly oppose 
either rule. A combination of a traditional Republican "cut-taxes-
to-spur-the-economy" leg and a traditional Democratic "equity" 
leg ran through the 1963 tax proposals of President John F. Ken-
nedy; this combination was no doubt motivated, at least in part, by 
a desire to broaden the support base for tax reform. Kennedy's 
proposed capital gains rate cuts (a 70% capital gains deduction not 
800 Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, supra note 301, at 2008; Individual Savings 
1995, supra note 302, at 72; Nasar, supra note 305. Boomers, supra note 305, at 30, reasons 
that in addition to anticipating relatively generous transfers from public and private pen-
sions, older Americans may have seen capital gains on housing as a substitute for financial 
wealth during the housing boom of the 1970's when borrowing costs (particularly from ear-
lier mortgages) were low. Moreover, they could foresee indexed Social Security benefits, so 
fear of inflation was lessened, and Medicare was seen as lessening the burden of medical 
costs. 
807 Jane Bryant Quinn, Debt's Dangers Again Become Clear, Wash. Post, May 15, 1994, at 
H2. While the high inflation of the late 1970's might be thought to lessen the incentive to 
save in fixed income accounts, the significant drop in savings among older Americans began 
in the mid-1980's, when such inflation years were over. Boomers, supra note 305. 
808 Nasar, supra note 305. 
800 Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, supra note 301, at 2008. 
810 Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Henry 
Aaron); see generally Michael Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized Gains at Death -An Evalua-
tion of the Current Proposals, 59 Va. L. Rev. 830 (1973); Jerome Kurtz and Stanley Surrey, 
Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: the 1969 Treasury Proposals, the Criticisms, and a Rebut-
tal, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1365 (1970); Lawrence Zelanek, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 Vanderbilt 
L. Rev. 361 (1993). 
811 Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Dr. Gravelle, 
CRS); see generally David Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual 
Taxation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111 (1986); see also Henry Ordower, Revisiting Realization: 
Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 1 
(1993). -
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seen since the "sliding-scale" deductions in President Franklin 
Roosevelt's Revenue Act of 1934, with a resulting maximum rate of 
19.5%) ran contrary, however, to the 1950's reformers' consensus 
of raising, not cutting, the capital gains rate.312 Moreover, the ben-
efit of the Democratic quid (an increased capital gains preference) 
was outweighed by the burden of the Republican quo813 (the taxa-
tion of unrealized capital appreciation at death, which would have 
more than paid for the capital gains cuts through increased realiza-
tions814) from the point of view of both wealthy individual taxpay-
ers8111 (a long-time Republican constituency316) and special inter-
111 In 1955, soon to be Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Representa-
tive Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., commenced a series of tax policy hearings with papers submitted 
from invited witnesses who included academics in addition to the public witnesses who ap-
peared in prior tax hearings; these hearings culminated in the well-known 1959 Tax Revi-
sion Compendium and accompanying Panel Discussions. The consensus conclusion of the 
Mills Hearings witnesses as to capital gains was the notion propounded by Harvard Law 
Professor Stanley Surrey; the excessively high nominal individual ordinary income rates 
coupled with the excessively large individual capital gains preference created politically ine-
sistible pressure to expand the categories of capital gains, which continued to be concen-
trated at the top. The consensus solutions in turn were to lower individual ordinary income 
rates, raise capital gains rates, repeal the 1940s and 1950s accretions to capital gains treat-
ment, "recapture" depreciation deductions to correct the Crane character mischaracteriza-
tion, and tax unrealized capital gains at death and upon gifts. Staff of Joint Comm. on the 
Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Sta-
bility: Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy 406-15 
(Comm. Print 1955); 2 Tax Revision Compendium, supra note 110, at 1203-32; see Staff of 
Joint Comm. on Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., The Federal Revenue System: 
Facts and. Problems 16 (Comm. Print 1956) (stating the results of the accretion process). 
818 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 102, at 285 (colloquy between Sen. Paul Douglas, D-
lll., and Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon). 
au The Kennedy Administration believed that the reduction in capital gains rate would 
be "somewhat more than offset by the increased revenue from the change in holding period, 
the taxation of capital gains at death and the changes in definitions. . . . " 1963 House 
Hearings, supra note 110, at 26. The anticipated increase in revenue would have arisen pri-
marily from the elimination of the ability to avoid all capital gains by holding assets until 
death. The resulting increased volume of realizations were to yield approximately $700,000 
per year in additional revenues for a net increase of $100,000 per year. Id. Between one half 
and two thirds of annually accrued capital gains are not realized prior to the owner's death. 
See Gravelle, Limits to Feedback Effects, supra note 48, at 354-65; 1990 Senate Tax Incen-
tives Hearings, supra note 155, at 82 (written statement of Dr. Henry Aaron, Senior Fellow 
at Brookings Institute and University of Maryland Economics Professor). At the time of the 
owner's death, the estate or heirs take a date of death (or alternate valuation date) fair 
market value as their basis in the capital asset, with no income tax being paid on the appre-
ciation in value. I.R.C. § 1014. · 
••• 1963 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 1419 (statement of Keith Funston, represent-
ing the New York Stock Exchange). See also 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 102, at 496 
(statement of Joel Barlow, representing the Chamber of Commerce of the United States). 
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ests, such as farmers, ranchers,817 and, especially, small business 
owners. 818 Thus, the best capital gains reform proposals to that 
date (namely, definitional purification and taxation of unrealized 
appreciation at death) united the interest groups in opposition, 
thereby dooming the Kennedy capital gains proposals. 819 When the 
House rejected the taxation-of-unrealized-appreciation part of the 
package, the Kennedy Administration opposed the enactment of 
the capital gains cut alone. Consequently, the Senate, and then the 
Conference Committee, rejected the flawed House capital gains 
provision containing a quid without the corresponding quo. 820 
Thus, the view that President Kennedy supported a bipartisan 
capital gains cut821 is only half the story. 
••• See supra note 112. 
817 1963 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 1538, 1540-42 (statement of Albert Mitchell 
and Stephen Hart, Esq., National Livestock Tax Committee); id. at 2529-91 (statement of 
Rep. Joseph Montoya, D-N.M.). 
818 1963 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 1327 (statement of Henry Bison, National 
Association of Retail Grocers); id. at 1344 (statement of Donald Alexander, Association of 
Institutional Distributors) (citing 1959 Panel Discussions and stating that the heaviest bur-
den would fall on small and medium sized businesses); id. at 1364 (statement of Samuel 
Foosaner, New Jersey Manufacturer's Association) (stating that the burden is on small busi-
ness, particularly from "goodwill" based upon capitalized earnings); id. at 1412 (statement 
of Keith Funston). 
110 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 102, at 286 (statement of Sen. Paul Douglas, D-Ill.). 
The date of death taxation of unrealized appreciation was the critical isstie. See, e.g., 1963 
House Hearings, supra note 110, at 591 (ranking Minority Ways and Means Member Rep. 
John Byrnes, R-Wis.); id. at 1380 (Rep. Howard Baker, R-Tenn.); id. at 1381 (Reps. Cecil 
King, D-Cal., and Thomas Curtis, R-Mo.). The fact that organized labor favored taxation of 
unrealized appreciation was to no avail. Id. at 1961 (statement of George Meany, AF of L, 
CIO). Mills hinlself was receptive to definitional reforms, but he and other Representatives 
were cool as to taxation at death. 1959 Panel Discussions, supra note 110, at 703-04, 711-13. 
••• In January 1964, in the debate on what was now the Revenue Act of 1964, floor Man-
ager Russell Long, D-La., with his famous "down home" oratory, announced to the Senate 
floor that the vast majority of top bracket individuals used the capital gains preference to 
obtain "surprisingly" low effective rates of income taxation (i.e. 22%). Long successfully 
argued against a capital gains cut uncoupled with some treatment of unrealized capital ap-
preciation at death. The super rich enjoyed a lower effective rate than the merely wealthy, 
or at least well to do. In Long's words the "tax on this capital gains income is low enough 
already. In a long run, capital gains clearly represents an ability to pay taxes .... Because 
this income is bunched, we tax it at lower rates; but is not 25 percent low enough?" 110 
Cong. Rec. 1438 (1964). 
"' Ways & Means Hearing, January 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Rep. Ron 
Wyden, D-Ore.) (stating that it is a myth that Democrats are against and Republicans for 
capital gains cut "even though Jack Kennedy was essentially the first major proponent of 
capital gains tax cut"); Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement 
of Mark Bloomfield). Rep. Bill Archer, R-Tex. quoted President John F. Kennedy's 1963 
82 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 15:1 
E. Competing Developed Countries and Capital Gains 
Some capital gains proponents argue that a capital gains prefer-
ence is necessary because our international competitors tax capital 
gains lightly or not all, the consequence being that the cost of capi-
tal necessary for growth is higher here.322 While it is true that ei-
ther capital gains are exempt or capital assets are indexed in most 
Western European countries, 323 as usual, that is only part of the 
story. Some have broader definitions of business transactions; 
more importantly, many have higher costs of capital, due to mone-
tary policies or an overall tax burden heavier than the combined 
Federal, state and local burden in the United States.324 The con-
sensus of economists as to the competitive tax advantage of these 
other countries is that they tend to rely on consumption tax sys-
tems,3211 which some believe encourages savings and investment. 
criticism of the then existing capital gains rules as "both inequitable and a barrier to eco-
nomic growth," in support of the 1989 Ways and Means "bi-partisan", i.e., conservative 
coalition, approach to capital gains. 135 Cong. Rec. H6276 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989). Rep. 
Tom Downey, D-N.Y. responded that "one of the first political axioms must be that when 
conservative Republicans invoke President Kennedy's name that we had all better beware." 
135 Cong. Rec. H6278 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989) (referring to Senator Lloyd Bentsen's, D-
Tex., "chastisement" of Senator Dan Quayle, R-Ind., in the televised October 5, 1988 Vice-
Presidential Debate.). In 1978, Senator Russell Long, D-La., argued on the Senate Floor 
that: (1) most experts thought that the 70% capital gains cut would increase revenues; and 
(2) "I thought if it was good enough for John F. Kennedy, a great President, it would be 
good enough for Edward Kennedy. I regret to say it does not seem so." 124 Cong. Rec. 35252 
(1978). Senator Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., rejoined that he would accept President Ken-
nedy's "unified package" of a capital gains cut with equitable limitations, including taxation 
of unrealized appreciation at death and complete recapture of depreciation, both of "which 
the chairman of the Finance Committee excluded." I d. 
••• Prepared Statement of Senator Orin Hatch, R-Utah, before Senate Finance Commit-
tee February 15, 1995, available in 95 Tax Notes Today 32-34 (February 16, 1995); Senate 
Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Sen. Don Nickles, R-
Okla.); Ways & Means Hearing, January 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of James Hoak, 
American Business Conference); id. (statement of Robert DeHaven, American Electronic 
Association) (stating that cost of capital was most important). But see Lee, supra note 35, at 
1411 n.66 (noting that some studies indicate capital is not that big a factor in determining 
investment); Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. 
Robert Matsui, D-Cal.). 
018 Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 35, at 41-46; Ways & Means Hearing, January 11, 
1995, supra note 54 (statement of former Commissioner Sheldon Cohen). 
814 Ways & Means Hearing, January 11, 1995, supra note 54 (statement of Dr. Michael 
Boskin); Dodge, supra note 34, at 1140 (stating that given the number of factors leading to 
our international trade problems and our lower overall taxes, a remedy with a tax band-aid 
is not persuasive). 
••• Ways & Means Hearing, January 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Dr. Alan Si-
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This suggests that the solution may be a consumption tax rather 
than a generic cut in the capital gains tax. Moreover, some view 
the capital gains tax as a very small part of the capital structure. 828 
F. Double and Greater Taxation · 
Some capital gains proponents argue that the capital gains tax is 
a tax on retained earnings (which fund a large part of corporate 
investment) and, therefore, the higher the capital gains tax, the 
more difficult it is for management to retain earnings. 827 The ex-
isting capital gains preference, however, equivalent to a 30% exclu-
sion at the top income bracket, encourages investment by high-
bracket individuals in growth or income retaining corporations.828 
In reality, in close corporations, there is often less income taxation 
of corporate earnings on a present value basis than would result 
under direct taxation a single time at the entrepreneur's level. 829 
This is due to splitting the venture's profits between compensation 
to the entrepreneur and retained earnings. The retained earnings 
nai); Senate Finance Hearings, January 24, 1995, supra note 8 (colloquy between Chair Bob 
Packwood, R-Ore., and Dr. J.D. Foster, Tax Foundation). 
818 Prepared Statement of Jane Gravelle, supra note 102: 
This information does not reveal very much about the causes of countries' different 
economic performances, however. First, the capital gains tax is a relatively small part 
of the capital income tax structures even in the United States; many other taxes ap-
ply and a full comparison of tax systems across countries would require some complex 
calculations. Secondly, the evidence does not support the notion that capital gains 
taxes are likely to influence growth rates. Recall that the simulation above suggests 
that the large percentage reductions in capital gains tax rates (over two-thirds) would 
increase output by only about 1/100 of one percent a year in the initial years (and less 
in later years). Thus, our ability to identify any links between capital gains taxes and 
growth rates would be severely constrained even if such a link existed, simply because 
it would be too small. 
••• Senate Finance Hearings, February 15, 1995, supra note 36 (statement of Mark 
Bloomfield); Ways & Means Hearing, January 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Robert 
DeHaven, American Electronics Association); id. (statement of Dr. Norman Ture, President 
of the Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation). In fact, non-fmancial corpora-
tions relied on internal funds (in the form of retained earnings) for 94.1% of their additional 
funds in 1990, with debt largely used to repurchase shares. Integration of Individual and 
Corporate Tax, supra note 292. 
818 Professor Zodrow reasons that a capital gains preference instead tends to encourage 
growth companies (retaining income) with less dividend payout, and consequently less funds 
available for investment by their shareholders in start-ups. Zodrow, supra note 37, at 482. 
••• Lee, Capital Gains Exception to the House's General Utilities Repeal: Further Indiges-
tions from Overly Processed Corn Products, 30 Tax Notes 1375, 1383-84 n.39 (March 31, 
1986). 
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are taxed at a lesser rate due to the interplay of: (1) graduated 
inside rates on the first $75,000 to $100,000 of retained earnings, 
which are lower than the entrepreneur's top marginal rate; and . (2) 
a long-deferred capital gain tax (or no income tax at all if held 
until the entrepreneur's death) on the realization of such earnings 
through a sale of the stock or retirement redemption. 
In public corporations, the lessons from the recent leveraged 
buy-out experience suggest that the market discounts the price of 
public stock (below the asset value) for the corporate level tax.880 
Thus, when a high income individual churns on the market, hold-
ing public stock for just over a year, he or she is not suffering from 
double taxation. His or her short-term investment is, in effect, net 
of the corporate level tax. 
To the extent that double taxation exists with respect to public 
firms, a capital gains exclusion is a very poor remedy. As much as 
40% of the stock in public companies is held by legally, or func-
tionally, tax-exempt shareholders.381 Around half of all capital 
gains realizations are derived from sources other than equities. 882 
Thus, at a maximum, double taxation extends to only 30% of capi-
tal gains realizations; taking account of realizations of close corpo-
rations and public stock held for only a year or so would reduce 
this percentage much more. Moreover, the greater problem is 
double taxation of dividends, for which a capital gains preference 
provides no relief. 888 To the extent double taxation is truly a prob-
lem (it clearly encourages debt over equity financing), integration 
of corporate and sharehoider taxation is the answer, not a capital 
sao The usual LBO premium (excess of tender offer above pre-offer price) ranged from 
30% to 50% (in RJR-Nabisco it was 100%). "It should come as no surprise that removing 
the burden of the 34 percent tax rate from a corporation's income stream can arithmetically 
increase the value of a corporation's capitalization. The substitution of interest charges for 
pre-tax income is the mill in which the grist of takeover premium is ground." 1989 Senate 
LBO Hearings, supra note 39, pt. 1, at 6 (statement of Sec'ty James Brady); see also id. at 
16, 18, 20 (statement of Sec'ty James Brady); Tax Aspects of Acquisitions and Mergers: 
Hearings Before the House Subcomms. on Oversight and on Select Revenue Measures of the 
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 20 (1985) (statement of Sec'ty 
James Brady); Tax Policy Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearings Before the House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 69 (1989) (statement of Subcommittee 
Chairman J.J. Pickle, D-Tex.). 
••• See supra note 39. 
••• Prepared Statement of Dr. Henry Aaron before the Senate Finance Committee Febru-
ary 15, 1995, available in 95 Tax Notes Today 32-36 (February 16, 1995) . 
••• ld. 
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gains preference at the shareholder level. 
The more extreme rhetoric speaks of double or even quintuple 
taxation, an example of this rhetoric being: 
I invest my saved dollar instead of enjoying that instant gratifica-
tion, invest in a public corporation. When they make a profit, it 
gets taxed a second time; dividend distribution, it gets hit a third 
time; I sell my stock, enjoy a capital gain, and it gets hit a fourth 
time; and the ultimate obscenity in our Code, in my estimation, is 
when you have the audacity to die, they come in and bash your 
bereaved spouse and loved ones. 
I personally think we have one of the most reprehensible tax 
codes on the face of this earth that does violence to the values that 
I was brought up to believe in, and one of these involves this ques-
tion of taxing interest, dividends or capital gains at all. 
The fact of the matter is, if you have denied yourself that gratifi-
cation, why can't you put that dollar to work for the rest of that 
dollar's life and let it grow and develop interest and hopefully be in 
a position at some point you can pass it on to a loved one when you 
die.884 
The view that the inside corporate tax is a second level of tax 
apparently rests on the notion that income generated by capital is 
not income, a not.ion discredited in this country for almost sev-
enty-five years.3811 The third and fourth hits are double counting. 
Corporate income is either paid out as a dividend or is retained, in 
which case it may be realized in a stock sale (or may be held until 
death). While the dividend is clearly a second tax on the corporate 
earnings if received by a taxable shareholder, share repurchases 
grew to be 34% of dividends by 1990, peaking at 47% of dividends 
at the end of the leveraged buy-out wave in 1989.888 Moreover, 
sales of stock may not really be equivalent to double taxation as 
outlined above, or, if so, the gain may be sufficiently deferred so 
that the present value of the tax is half or less than half of what a 
tax would have been on the gain as it accrued. The fifth tax, the 
"obscene" estate tax, is often the first shareholder level tax, levied 
884 Ways & Means Hearing, January 24, 1995, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. Philip 
Crane, R-ill.); Ways & Means Hearing, January 25, 1995, supra note 33 (statement of Dr. 
Norman Ture, President Institute for Research of the Economics of Taxation). 
••• See Kornhauser, supra note 107; Walter Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital 
Gains Arguments, 36 Taxes 247, 248 (1957). 
"" Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax, supra note 292, at 11. 
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on the corporate earnings which were retained in stock held until 
death with substantial deferral. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
Some Congressional supporters of the current capital gains pro-
posals might actually believe that the primary beneficiaries of the 
cuts would be the small business folks, farmers, and home owners 
in whose interest they are claiming the need for additional capital 
gains preferences. They are deluded. Small business people and 
farmers together probably account for at best 10% of annual capi-
tal gains realizations; the overwhelming sales of personal resi-
dences are not taxed due to rollovers, the $125,000, age-fifty-five 
exclusion, and a step up in basis at death. (Venture capital is prob-
ably less than 1% of such realizations.) Moreover, for most entre-
preneurs, a capital gains preference is a subsidy rewarding them 
for what they would have done anyway, rather than an incentive to 
do what they otherwise would not have done. Other proponents 
probably realize that the interests that they champion garner only 
a fraction of the benefits (as a reward), but succumb to the influ-
ence of small-business and timber interests because they are vocal 
constituents of that member of Congress as well as local opinion 
leaders who do want the benefits of a capital gain preference. Fol-
lowing the adage of the late Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill, that 
"[a]ll politics is local,"337 they support the preference in order for 
their constituents to obtain their small piece of the overall pie. 
Others really want the preference for their wealthy constituents 
who realize the bulk of capital gains year after year,338 mostly from 
public stock and real estate investments, and they are cloaking 
those interests in the mantle of the small business, farm and 
residence. 
The rationale that on the average capital gains are all inflation-
ary has much more merit; it is true on average. But it is only half 
817 T. O'Neill, Man of the House 26 (1987). 
aaa Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex., represents "one of the half-dozen most affluent [districts] 
in Congress." David Rosenbaum, A Zeal for Tax Cuts Now Has Power, Too, N.Y. Times, 
April 4, 1995, at A1 ("[A]ffluent taxpayers must receive tax breaks because they are mainly 
the ones who invest money and create jobs for others." Accord 141 Cong. Rec. H4213 (daily 
ed. April 5, 1995) (remarks of Chair Bill Archer, R-Tex.) ("[W]e provide fuel for the engine 
that pulls the train of economic growth by cutting capital gains." This is the trickle down 
philosophy.) 
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the truth: at levels of adjusted gross income below $100,000 all 
gains are on average inflationary; at a level of $200,000, only 50% 
are inflationary; and at a level of $500,000 only 30% are inflation-
ary. This pattern renders the 50% exclusion a very poor, regres-
sive, and unfair remedy. The economic losses at the bottom aver-
age out the economic gains at the top. Indexing as proposed is too 
complex and too narrow; above all, indexing has no logical support 
from either the stated small business and timber interest groups, 
or from the perhaps-real interest groups of big hitters churning on 
the stock market or selling improved real estate investments .. 
The proponents' answer to the distribution charges of opponents 
is also a myth: most sales are not once-in-a-lifetime sales bunching 
into one ye'ar gains actually accrued over many years. Although 
some may believe the unreasonable claims that 70% of capital as-
sets are held by taxpayers with no more than $50,000 of AGI, and 
that such taxpayers pay most of the capital gains taxes, they are 
mistaken both as to the facts and as to patterns of wealth in this 
country. The opposite is more true: 70% of the benefits of a capital 
gains preference are realized year after year by the same top 10% 
of families; 50% of the capital gains realizations are enjoyed by the 
top 1% of families, with the bulk of their gains being real and not 
inflationary. It could be no other way, taking into account the 
sources of capital gains realizations (mostly public stock and in-
vestment real estate) and concentration of ownership of such as-
sets at the top. The claim that there is substantial income mobility 
is misleading: much of the apparent upward mobility in income 
reflects the young growing older and becoming part of a two-work-
ing-spouse household or reaching peak earning years; much of the 
downward mobility reflects taxpayers growing older and retiring. 
Similarly, the decline in wages at the middle and bottom over the 
past two decades indicates that the benefits of the capital gains 
cuts of 1978 and 1981 did not trickle down. Nor did the 1978 and 
1981 capital gains cuts increase the individual savings rate; in fact, 
it fell in the period following such cuts. 
The claim that increased realizations due to the proposed rate 
cut will increase efficiency in the economy appears unlikely. Part 
of the gains will be consumed; a large part of the remainder will 
most likely be put into other, already-traded public stock. There-
fore, new money will not go to the corporate issuer, which raises its 
funds by and large through internal generation and debt issuance 
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anyway. 
Whether the proposed preferences would raise revenue is harder 
to predict, since this is an economic question on which economists 
disagree both in theory and in their empirical studies. The consen-
sus is that increased realizations alone will offset most, but not all, 
of the otherwise occurring revenue loss. Clearly, more realizations, 
and hence more revenue, would result either from taxation at 
death of unrealized appreciation (many more realizations would 
occur prior to death), or from annual accrual of unrealized appreci-
ation in public stock. Those who support additional capital gains 
preferences would give them up rather than be faced with income 
taxation at death, as the rejection of President John F. Kennedy's 
proposed package in 1963 by capital gains cut proponents makes 
clear. Their opposition to annual accrual would be even more in-
tense, unless perhaps it was coupled with pass-through corporate 
shareholder integration, which would be the ideal answer to a host 
of current law policy problems. The macroeconomic effect, particu-
larly during the five-year budget window of the CWATRA propos-
als, seems much more problematic. There is no clear consensus as 
to how to estimate such effects. 
The flawed international competitors and double taxation argu-
ments are raised less often these days by members of Congress and 
less frequently by witnesses, compared to other contentions. The 
overall tax burden of most of these competitors is heavier. Double 
taxation in practice does not reach that much of capital gains reali-
zation; integration of the taxation of corporations and their share-
holders is the better answer. 
